JEAN-LUC MARION’S VEIL OF “THE ‘END OF METAPHYSICS’”.
TOWARDS AN INDETERMINATE EXCESS OF SATURATION AND DEFICIENCE IN PHENOMENOLOGY

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Who or what comes to light after the ‘beyond’ of Cartesian, Husserlian or Heideggerian post-intuitus philosophical attempts and receives a new souffle (breath) from otherwise Jean-Luc Marion’s desire to opt conceptually a new context for phenomenological and theological researches? Granted the importance of René Descartes, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, it is, nevertheless, Jean-Luc Marion who has contributed to the question of overcoming of metaphysics’ possibility in order to disqualify a ground of being within a phenomenological reality of love. In the present article the author wishes to introduce an acquaintance of Jean-Luc Marion’s pensée (thinking) in reference to the inevitability of the leap through metaphysics aiming at doing justice to Ukrainian readers by putting Marion’s voice into the nuance of new approaches that have been resulted in recent contemporary French debates.

Key words: self, other, saturated phenomenon, call, giveness, donation, erotic reduction, love.

Preliminary itinerary in philosophy of Jean-Luc Marion

It is well-known in many critical researches that French philosophy after the Second World War was deeply traced by German thinking, mainly by Martin Heidegger and by Edmund Husserl. The French Heidegger and French Husserl were enormously proliferated and evidenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida, and by structuralism where the last one subsequently revolutionized the label of poststructuralism through 1960-70s [77]. The French reading and interpretation represented the language not-to-be-bypassed in order to pursue the dialogue with mentioned above German philosophers who have failed themselves to point out in their phenomenologically ontological backgrounds. That is why the reinterpretation of linguistic, hermeneutic or even iconic turns has been differently highlighted in the works of new generation of contemporary French phenomenologists, namely of Michel Henry, Henri Maldiney, Didier Franck, Françoise Dastur, Éliane Escoubas, Renaud Barbaras, Natalie Depraz, Jocelyn Benoist. Far from an indissoluble rupture of “atheist phenomenology” envisaged by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne, we have the reference to “spiritualist” phenomenology [61, p. 17] entitled otherwise as “le rayonnement d’une spiritualité” [65, p. 12] issued in journal...
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale of 1991 [22; 52; 54]. The circular discussion sketched out by Dominique Janicaud and directed toward the possibility of taking into account the phenomenological method irrelevant to the project of “phenomenologists of religion” revealed a “turn toward the theological” in recent French phenomenology. Whereas Janicaud described “rupture with immanent phenomenality” and its “opening [ouverture] to the invisible, to the Other [Autre], to a pure givenness [donation], or to an ‘archi-revelation’” [61, p. 17] as two traits in recent French phenomenology, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Michel Henry, and Jean-Yves Lacoste now see the phenomenology of voice, of nakedness, and of flesh as founded on a new re-orientation and moment in which the French phenomenology is disclosed. Janicaud tries to delineate the boundary and limits of phenomenology in his discussion with his ‘adversaries’, but by doing so, he demands to “respect in the Husserlian concern for rigour” [61, p. 91] “the essence of intentionality in phenomenal immanence” [61, p. 35; 62, p. 7]. Apart from accepting Marion’s “unconditioned affirmation of the Transcendence” [61, p. 26], Janicaud remains pertinent, as we can see against veering endeavour of Marion’s phenomenology of giveness which modified the language of Husserl’s intention and caused that “phenomenology has been taken hostage by a theology that does not want to say its name” [61, p. 43]. Éric Alliez assumes that “there is perhaps less turn or theological reversal (dé-tournement) of French phenomenology but rather self-comprehension of the returning of immanence to the call of this primordial transcendence which had made phenomenology to access its most accomplished possibility: to name in its pure phenomenality the appearance of the absolute and to identify itself with the absolute subject as principle of any phenomenon. What amounted to make the fold of transcendence in an immanence is that its defect (Lévinas) as its absoluteness of being (Henry) cannot be anything else than l’à-Dieu, which is the gift by and for transcendence starting from the immanent” [38, p. 63-64; 50, p. 605-609]. At this point the methodological quarrels evoking the trust in the ‘second generation of French phenomenologists’ explore the connection between possibility and impossibility of so-called “phenomenology” which “is hospitable to the theological turn, but it will not realize this amicable accord until such day starts, perhaps, from a surprising principle: So much Husserl, so much phenomenological theology” [69, p. 563]. Leaving apart the conceptual dichotomy within French ‘phenomenologically theological turn, let’s concern with general features of Marion’s thinking.

