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PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES: INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

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This paper looks at the concept of ‘social and political institution’ and examines the role of institutions in facilitating and structuring participation and inclusion in multi-ethnic and diverse societies. It argues that the institutional context in which different ethnic groups function is one of the key factors that determines the patterns of political participation and encourages either confrontation or compromise. It distinguishes between latent and manifest types of political participation and explains how different institutional models can facilitate or restrict access to different types of participation. The arguments are illustrated with the analysis of several types of electoral systems that can serve as one of the examples of institutional mechanisms of participation and inclusion.

Key words: participation, inclusion, multi-ethnic and diverse societies.

The study of institutions and their role in social life has always been an integral part of social science. Traditionally, however, the theories of institutions are divided into two clusters – ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism. Although there are some differences in the focuses between the two branches of institutionalism, the major principles are shared by both ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalists and the divide is, by and large, time-bound.

The ‘old’ institutionalism includes practically all the key figures in the classical social theory (Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Marx etc.) and views institutions primarily as a means of control that subsumes (or even shapes) individuals and constraints their voluntary actions. Marx’s theory (‘base’ and ‘superstructure’) dealing with the ways collective agencies subordinate individuals can be particularly regarded as an essentially institutionalist concept. However, the most consistent account of institutions as a mechanism of control was produced by T. Parsons [21], who introduced the elaborated theory of ‘the social system’ consisting of institutions that by restricting voluntary actions contribute to the stability of an entire system. The reaction against the domination of theories that tended to minimise the significance of individual choice and emphasised the role of the established structures was the advent of a number of phenomenological, social-psychological and behaviourist theories. These theories (though differing amongst themselves) stressed the role of individuals in the process of social evolution. They defended the role of voluntary choice and individualism and rejected the structural determinism, pointing at the serious limits of approaches advocated by the proponents of the ‘old’ institutionalism. The effect of the ‘individualistic’ theories on the social science was quite noticeable. It helped to divert the attention from the rigid structures that supposedly define what an agent had to

do to the actual actions of this agent. Studies on the role of personal communication in the conflicts can be regarded as examples of the influence of ‘behaviourist’ studies on the studies of inter-group relation [5].

However, critics of ‘behaviourism’ [15] pointed that any human action has also its limits and these limits often depend on the available organisational resources (or ‘technologies’ in March and Olsen’s terms), a fact that many ‘behaviourists’ failed to acknowledge. On the other hand, as Goodin pointed out, behaviourism in social and political science “builds more economic models of human action: upon notions of instrumentally rational, goal-seeking behaviour” [7, p. 14], which was reflected in the rational choice or game theories. Rational choice theories themselves have tended recently to emphasise the importance of norms, institutions and organisational structures¹.

A gradual apprehension of the fact that personal choices and preferences cannot be understood without reference to the institutional context, in which they are made, has resulted in the re-emergence of the mainstream theories stressing the importance of institutions. The arrival of this ‘new’ institutionalism owes a great deal to the work of D. North (a Noble Prize winner), who (though being primarily concerned with the economic institutions and their contribution to the maximisation of the effectiveness of economic interaction) made a vital contribution to the resurgence of the interest in institutions among social scientists and to a better understanding of the nature of institutions. He defined institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction... they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic” [18, p. 3] and this definition practically summarizes the generally agreed contemporary understanding of institutions.

On the whole, the focus of the ‘new’ institutionalism was on how institutions “alter individual preferences and possibilities” [7, p. 7], or how institutions can control the actions and choices of people. Thus, the differences between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ institutionalisms are not as fundamental as it may seem and the ‘new’ institutionalism (similarly to the ‘behaviourist’ theories) has been to a large extent a reaction on the dominance of overindividualised theories. There are several branches within the ‘new’ institutionalism. One of the most influential ones (best represented by [6]) very much follows the tradition of the ‘old’ institutionalism studying the various ways in which institutions control and dominate individuals, social groups or other social agents – ‘structuration’ theory [6]. Another group of social scientists argues that individual actions are ‘embedded’ in the institutional context and are primarily shaped by this context [8]. An example of how the latter theory has been employed is the acclaimed study by Putnam [22], who argues that the development of a civil society in Italy has been a consequence

¹ Some researchers [1, 7, 17], for instance, analysing the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma pointed that in case the game is played over and over several times, the cooperative action is becoming clearly preferable and (unlike one-shot play) defection ceases to be a dominant strategy. This example points how cooperative norms (with consecutive conventions or institutions) can emerge even within the most individualistic theories of human interaction.

