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THE RECEPTION OF SCHOLASTICISM IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: SPECIFICS AND PROSPECTS¹

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The article investigates how the ideas of scholasticism became popular in analytic philosophy. It is argued that interest in drawing analogies between analytic philosophy and scholasticism is largely due to several factors: 1) the presence of common themes (in particular, meaning, intentionality); 2) the expansion of the subject matter of analytic philosophy, as a result of which metaphysical issues become one of its integral components; 3) the processes of scholasticization within analytic philosophy, manifested in the creation of terminological systems with complex and intricate content and unexplained practical usefulness; 4) the application of the method of analysis to the study of religious and ethical issues, especially the teachings of St. Thomas, which is characteristic of analytical Thomism, one of the most promising directions in the development of scholastic research in analytic philosophy, considered in light of L. Wittgenstein's pragmatic approach to religious experience; 5) attempts to comprehend the history of medieval philosophy from the standpoint of analytic philosophy. It is argued that despite the apparent substantive and methodological similarities (attention to the accuracy of definitions, semantic subtleties of terminology, formal and argumentative discourse), the development of analytic philosophy is inspired by progress in the areas of mathematical logic, linguistics, experimental natural science and is therefore based on principles different from those of scholasticism, primarily on the principle of scientific philosophizing. The article is based on the idea that, despite the heuristic

¹ Some of the arguments put forward in this article were first made in the presentation «Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism: Should We Talk About It?» at the *Cafe philosophique Lviv*, which took place on October 24, 2018, at the First Lviv Media Library. They were later revisited in a presentation entitled «Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism» given on May 14, 2019, at a scientific seminar at the Ukrainian Catholic University. In addition, considerations regarding the reception of Thomas Aquinas's ideas in contemporary analytic philosophy were presented in the report «How the Teachings of Thomas Aquinas Became the Subject of Research in Analytic Philosophy» at the International Round Table «Thomas Aquinas and Thomism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow», which was held on December 18, 2025 at the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of the birth of Thomas Aquinas.

potential of concepts such as analytic scholasticism, it inevitably has its own distinct limitations, due to the differences between analytic philosophy and scholasticism at the theoretical and methodological levels.

Keywords: analytic philosophy, scholasticism, analytic scholasticism, metaphysics, analytical Thomism.

Introduction

Attempts to synthesize various philosophical methodologies and schools into a single system have become quite popular. On the one hand, it proves that the division of philosophy into different kinds is artificial, and on the other – it offers broad opportunities for interaction between different schools of philosophical thought. In particular, using the example of analytic philosophy, it can be argued that the projects combining the ideas of analytic philosophy and phenomenology (in the form of analytic phenomenology), analytic philosophy and pragmatism (neopragmatism), analytic philosophy and philosophy of mind (analytic philosophy of mind), etc., have proven successful. It is, however, another matter to integrate the methodology of analytic philosophy and scholasticism. At first glance, any philosophical parallels between them seem dubious. After all, on the one hand, we are dealing with the leading movement of contemporary Western philosophy, on the other – with one of the historical stages in the development of medieval philosophy. However, with the development of the essential core of analytic philosophy, the change in its theoretical and methodological guidelines, many researchers have devoted attention to the correlation between analytic philosophizing and scholasticism. Over the past decades, they have demonstrated the conceptual proximity of Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas' legacy to modern scientific investigations in the fields of analytic metaphysics [Hüntelmann, Hattler (eds.), 2014], identified common theoretical and methodological positions on metaphysics in different historical eras [Novak, Novotny, Sousedik, Svoboda (eds.), 2012], carried out a detailed logical and linguistic analyses of theistic argumentation developed by medieval thinkers such as Anselm of Canterbury, Gaunilo, Thomas Aquinas, as well as by more modern authors including W. James and A. Plantinga [Davis, 1997], and examined a wide range of metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical issues raised by Thomas Aquinas that remain relevant today [Paterson & Pugh (eds.), 2006].

Of course, in addition to the fascination with the study of scholasticism in analytic philosophy, and some authors argue that a scholastic-like approach for explanation of some issues in modern philosophy is inevitable [Levin, 2023], there are also critical considerations regarding the synthesis of scholasticism and analytic philosophy [Schuessler, 2024]. Such criticism fits into the context of previously expressed remarks¹, which will be supplemented and analyzed further. The **purpose** of the study is an attempt to critically analyze the factors that made possible such historico-philosophical analogies between theoretico-methodological legacy of medieval scholastics and contemporary analytic thinkers, and to determine the

¹ See comment in first footnote.

prospects of analytico-scholastic philosophizing. This seems quite achievable, even if we have to resort to the metaphor of Occam's razor to avoid generating entities unnecessarily.