Born in Meudon in 1946, near Paris, Marion followed his intellectual formation at the University of Nanterre, Paris IV (Sorbonne), École Normale Supérieure in the Rue d’Ulm in Paris, obtaining Agrégé de Philosophie and PhD in Philosophy [21, p. 1-39]. Teaching at the University of Poitiers (alma mater of Descartes himself), Paris X – Nanterre, he succeeded Emmanuel Lévinas at the Sorbonne and took over Paul Ricoeur’s chair at the University of Chicago and assured the membership in the Académie Française in 2008, succeeding Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger. During his affiliation with the Paris IV, Marion founded the Centre for Cartesian Studies, participating in prestigious conferences.

1. Cartesian Meditations

Cartesian voice seems to be unable to cease its quavering on the pages of Marion’s texts unlike the voiceless breathing of Derrida’s ‘mortal’ *écriture* [42]. Does Marion’s Descartes or Cartesian Marion play no role in echoes or allusions of linguistic certainty that does not yet fulfill the definitive passage from ‘cogito ergo sum’ to ‘sum ergo cogito’ appropriating himself with ‘ego sum, ego existo’? Situated between the bifurcated abysses of thought and being Marion tends to tantalize with ‘in-middle-ness’ of love which could nourish itself with *thought-less-nees* or with *subject-less-nees* imposed ‘beyond’, ‘after’ ‘philosophie dé-égoisée’ of the subject, as if the naked deafness of metaphysical destiny. Rereading the entire epistemological and metaphysical heritage of Descartes’ grammar, Marion captures us in relation to phenomenological and theological ‘leaps’, presupposing the “infinity and the incomprehensibility of God” (“Third Meditation”), the “ontological argument” (“Fifth Meditation”), indicating explicitly finally God as *causa sui* [21, p. 52]. To the extent that Marion’s Descartes enters into a theological perspective to prove his belonging to metaphysics, Marion utters the Heidegger’s conviction that “metaphysics is onto theology” [58, p. 54], reducing the theological One (*causa sui*) to ontological Being
of beings [58, p. 61]. The resonance of the phrase “metaphysics is theo logical because it is onto logical” [58, p. 60] fits Marion to “establish, on the one hand, that there was a general metaphysics (…), an ontology of the object (“gray ontology”), and, on the other hand, the theory of grounding, special metaphysics in the shape of rational theology in competition with the doctrine of the ego or “rational psychology,” to use Kant’s language (“white theology”) [21, p. 54; 23].

According to Marion, Descartes’ epistemological and metaphysical presupposition is unacceptable from the ethical point of view. The fear of the ego to hospitalize the alter ego hides its solitary character and contains no reference to the otherness of other people. Even the certainty proved by self-esteem does not really allow ego to gain access to himself or to others [9. p.111-117]. How can we reinterpret – according to Marion – the possibility of the separation of the ego in terms of reference to the self? The truth of Descartes’ “I” occurs as appropriating autarchic face of the ego. If the existence of the ego comes from the thought and, therefore, the thought derives from the representation, how, indeed, can we trust this representation which is made by the ego and which does not coincide with the representative ego? [11. p. 254-258]. Michel Henry who examines the self-affection of the ego cogito follows a critique of intentionality. Henry substitutes the formula cogito ergo sum with “at certe videre videor, audire, calescere” [56. p. 102], which refers to self-affection. The Videre, eternally seeing, designates the object to appear whereas videor implies appearance to reveal itself. Henry specifies: “That which appears in the appearance is first and necessarily the appearance itself” [55. p. 17]. This distinction of the cogito allows us to overcome the dualism between seeing and appearing, permitting to move from the ecstatic vision to the self-revelation of life. The key to understand the unintentional aspect of the Cartesian cogito constitutes an unintentional phenomenology of Henry and Marion. Both philosophers try to manifest life and gift in the immanence for primitive self-affection. Self-affection precedes intentionality and prepares the place for incorporation of the other into the ego. In these adjoinings, the ego experiences its inability to access the original “I” in nominative. The nominative form of the subject does not coincide with its dative form (mihi) and cannot constitute itself independently from the exteriority. On the contrary, the genesis of subjectivity comes from the dative. The motive of J.-L. Marion makes possible the comprehension of the subject, which does not derive from the certainty of the existence of the subject, but arises only from its assurance that it holds from outside. This notion reappears in The Erotic Phenomenon. Nevertheless, J.-L. Marion, detaches himself from the self-affection of Henry’s ego, proving that the place of subjectivity is not rooted in the original affectation, but resides in the affection received from others: “before becoming a thinking thing, the ego exists as deceived and persuaded, as a thought thing – res cogitans cogitata. Thus, the first truth, ego sum, ego existo, does not say the first word. It listens to it” [7. p. 31]. Later, in Being Given, J.-L. Marion clarifies the subject of subjectivity in terms of the call and the answer. He shows, in fact, that the affirmation of the non-auto referential self and intersubjective
constitution of the ego permits to liberate ego from solipsism relating him to the “alterological” principle.