of the existence of a particular institutional network. Another important point that helped understand the functioning of institutions better was made by C. Offe, who has drawn attention to the dual nature of institutions [19]. According to Offe, institutions should both “make sense” and “be fit” [19, p. 201], which means that institutions should not simply be ‘properly’ designed to produce the best utility-maximising effect, but should also be “compatible with the supply of resources they depend upon and [be able to] extract from their environment” [19, p. 200]. On the basis of this point, Offe criticises both the ‘culturalists’ (including the proponents of the ‘embeddedness’ approach) for the focus on explaining institutions solely by the social norms and values these institutions embody and the ‘utilitarianists’ who analyse institutions from the position of efficiency.

Also, although new institutionalism has evolved in a complex subject, which embraces representatives of all areas of social science (who study different kinds of institutions and are interested in different aspects of institutional performance) there are several points that highlight the common vision and consolidate social scientists. Goodin outlined seven such points, which in particular include the following:

1. Individual agents and groups pursue their respective projects in a context that is collectively constrained.
2. Those constraints take the form of institutions – organised patterns of socially constructed norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviours expected of occupants of their roles, which are created and re-created over time.
3. Those constraints embody, preserve, and impart differential power resources with respect to different individuals and groups.
4. Individual and group action, contextually constrained and socially shaped... is the engine that drives social life [7, p. 20].

Institutions as Means of Control of Social and Political Mobilisation

One of the major areas in the study of institutions within social science is the analysis of how political mechanisms can affect political mobilisation. The area, emerging from the studies of ‘the new social movements’ (feminists, ‘green movements’, minority movements, etc.), has been especially concerned with the role of the ‘political process’ in shaping the organisation of resources for a political mobilisation and the channels of control/management of such a mobilisation [16, 24]. The main point of these studies states that the grievances or injustice alone are insufficient to result in large-scale collective actions, but the availability of resource and opportunity structures is a necessary prerequisite of any political mobilisation². The scale and dimension of a political opportunity and a groups’ capability to accumulate necessary resources is greatly dependent on the political mechanisms functioning within a state.

² See in particular the Tarrow’s five points [24, p. 85] that can facilitate collective action.

The means of institutional control over the political mobilisation is directly relevant to the studies of management of inter-group relations in diverse societies and, thus, has been of great interest to scholars dealing with interaction of ethnic groups. In fact, institutions as a mechanism setting stable and recurring patterns of social behaviour have been seen as a vital element of successful and sustainable conflict prevention strategies. The framework capable of ensuring the stability and consistency of the peaceful (non-violent) interaction between social groups and of providing the rules for the dialogue in case any disputes emerge may well be regarded as an effective conflict prevention tool. Not surprisingly that the debate over the usage of political means in managing interethnic relations in divided or conflict-prone societies has been particularly prominent in the literature on ethnic conflict prevention.

The idea to design a mechanism that would adequately control the inter-group relations in multiethnic polities stems from the observations of a destructive capacity of nationalist driven political movements³ during the Second World War (as well as of many other cases where ethnic minorities were politically persecuted or expelled). However, the intention to produce an all-encompassing theory of political accommodation has resulted in a general flaw – the majority of theories are essentially ‘utilitarian’ trying to design the most effective institutions that can be installed virtually in every polarised/divided society to generate roughly the same outcomes. In reality, however, some mechanism may fit in a particular social environment and produce expected results, while others may, using Offe’s words, be unable to extract the necessary resources from this environment to perform their functions in an effective manner.

A. Lijphard [13, 14] and his followers devised a concept called ‘the consociational democracy’, which envisages a broad and extensive range of powersharing provisions in the plural societies. This concept, which was initially developed on the basis of the Dutch pillar-based system, has also been used to explain the political system in Austria, Switzerland, Lebanon and elsewhere. Broadly speaking the ‘consociational’ mechanisms include the (1) government by a ‘grand coalition’, (2) an electoral system based on proportional representation, (3) a mutual veto system (every segment of the government can veto the decision), and often even (4) federative arrangements.