Connotations of the concepts of scholasticism and analytic philosophy

The development of the history of philosophy often appears as a clarification of the meaning of concepts or the creation of new ones. Moreover, very often the analysis occurs post facto, when it is necessary to clarify in a new term the meaning of what has been talked about for a long time. This can be done by both supporters and opponents of a particular philosophical movement being studied.

In the case of analytic philosophy, self-reflection on its essence was initiated quite late – only in the 90's of the twentieth century. The core of analytic philosophy has turned out to be so heterogeneous that it is difficult to offer a single definition. Therefore, it is not surprising that the concept can be determined as «movement», «tradition», «school», «style», «technique», «the way of philosophizing», «format» etc. On the other hand, we can also consider that each of these categories does not fully cover all the manifestations of analytic philosophy, which as a phenomenon of intellectual thought clearly declared itself in the 20th and early 21st centuries. It even gave reason to A. Preston to recognize the concept of analytic philosophy as an illusion [Preston, 2007].

But not all scholars were so radical. Analytic philosophy can be viewed simply as a way of philosophizing. In this case, it will be characterized by a set of features. For example, J. Peijnenburg identified the following: 1) special interest in questions of language and meaning; 2) a partiality for «analysis» in the most literal sense; 3) a clear and light-footed style; 4) aspiring to define precisely the terms; 5) the use of logical symbols and formulas; 6) a high opinion of empirical science; 7) the intention to eschew metaphysical, sociopolitical and religious matters; 8) a decided lack of interest in historical matters [Peijnenburg, 2000, pp. 365–367].

However, it is worth adding that, in addition to the logical-semantic aspect of cognition, analytic philosophy as a methodology of philosophizing also pays special attention to linguo-pragmatic aspects. Interest in pragmatics explains the fact why in contemporary analytic philosophy there has been a transition from the study of language to the conceptualization of consciousness, since it is important to clarify not only all the features of language, but also the nature of what precedes it – the mental.

For their part, when scholars attempt to define the concept of scholasticism, they refer to things that belong to a completely different historical period. However, a more detailed analysis may indicate a certain closeness of approaches in individual definitions of analytic philosophy and scholasticism. For example, following B. Russell, scholasticism can be considered as a school and as a method. Clarifying the essential dimensions of this distinction, he wrote: «As a philosophic school, it has certain definite characteristics. First, it is confined within the limits of what appears to the writer to be orthodoxy... Second, within the limits of orthodoxy, Aristotle, who gradually became more fully known during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, is increasingly accepted as the supreme authority; Plato no longer holds the first place. Third, there is a great belief in «dialectic» and in syllogistic reasoning... Fourth, the question of universals is brought to the fore...» [Russell, 2013, p. 435].

Ultimately, due to the excessive attention to «dialectics» («logic»), the defects of the scholastic method were: «indifference to facts and science, belief in reasoning in matters which only observation can decide, and an undue emphasis on verbal distinctions and subtleties» [Russell, 2013, p. 435].

To compare the analytic philosophy and scholasticism, it is expedient to consider the latter not in the context of the Christian worldview, but taking into account the peculiarities of its methodology of cognition developed by medieval thinkers. In other words, it is important to appreciate the philosophical rather than the theological aspect of scholasticism and to understand it not as a system, but as a method, which was formed on the basis of the teaching of dialectics in the Middle Ages, with its famous appeal to logical evidence, and not mental intuitions, in the process of substantiating philosophical truths. Consequently, the progress of the ideas of scholasticism enabled discussions about the logic (dialectic) of Aristotle as a science of proof. In general, the features of the scholastic methodology that enriched the scientific theorizing of that time were: 1) the application of logic and in general rational arguments in the process of substantiation of theological truths; 2) formalism and meticulous attitude to the various semantic subtleties in definitions that are understandable and interesting only to their authors; 3) the production of excessive terminology, due in large part to attempts to translate Aristotle's treatises into Latin; 4) neglect of natural and historical issues; 5) the practice of argumentative and formal disputes. Based on these theoretical and methodological features, scholasticism can be compared with analytic philosophy.

