Epistemological Dimension vs Ontological Argument: J. S. Coleman’s Conception of Micro-To-Macro Transitions In The Critiques

Анотація

The author reconstructs epistemological presuppositions in the critique of J. S. Coleman’s conception of micro-to-macro transitions. The author argues that J. S. Coleman chose ontological argument as a key foundation of his methodology. The lack of interest in epistemological dimension provoked naive line of defense against critics. The article exposes ontological argument as an epistemological construct. The author uses contemporary sociological interpretation of L. Wittgenstein’s works. That interpretation was developed by P. Winch, P. Hutchinson, R. Read, W. Sharrock as an instrument for deconstruction of realistic dualism in social theory. This realistic dualism is a source of naive ontological presupposition in J. S. Coleman’s conception. New epistemological agenda for J. S. Coleman’s conception is needed.