A number of limitations to the ‘consociational’ theory were quite evident and it was by no means evident that a mechanism serving to accommodate religious differences in the Netherlands could be equally adequate in societies that are characterised by ethnic diversity. Nevertheless, ‘consociationalism’ became very influential both as a theory and a practical policy advice. Criticism of the consociationalism led the proponents of the concept to alter some of the points. Lijphard himself outlined a list of conditions favourable to ‘consociationalism’ [14]. Also, one of the Lijphard’s followers, P. van den Berghe [25],

³ This capacity has seriously influenced a number of researchers studying nationalism to produce rather negative accounts of the phenomenon. For examples, see [9, 12].

reasserting the argument that the consociationalism is a highly appropriate system for multiethnic societies, stated that not all societies could be equally responsive to the effect of 'consociational arrangements'.

At the same time, 'consociationalism' was criticised as ineffective in preventing conflicts and as a model that can hardly be called 'democracy'. Critics like B. Barry [2] and P. Brass [4] cited a number of cases where the consociational arrangements did not work or where a political accommodation was successful without any resort to 'consociationalism'. Criticising 'consociationalism' for its lack of effectiveness and its tendency in some circumstances to encourage rather than discourage ethnic conflicts, Lijphard's opponents (particularly P. Brass) argued that instead of providing a framework for a guaranteed group representation, the political system should encourage inter-ethnic co-operation and aim to generate intra-group cleavages. One possible way to achieve this task could be to adopt majoritarian models, which would avert deeper political segmentation exclusively along ethnic lines. The origins of this approach derive from Bentley's theory of the cross-cutting cleavages [3, p. 208]. Bentley contended that participation in the same functional group would likely decrease the tension between ethnic communities.

There were also some attempts to devise an integrated approach that would manage to avoid the shortcomings of consociationalism, retaining at the same time the advantages of the Lijphard's models. The most notable of those attempts is the work by Horowitz [10] who suggested a set of constitutional solutions, each of which is appropriate for a particular conflict situation. The set contains both elements of consociational and majoritarian models as well as some other mechanisms. To the date, the Horowitz's model is, perhaps, the most flexible and adaptive among the available mechanisms. Nevertheless, it also (like the Lijphard's 'consociationalism') sometimes tends to be rather prescriptive, which limits the scope of applicability.

Manifest and Latent Participation in Political Systems

The structure of political participation (organisationally expressed through parties, alliances and other institutions) often reflects the main political or/and cultural cleavages that exist in a society and it would be logical to assume that ethnic separation should also affect the political structure of a society. Indeed in many societies political alignments occur almost exclusively along ethnic lines. However, existing cleavages constitute only a part of the environment in which political organisations develop and function. Constitutional systems defining the principles of political participation and setting up the channels through which social groups convey their political/economic aspirations also play an important role in shaping the forms political representation takes. Whether a political structure is a reflection of existing ethnic lines or there is a room for overarching pan-ethnic political organizations depends heavily on the particulars of political systems. Each system organises the participation through channels regulating access to decision-making institutions and forming incentives and impediments for political manoeuvring.

Analysing multiethnic societies, it is important to differentiate between different types of political participation, which can be subdivided into two clusters – *manifest* and *latent* types.

An ethnic group can be represented by a political party specifically formed to protect the rights of this group and to lobby for this group's interests. Membership in such an ethnic party is usually restricted to members of the group it aspires to represent and it does not try to appeal to outsiders. The party's programme is focused on defending specific interests of the group. An ethnic party effectively becomes an interest group primarily concerned with narrow sectarian interests. Such a party is a typical example of a *manifest* mode of political participation. This type of participation aims to maximise the political importance of the group and to make the existence of the group clearly visible in the political structure of a society. Manifest participation also requires the political organisation representing the ethnic group to articulate the key political objectives of this group. The manifest forms of political participation are exceptionally transparent, which is instrumental for monitoring whether a group is discriminated against or lacks sufficient access to decision-making and resourceallocating mechanisms. In a society, where ethnic cleavages are deep and inter-group relations are tense, manifest participation performs several important functions helping secure representation and politically mobilise ethnic groups. Manifest participation includes not only political organisations representing specific ethnic groups, but also various institutional arrangements designed to guarantee representation of all groups or to provide a venue for an inter-ethnic communication. Devising strategies to solve ethnic conflicts often involves a construction of mechanisms that will enable a manifest participation.