But we will always have to take into account that scholasticism is primarily a religious philosophy, for which the ontological and theological issues were determined, and in analytic philosophy they don't have the same meaning as epistemological or logical issues. Another thing is that, for the theoretical justification of the Christian dogma scholastics proposed a large number of formal proofs, based on the logic of Aristotle. In addition, they were interested in the problems of the correlation of language and abstract concepts, universals, the meaning of words (for example, the sermonism of Peter Abelard), correlations between words and meanings, as well as the problem of intention (J. D. Scott's terminism), supposition theory, which is devoted to the study of various cases of use of terms (William of Ockham and others). It can be argued that the discussions between nominalists and realists have not disappeared from philosophical discourse – they have simply taken on more sophisticated forms. For example, G. Frege did a lot of effort to defend the principle of realism in mathematical logic and to justify the idea of the real existence of laws and defining concepts of logic that do not create, but reveal. Therefore, abstractions are those entities that inevitably exist in the structure of the theory. Explaining the nature of the objective, G. Frege clarified: «It is in this way that I understand objective to mean what is independent of our sensations, intuitions, and imagination, and of all construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations, but not what is independent of reason...» [Frege, 1994, p. 36].

However, from the standpoint of constructive nominalism, popular in analytic philosophy (N. Goodman, W. V. O. Quine), the assumption of abstractions in mathematics is inappropriate, since it contributes to the emergence of logical and

mathematical paradoxes. On the other hand, nominalism leads to relativism. As summed up by Quine: «...we cannot require theories to be fully interpreted, except in a relative sense, if anything is to count as a theory» [Quine, 1968, p. 202]. Scholastic thought demanded recognition of the truth of transcendent entities, doubts about the existence of which, by definition, contradict the foundations of any religious teaching.

Interest in the history of philosophy as a path to metaphysics

The aforementioned somewhat similar common features of the analytic and scholastic approaches raised the question of whether the experience of the latter could be useful for the development of the former.

Not taking into account the interest in medieval philosophy in the framework of general studies on the history of philosophy, for example, B. Russell in «A History of Western Philosophy» (1945) [see: Russell, 2013] or K. Twardowski in his «Six Lectures on Medieval Philosophy» (1910) [Twardowski, 1910], which served primarily didactic tasks, to begin to reflect on historical and philosophical issues in analytic philosophy relatively recently [see: Sorrell, Rogers (eds.), 2005]. Understanding of historical and philosophical problems from the point of view of analytic philosophy acquired the following features: 1) historical texts perform primarily educational and pedagogical tasks; 2) there is mostly an appeal to certain historical figures, without a systematic historical and philosophical analysis of the problem; 3) commentary style of presentation of a material, which is mostly inherent to continental thinkers, in many cases becomes characteristic of analytic philosophers as soon as they begin to study the historical component of the question. T. Sorrell wrote about one of the drawbacks of this approach:

«Often analytic philosophers are casual in their use of historical figures. For example, there may be a good basis in Plato's texts for associating him with Platonism in mathematics, but no one interested in Platonism in mathematics cares whether what is called "Platonism" fits those texts. In the same way Cartesian dualism is supposed to be discussable even if Descartes is not really an exponent of what most analytic philosophers call "Cartesian dualism". The issues associated with these references to Plato and Descartes can be stated quite impersonally and ahistorically, and it is these issues that matter to analytic philosophers of mathematics and analytic philosophers of mind, not the identities of the books or authors the issues are taken to spring from» [Sorrell, 2005, p. 2].

Traditionally, analytic philosophers did not resort to the analysis of historico-philosophical issues, substantiating the idea of problem-oriented approach, as opposed to descriptive-historical one. In this regard, the analytico-philosophical activity consisted in substantiating a certain thesis and considering counterarguments. However, the study of historical prerequisites for the origins of analytic philosophy opened the opportunity to study historical and philosophical issues. For example, already A. Pap was among the forerunners of analytic philosophy called such persons as G. Leibniz, I. Kant, J. Locke and D. Hume [Pap, 1958, p. 7–86]. M. Dummett believed that the defining figure for the emergence of ideas of analytic philosophy is G. Frege; for P. Simons such figure is B. Bolzano, who in the work «Wissenschaftslehre» laid the foundations of scientific philosophy, built on the