2. Phenomenological reflections

Despite all historically previous evidences, neither Descartes, nor Husserl, nor even Heidegger didn’t shatter the autarkic horizon of the subject. The reasons for this failure are – according to Marion – varied: the Cartesian ego remains locked in its solipsism and its pure identity, being unable to decenter itself from its unique center and to put its sum outside of itself. Husserl’s empirical ego was also too fragile to liberate the transcendental I from its timeless dwelling and, consequently, the subject splits into a pure, transcendental I and an empirical “I”. As a result, the appearance of both subjects reduces the horizon of phenomenality and I appears as a mere object. In Reduction and Givenness J.-L. Marion criticizes the author of Being and Time, highlighting in the analytics of Dasein its relationship to the Cartesian ego. Dasein does not rescue ‘I’ from the “I am”. In § 82 of Being and Time, Dasein’s concern remains inseparable from its relation to itself. Thus, “Dasein is the one who calls and, at the same time, the one who is called” [75. p. 30], which allows him to remain the measure of all phenomenality and the giver of meaning to reality.

After the criticism of the Husserlian reduction (“As much to appear, as to be”, “Back to the things themselves”, “The Principle of all the principles”) and the existential reduction of Heidegger (the question of being), Marion elucidates the third reduction “The more reduction, the more givenness” (Autant de réduction, autant de donation) [11, p. 14]. Since the publication of Reduction and Givenness, the third phenomenological reduction has become the reduction of the pure form of the call, which “gives all that can call and be called” [8, p. 205].

The phenomenological trilogy: Reduction and Givenness (1989), Being Given (1997), In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena (2001) confronts the problem of the subject in relation to the the giveness of phenomena. J.-L. Marion concludes that the giveness (donation) qualifies the phenomenon from itself. The main role belongs to the giveness: “The giveness doesn’t provide phenomenology merely with one concept among others, or even with the privileged act by means of which it can become itself; rather, it opens the entire field of phenomenality for it. For nothing appears, except, by giving itself to pure seeing, and therefore the concept of the phenomenon is exactly equal to that of a self-giveness in person. The staging of the phenomenon is played out as the handing over of a gift” [8, p. 27].

Marionnian reasoning necessarily concentrates on the gift of phenomenon which allows to reconsider the principle and the phenomenological method by avoiding all a priori presuppositions. The interpretation of phenomenon, according to Marion, seems to be part of the research by Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas and Henry. It is the phenomenon “which shows itself” freely, without obstacles, unconditionally. What does
“self” mean? The self of the phenomenon reduced to the pure given and excluded so much from the intervention of the subject arises from the privilege of givenness (donation) which “gives itself without limit or presupposition, (…) without conditions” [11, § 8]. The self of the phenomenon in its phenomenality scandalizes the statute of the phenomenology in its claim to constitute the phenomena. Who is the enigmatic self of the phenomenon given to itself? J.-L. Marion does not hesitate to answer: “The origin of the givenness (donation) remains the “self” of the phenomenon, without [other] principle or origin than self”. The gift of self”, “Selbstgebung” certainly indicates that the phenomenon is given in person, (…) it gives of itself and from itself” [11, § 3].

J.-L. Marion alludes to § 7 of Being and Time: “alone (the phenomenon) really appears as oneself, of oneself and from oneself” (“Das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende”) [57, § 7]. Heidegger’s interest focuses on the thing that appears, rather than on the origin of the appearing. He makes a distinction between the manifested phenomenon (Phänomen) of oneself and from oneself, the appearance (Schein) which considers the self inauthentically, the appearance (Erscheinung) which does not appear by oneself but only indirectly [57, § 7]. J.-L. Marion borrows the classification of the phenomenon from Heidegger. It is precisely from the self of the phenomenon that one discovers the delay of one’s gaze concerning the origin of the pure given.