basis of the method of logical analysis [Simons, 1992, p. 1–69]. S. Critchley, investigating the origins of continental and analytic philosophy, considers I. Kant the last common figure for these two philosophical traditions [Critchley 2001, ch. XI]. Of course, one could also look at earlier philosophical systems. It is no coincidence that some analytic philosophers, largely influenced by continental philosophy, decided to compare the features of modern and medieval metaphysics, to compare the views of thinkers of different ages on the same philosophical problems. The basis for this kind of comparativity is the recognition of the fact that the ideas expressed in philosophy are not always determined only by the context of time, sometimes they are interesting in themselves. Therefore, the study of the heritage of medieval philosophers from the standpoint of analytic philosophy was only a matter of time. When studying the concept of substance in analytic metaphysics, Aristotle's reflections may be quite useful for a deeper understanding of the issue. No less interesting is the comparison of views on various logical issues in Aristotle and modern logicians. The idea of intentionality in Duns Scotus can also find its echo in the philosophy of mind. What can we say about the importance of reflections on the philosophical issues of religion, which have become important for analytic philosophy. Discussions on this kind of issue can be found on the pages of the journal «*Studia Neoaristotelica*», which is dedicated to the study of analytic scholasticism.

The study of the historical and philosophical heritage inevitably leads to the need for a correct interpretation of the relationship of analytic philosophy to metaphysics, which was part of many philosophical systems of the past. Over time, metaphysics generally became one of the leading topics of analytic philosophizing, although it was initially defined as absurd in essence, since it had no relation to the empirical. Significant position in this regard was the position of R. Carnap, who emphasized that: «A statement asserts only so much as is verifiable with respect to it. Therefore a sentence can be used only to assert an empirical proposition, if indeed it is used to assert anything at all. If something were to lie, in principle, beyond possible experience, it could be neither said nor thought nor asked» [Carnap, 1959, p. 76]. Metaphysical theorizing was essentially viewed as a continuation of theological and mythological knowledge, replacing ideas about the supernatural with conceptual thinking about the supra-empirical. But under the influence of the development of the methodology of pragmatism and linguistic analysis of language, the status of metaphysics has changed. It could be argued that the linguistic turn in philosophy finally took place only when linguistic analysis became suitable for the study of metaphysical knowledge. After all, this knowledge forms a system based on a number of defining principles that are inherent to all languages. Moreover, the linguistic picture of the world is determined by cognitive processes occurring in the cerebral cortex. Therefore, an analytic philosopher must go beyond the limits of language and comprehend the nature of extra-language and, possibly, metaphysical reality.

However, metaphysics, constructed on the basis of the application of the method of analysis, acquires somewhat different peculiarities in comparison with traditional philosophical systems. For example, P. F. Strawson constructed a system of descriptive metaphysics, opposing its to traditional ones – revisionary

metaphysics. In this regard, he clarified that: «Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure» [Strawson, 1959, p. 9]. Only a linguistic analysis of metaphysical knowledge will enable us to discover the deep structures of the language that form its ontology. In the process of direct perception fixed in our empirical experience, the deep (metaphysical) level is not revealed. The presence of the metaphysical level of knowledge is confirmed by the fact that the language structures reflect the thinking structures that are characteristic for each language. And therefore they can not be based on a simple analysis of the syntactic structures of the language. The latter is not a closed system and has access to single entities of being, which are specific individuals in the space-time.

So, comprehending the essential nature of space-time, causality or substance, analytic philosophers involuntarily find themselves in the realm of metaphysical theorizing. They understand that it is impossible to apply concepts that have an exclusively empirical basis, since the terminology of any theory is much wider. Eliminating metaphysical knowledge would mean a depletion of science, because metaphysics is an integral part of it. But one has yet to prove that metaphysical knowledge has a separate status and, therefore, is a necessary element of the theory. Therefore, it is important to justify the idea of expediency of universals, which to some extent relates to the research of analytic philosophers with the metaphysical searches of scholastics in the Middle Ages.

However, often these searches in analytic philosophy, although intended to clarify incomprehensible things, only further confused them, which is quite similar to the processes that were inherent in medieval scholasticism. A detailed analysis of a certain problem can not only clarify it, but also significantly complicate understanding, indicate the impossibility of finding an unambiguous answer. In order to solve a certain problem in analytic philosophy, each time a new terminology is created. It becomes more subtle and confusing. It is necessary to apply an additional analysis to compare some philosophical theories with others and to find out their common and distinctive features. Recognizing the disadvantages of developing and improving analytic programs, N. Resher summarizes: «The further the program was developed and extended, the less substantiation it provided for the doctrines it was designed to validate. Those traditional issues were not dissolved or resolved but instead reemerged in a more sophisticated, intricate and subtle forms» [Rescher, 1994, p. 39]. It becomes very difficult to understand the senses, which are fixed in philosophical theories studying similar philosophical problems.

Analytic philosophers create speculative theories that offer different, sometimes diametrically opposed, views on certain problems (for example, the nature of mind). It is no coincidence that for representatives of other philosophical trends, problems that arise from the soil of analytic philosophy will generally seem uninteresting and incomprehensible.

All this points to possible scholastic processes in analytic philosophy – the creation of a huge number of terms and concepts which capture barely perceptible shades of meaning, their complexity for further analysis and the lack of significance for various kinds of social and cultural or historical and national practices, in which

partly philosophy finds itself as a sophia knowledge. This opinion is reinforced by the arguments of G.-J. Glock who remarks:

«First and foremost, there is the palpable scholasticism into which a lot of analytic philosophy has descended. This vice manifests itself in, among other things, the focus on a very narrow range of issues and authors in what are regarded as the leading journals, a general disinclination to explain why these issues and authors are worthy of attention, the tendency to treat many fundamental issues as settled once and for all, and a predilection for technicalities irrespective of their usefulness» [Glock, 2009, p. 246].

However, such a general description of the state of affairs is external and does not describe the important processes taking place in analytic philosophy itself. Modern science could just as easily be accused of scholasticism for the complexity of its analysis, but this assessment is hardly objective, given the results it has achieved. Something else is important, analytic philosophy came closer to the ideas of scholasticism precisely when it realized the importance of philosophical analysis of religious and ethical issues. As a result, at a certain point it found new sources of its inspiration. One of them was the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, which were examined using the methods of analytic philosophy¹.

The rise of interest in religious and ethical issues as well as in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas

Investigating the reasons for the emergence of interest in religious issues in analytic philosophy, it can be argued that among them there is the English scholastic tradition and absolute idealism of F. G. Bradley, as well as a certain dissatisfaction with the possibilities of positivism and empiricism. The phenomenon of religion was already investigated by L. Wittgenstein. In the three lectures of 1938 he shared his thoughts about religion [Wittgenstein, 2007, pp. 53–72]. In particular, he drew attention to the incompatibility of religious and nonreligious beliefs and the extent to which religious experience differs from knowledge gained on the basis of reason. By that time, such reflections had little to do with the outlines of analytic philosophy, which considered the religious experience as metaphysical and unreasonable. But, on the other hand, are sufficiently substantiated methodological principles of realism, belief in the presence of other minds, sensually perceived world, and so on. Argumentation such as «here is a hand», the logical possibility of philosophical zombies or anti-zombies often can not withstand criticism and is no less ambiguous, as well as considerations about the ontological foundations of religious world perception.

As is known, Wittgenstein's ideas on religious experience were later developed in analytic philosophy by various scholars, in particular G. E. M. Anscombe called for a return to virtue ethics [Anscombe, 1958], P. T. Geach analyzed the teachings of Thomas Aquinas [Anscombe & Geach, 1961, part 2], and A. Kenny examined in detail the ideas of this medieval thinker about being [Kenny, 2002a] or compared his views on intentionality with those of

¹ It is worth noting that the method of analysis has recently been used to study other religious teachings, for example, patristics [Rojek, 2025].

Wittgenstein [Kenny, 2002b]. Moreover, traditional scholastic argumentation in analytic philosophy was reinforced by ideas of the semantics of possible worlds, as A. Plantinga did, giving a modal version of the ontological proof of God's existence¹. And although arguments like this seem more logically clear than, for example, Thomas Aquinas' five ways to prove the existence of God, they are far from unambiguous, since they appeal only to certain logical systems (S_5) and are not deducible in other systems, do not properly explain the relationship between the logical concepts of possibility and necessity, are based on unproven assumptions and statements containing terms with specific meanings that should not play any role in the process of formal analysis.