J.-L. Marion does not hesitate to say that the excess of the phenomenon opens a new perspective for and from the phenomenology of the gift and moves away from the metaphysical subject. He emphasizes that “the self of the phenomenon is marked in its determination of event: it comes, occurs and starts from itself and, showing itself, it also shows the self that takes (or withdraws) the initiative to give itself” [11, § 17].

3. Theo-phenomenological ego amans: theology of Charity and phenomenology of Eros

Keeping divergences apart between Derrida’s deconstruction and Marion’s phenomenology on the subject of “the gift”, “desire”, “adonné”, and “givenness”, the question of love is enigmatic and central in Marion’s philosophical treatise. Guided by paradox of love’s nature Marion points out that “love is not spoken, in the end, it is made” (“L’amour ne se dit pas, à la fin, il se fait”) [4, p. 107]. To what extent can we situate Marions’ articulation of love? In the systematic research on the subject of love, Marion calls it as “first gift”, “gift of origin”. Love does not destroy reason but its erotic trace hospitalizes the noetic reason. Marion inscribes the phenomenality of others in the project of the phenomenology of the gift. It is the way of being of others to be situated first and more often under the givenness of the phenomena which is conditioned by the gift of the receptivity of the love of others. The peculiar character of others is hidden in, from and to love, and does not necessarily anchor itself in the reality of the invention of love. Love releases the affectivity of others and the individuation of the self in the inter givenness. In Erotic Phenomenon Marion writes that the erotic phenomenon envisions the lover as an alteration of the ego. In the analysis of the third Marionnian reduction, love
exercises its name – *eros*. In this respect, J.-L. Marion speaks of the conversion of *eros* in *agape* and *agapè* in *eros*. The *logos* of the erotic phenomenon expresses “the unique sense of love, which is recognized by the exercise of reduction and the proof of elsewhere” [13, p. 335-336]. The synthetic impossibility of these two different realities has already been discussed by St. Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite. *Eros*, from Augustine’s perspective “refers to God, he is (already) no longer desire, but charity” [16, § 42] and in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s language, *eros* is the non-idolatrous finite noun of God and the infinite name of man” [74, 709B-709D, § 12, p.106-107]. What we find in Marion’s *Erotic Phenomenon* is a fact that the possibility of love corresponds in fact to the external force which delivers the subject from his auto–reference. J.-L. Marion reveals that the possibility of being loved becomes the condition of the possibility of man, because the being receives its meaning and its name from the beloved.

It is precisely the notion of “flesh” that indicates the entry of the inter–giveness (*entre-donation*) of the lover and the beloved, designating their disproportionate appearance. The immediate proximity between the crossroads of eyes in *Prolégomènes à la charité* and the crossing of the fleshes thus suggest the invisibility, the non-objectivity, the appearance of the look and the flesh in the experience of love. The Marionnian principle “As much reduction, as much giveness” (“*Autant de réduction, autant de donation*”) is enriched by another principle “As much erotic reduction, as much of the inter–giveness” (“*Autant de réduction érotique, autant de l’interdonation*”) [40, p. 506].

The final prologemenon to Marion’s encounter with his critics prampts us to focus on certain arguments and themes to claim. The attempt of the French thinker to overcome the metaphysics and his desire to get rid of the metaphysical restrictions (presence, transcendent subject, objects, the language of being, gaze, idol) by phenomenology of giveness (call, gift, *interloqué*, regard, *adonné*), and theology of revelation (saturated phenomenon), find some objections among John Milbank, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Marlène Zarader, Claude Romano. The privileged status of non-metaphysical theology for being originary as saturated phenomenon before, in, out, after ‘beyond’ of immanence or transcendence is critically reconsidered in the researches of John Caputo, Thomas Carlson, Robyn Horner, Richard Kearny, Bruce Benson, John Manoussakis, Emmanuel Falque. In these divergent interpretations we can’t fail also to take issue with what Marion and Derrida quite often confronted: the gift.