In general, the objects of logical criticism in analytic philosophy of religion are the anti-theistic principles of naturalism, supported by evolutionary theory. Such naturalism is primarily methodological. It has no relation to the supernatural, to the essence of religion, therefore it cannot refute it at all. It does not concern faith as a component of the cognitive sphere, thanks to which the knowledge of the immaterial God is possible. This feature seems somewhat paradoxical, which is especially clearly noticeable within analytical Thomism as the leading trend of scholastic philosophizing in analytic philosophy. J. Haldane as one of the theorists of analytic Thomism clarified: «Analytical Thomism is not concerned to appropriate St. Thomas for the advancement of any particular set of doctrines. Equally, it is not a movement of pious exegesis. Instead, it seeks to deploy the methods and ideas of twentieth-century philosophy – of the sort dominant within the English-speaking world – in connection with the broad framework of ideas introduced and developed by Aquinas» [Haldane, 1997, p. 486]. Therefore, within this movement, emphasis is placed on metaphilosophical, metaphysical and methodological issues.

Thomism, as defined in analytic philosophy, differs significantly from its other forms – traditional (R. Garrigou-Lagrange), existential (É. Gilson, J. Maritain), transcendental (J. Maréchal, K. Rahner), or phenomenological (K. Wojtyła). It also differs from Science-Engaged Thomism, which seeks to reconcile Thomistic theology with the findings of science [Kopf, 2024; Leidenhag, 2025].

For representatives of analytic philosophy, Thomism serves as a kind of theoretical framework within which they can develop the methodology of analytic philosophy. So it turns out that analytic philosophers very often disagree with the conclusions of Thomistic teaching, demonstrating its essential omissions and inconsistencies. Their attitude towards Thomas is somewhat reminiscent of his attitude towards scholars like Plato or Aristotle, who were good philosophers but

¹ This argument is as follows: 1. There is a possible world [W] in which maximal greatness is instantiated. 2. Necessarily, a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world. 3. Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection in every world. 4. If W had been actual, then there would have existed a being that was omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect in every possible world. 5. If W had been actual, it would have been impossible that «There is no omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being». 6. It is impossible that «There is no omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being». 7. Necessarily, there is an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being [Plantinga, 1974, p. 111–112].

did not understand how to apply their method and arrive at the discovery and understanding of religious truths. However, the very idea of interpreting Thomism detached from the religious aspect of this movement has led to different approaches to understanding the legacy of this scholastic thinker. These approaches are conventionally defined as the Wittgensteinian Thomism and the Geach-Fregean Thomism [Damonte, 2018, p. 200]. Only the first of these aligns its worldview with the teachings of Aquinas; the latter often tries to develop a logical or epistemological framework more perfect than that of the medieval thinker, to show inaccuracies in his reasoning, to separate his teachings from the religious component, and partly does not take into account the context of medieval scholasticism and culture. The approach to understanding religious experience, as understood by Wittgenstein, seems more promising [Synytsia, 2022]. The fact is that Wittgenstein, in his theoretical reflections, left room for faith and saw in it, quite pragmatically, certain advantages, such as the possibility of achieving peace of mind. He took the truths of faith beyond the limits of language and experience that we can rationally justify. In this, his position is consonant with that of Thomas Aquinas. At the same time, it is worth noting that Thomas Aquinas could also be close to the way of thinking of the analytic philosopher in his reasoning, for example, when he pointed out that when we speak of God being «wise» or «good», then «...nullum istorum nominum proprie dicitur de Deo» / «...none of these names belong to God in their literal sense» [Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, T I, 13]. The meanings of these terms are in many ways reminiscent of Wittgenstein's «family resemblances» [Wittgenstein, 1968, § 67], that is, these terms have not only common but also distinctive features.

From the standpoint of analytical Thomism, issues of ethics also acquire particular importance – it is about the study of universal values characteristic of communities, not only of individuals, understanding the conceptual scheme of morality, the problem of rational justification of ethical problems, the correlation of moral and ethical issues with political, legal and socio-cultural issues, etc. However, it can hardly be said that philosophy will be able to resolve debates on moral and ethical topics and achieve the same clarity at the theoretical and conceptual level as in the case of argumentation in empirical science. This skepticism is expressed by A. MacIntyre when he says: «In the real world the dominant philosophies of the present, analytical or phenomenological, will be as powerless to detect the disorders of moral thought and practice A Disquieting Suggestion as they were impotent before the disorders of science in the imaginary world» [MacIntyre, 2007, p. 2–3]. In the realm of morality, contradictory values and conceptually incommensurate arguments can coexist simultaneously. Despite their opposition, each claims to be the basis for rational analysis that is objective in nature. The essential difference in arguments is due to the difference in historical traditions that determined their origin. All this makes it difficult to reach a mutual understanding between proponents of different values and becomes a cause of permanent discussion. However, the fundamental difference between this discussion and the scholastic one lies in the realization of the impossibility of finding unified rational arguments and, for example, substantiating the idea of a unified Justice, which simply does not exist. Analytic thinkers shifted the emphasis from the theoretico-conceptual discussion

towards a practical-religious one. And then they tried to build a unified methodology of analysis, as C. Taylor did by drawing on the concepts of strong evaluation, moral framework and the hypergood [cf. Taylor, 1989, p. 3–110].

Thus, as we see, analytic philosophizing was extrapolated to the spheres of transcendental-metaphysical and moral-ethical, distinct from the empirical and objectively given. All this provided grounds for speaking of a certain thematic similarity between the analytic tradition and scholasticism, despite their essential differences.

Conclusion

In summary, we can conclude that the interest in scholastic issues increases in the contemporary analytic philosophy. It was caused by changes in ideas about the essential core of analytic philosophy and its history, the study of metaphysics, attempts to apply the method of analysis in the religious sphere, etc. Although there were some common themes characteristic of analytic philosophy and scholasticism (in particular, the analysis of meaning or intentionality), they differed significantly. Ultimately, even the methodological similarity between them – the emphasis on the importance of argumentation, logical proofs, differences in word usage, subtleties of meaning – is superficial. The main difference between them is that since the times of scholasticism, the progress of philosophy has been largely inspired by science. It was under the influence of logic, linguistics, and experimental natural science that analytic philosophy emerged. Its methodology is not limited only to the logic of Aristotle, but enriched with methods of logical analysis (reduction, derivation, demarcation, intension and extension), linguistic analysis (language-game, speech acts, contextual analysis), thought experiment, extrapolation, conceptual analysis, convergence etc. Analytic philosophy is based on the patterns of scientific philosophizing, and therefore its interaction with scholasticism, involves a radical change in the theoretical and methodological program of one of them.

In any case, theoretical constructions such as analytic scholasticism, go beyond the limits of both scholasticism and analytic philosophy. Therefore, at a certain point in the development of philosophy in this direction will be applied restrictive mechanisms such as Occam's razor. However, its application leaves a lot of space for creativity, aimed at justifying and discovering new truths.

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РЕЦЕПЦІЯ ІДЕЙ СХОЛАСТИКИ В АНАЛІТИЧНІЙ ФІЛОСОФІЇ: ОСОБЛИВОСТІ І ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ

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У статті досліджено, як ідеї схоластики стали популярними в аналітичній філософії. З'ясовано, що зацікавлення пошуком аналогій між аналітичною філософією і

схоластиком значною мірою зумовлене такими чинниками: 1) наявністю спільних тем (зокрема, значенням, інтенціональністю); 2) розширенням предметної області аналітичної філософії, в результаті чого її невід'ємною складовою стали метафізичні питання; 3) процесами схоластизації в аналітичній філософії, що проявилися у створенні термінологічних систем зі складним і заплутаним змістом та незрозумілою практичною затребуваністю; 4) застосуванням методу аналізу до вивчення релігійно-етичних питань, особливо вчення Томи Аквінського, що характерно для аналітичного томізму, одного з найперспективніших напрямів розвитку схоластичних досліджень в аналітичній філософії, який розглянуто з урахуванням прагматичного підходу до релігійного досвіду Л. Вітгенштейна; 5) спробами осмислення історії середньовічної філософії з позицій аналітичної філософії. Стверджено, що попри видиму предметну та методологічну схожість (увагу до точності визначень, семантичні тонкощі терміносистем, формально-аргументативний дискурс), розвиток аналітичної філософії інспірований поступом у царинах математичної логіки, лінгвістики, експериментального природознавства, а тому ґрунтований на інших, ніж схоластика, принципах, насамперед наукового філософування. Обґрунтовано думку, що незважаючи на евристичний потенціал таких понять, як аналітична схоластика, вони неминуче мають свої чіткі обмеження, зумовлені відмінностями між аналітичною філософією та схоластиком на теоретичному та методологічному рівнях.

Ключові слова: аналітична філософія, схоластика, аналітична схоластика, метафізика, аналітичний томізм.

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