It is clear from the Marion’s conviction that saying “You loved me first” becomes the desire of the loving *ego* to receive the gift of Love to be able to love. The gift given to the lover to love freely reveals his improperness and shows the non-belonging of the self to him. For J.-L. Marion, there is no doubt that God does not determine himself as *causa prima* or the first mover, but as a gift. While Marion obliges the language of responsible indebtedness to give “self” to others, Derrida envisages the possibility of gift “beyond the causal depiction of gift-exchange in terms of economy” [66, p. 75]. In *Giving Time*, Derrida reflects on the two main questions concerning the first motor and
the gift. Derrida writes: “the order of meaning (presence, science, knowledge): Know still what giving wants to say, know how to give, know what you want and want to say when you give, know what you intend to give, know how the gift annuls itself, commit yourself [engage-toi] even if commitment is the destruction of the gift by the gift, give economy its chance. Finally, the overrunning of the circle by the gift, if there is any, does not lead to a simple, ineffable exteriority that would be transcendent and without relation. It is this exteriority that sets the circle going, it is this exteriority that puts the economy in motion. It is this exteriority that engages in the circle and makes it turn. If one must render an account (to science, to reason, to philosophy, to the economy of meaning) of the circle effects in which a gift gets annulled, this account-rendering requires that one take into account that which, while not simply belonging to the circle, engages in it and sets off its motion. What is the gift as the first mover of the circle? And how does it contract itself into a circular contract? And from what place? Since when? From whom?” [41, p. 30-31].

From this text we conclude that the gift is impossible in relation to the circle because of the lack of relation; the gift as the first motor becomes the condition of the possibility and the impossibility of the giveness: what Derrida calls difference [60, p. 144]. This reasoning permits to grasp, according to J.-L. Marion, the difference between the impersonal gift that makes the circle possible and love that implies the personal character.

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ВУАЛЬ “КІНЦЯ МЕТАФІЗИКИ” ЗА ЖАНОМ-ЛЮКОМ МАРИОНОМ. НЕОЗНАЧЕНИЙ НАДЛИШОК ТА НАСИЧЕНІСТЬ У ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГІЇ

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Сучасна французька філософія в Україні переживає концептуальну неповноту через відсутність перекладів філософських творів. Дана стаття є спробою ознайомити українського читача з французькими мислителями феноменологічно-герменевтичного спрямування, які після Мерло-Понті, Левінаса, Рікера, Дерріди по-іншому інтерпретували німецьку традицію Гуссерля та Гайдегера. “Богословський поворот” у французькій феноменології на початку 1990-х років викликає чимало дискусій та, одночасно, зародив ренесанс естетично-мовних штрихів у творах Жана-Лука Маріона, Мішеля Андрі, Жана-Іва Лакості, Жана-Луї Кретьєна. Незважаючи на вагомість Декарта, Гуссерля та Гайдегера, саме Маріон (1946 р.н.)
зробив внесок у постановку питання про подолання метафізики, дискуваліфіковуючи основи буття у межах феноменологічної дійсності любові. Маріонова критика філософії за горизонт Lieblosigkeit (не-любові) розвинулася – на переконання М. Анрі – на основі трьох феноменологічних редукцій, а саме: “Наскільки з’явлення, настільки буття”; “Первісно-даруюча інтуіція, з права, призначена для пізнання” [§24, Гуссерль “Ідеї 1”]; “Назад, до самих речей” та, вкінці, маріонова редукція: “Наскільки редукції, настільки дарування”.

Трансцендентна редукція (Декарт, Кант, Гуссерль) конституючий статус “его”, “суб’єкта”, “свідомості”, як і екзистенційна редукція гайдегерівського буття-там (Dasein), не тільки уточнюють буття з думкою, але автаркічна самість відкриває несумісність “я” у діалогу з іншою іншої особи. Для того, щоб “де-еґо-зуватися” від концептуальних “ідолів” та визволити філософію з “любові до мудrostі” до “бажати бажання(м)”, Маріон створює феноменологію дарування, яка продовжує гайдегерівські теми відносно esgibt (давати) та Ereignis (подія). Надмірний поклик дару, який етимологічно відноситься до данності, а в еротичній редукції Маріонової феноменології трансформує дарування явищ у міждарування тілесностей, реабілітує “я є” у здатність “я кохаю першим”. “Чи я кохаю?”, чи “Мене кохають?” – це два егоїстичних питання, які закладені у певності декартівського суб’єкта. Відмовлячись від симетричної впевненості “egosum” на парадоксальні завірення “egoamo”, Маріон доводить, що саме дійсність кохання “зраджує” доступ до свого походження і відкривається іконічністю обличчя іншого. Для Ж.-Л. Маріона є лише однекохання, одна плоть, останнє “a-dieu”.

**Ключові слова:** сам, інший, насичений феномен, поклик, дарованість, дарування, еротична редукція, любов.