However, a particular ethnic group (especially an ethnic minority) may lack organisations that can be clearly associated with this group. Also, many political systems do not contain institutions purposely designed to mediate between different ethnic groups. Such situations, though, do not necessarily mean that an ethnic minority is infringed and underrepresented. In some cases, this may point at the availability of alternative channels of political participation, which do not require from politicians to manifest the belonging to an ethnic group. For example, members of one ethnic group may hold position in the governing institutions and representational bodies (parliaments, local councils etc.) without being members of an ethnic party. Instead they may join a non-ethnic party or remain politically impartial, but in all cases their non-ethnic political affiliation does not deny their loyalty to an ethnic group. Such type of participation may be defined as *latent*. Latent participation still allows an ethnic group to gain sufficient representation and to have a say in the important political institutions. At the time, it allows to conceal an ethnic affiliation, which is often a strong irritant capable of precipitating ethnic tension.

The major benefit of the latent participation is that while providing mechanisms of ethnic accommodation, it does not necessitate substantial alterations to the political system. Instead, existing institutions are used to channel the interests of ethnic groups. This means that the ethnic integration and accommodation can also become latent processes, happening

without communities actually being fully conscious of it. If one tries to solve an ethnic conflict by means of manifest participation, the interests of an ethnic minority usually prevail and a majority is often expected to make some concessions. Effectively disregarding the (possibly justified and legitimate) views of a majority, such a solution may result in a growing dissatisfaction among the members of a majority group, who are likely to feel they have surrendered some of their fundamental values. Latent participation allows to avoid such a situation and to take into account interests of both minority and majority.

In other cases, where relations between ethnic groups may be quite tense and mutually hostile, ethnic accommodation may be impeded by the lack of strong incentives for politicians representing a majority to openly collaborate with the representatives of an ethnic minority. Public opinion may seriously constrain any attempts to implement an explicitly accommodative arrangement, making those politicians who try to cooperate with members of an ethnic minority unelectable. Hence, for a political leader, every step towards an ethnic co-operation may risk political suicide. For example, negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian leaders are regularly hampered by Israeli public opinion, which does not favour any peace agreement involving large concessions. Latent participation seems to be particularly instrumental in solving this dilemma. Mechanisms of latent participation make it possible to integrate a minority politically without irritating the public opinion. Latent participation is likely to precipitate gradual changes in the attitudes, making people to accustom steadily to the integration of the minorities into the mainstream politics.

Latent participation provides a viable alternative to the ethno-centric politics, allowing politicians to build political coalitions not only around ethnic concerns, but to establish alliances based on much more diverse interests. Latent participation even encourages politicians to look for new grounds for co-operation. More importantly, as far as the ethnic mobilisation is concerned, the latent mechanisms help disperse organisational resources of ethnic groups, minimising the very chances of such a mobilisation. Ethnic parties lose the monopoly to speak for an ethnic group they claim to represent as well as the monopoly to control the access of group's members to the key state institutions.

Thus, latent participation serves several important functions in managing inter-ethnic relations in plural societies. In particular, it:

- (1) Helps institutionalise the political integration of ethnic minorities.
- (2) Moderates a political discourse by encouraging ethnic co-operation.
- (3) Precipitates gradual changes in the identity compositions of all ethnic groups a society consists of, cherishing more tolerant views of 'others'.
- (4) Reduces potential political damage for politicians co-operating with the representatives of ethnic minorities.
- (5) Disperses organisational resources of ethnic groups making ethnic mobilisation far more difficult to organise and sustain.

At the same time, latent participation lacks a mechanism to ensure that a group is represented. This function is undoubtedly better performed by the manifest means of participation. Nevertheless, to compare two types of participation with each other in order to find out which one is the most adequate solution for multiethnic societies is hardly appropriate. Different societies can benefit from different types of participation depending on particular circumstances of each specific case. Moreover, the availability of a particular type of channels of participation does not necessarily mean that an ethnic group is going to use this channel. For example, in some diverse societies, mutual hostilities may prevent any types of co-operation and, institutions establishing latent participation are likely to remain unused. Latent participation may take place only if there is a willingness on the part of a majority elite to co-operate with the ethnic minority. Latent participation itself cannot possibly generate such willingness. It only provides channels that make inter-ethnic cooperation technically easier and minimise the potentially damaging effects of such a co-operation. Therefore, those designing institutions to structure ethnic participation in politics must always look at the 'institutional fitness'. In other words, there is a little sense in trying to apply ready-made institutions that have worked elsewhere or ones which should work in theory. Rather it makes sense to determine whether these institutions will fit the environment in which they are to operate, taking into account whether the environment contains sufficient incentives to encourage the political elites to use the available channels. Therefore, institution-building in divided societies is more likely to contribute to conflict mitigation if it is accompanied by the structuring of incentives to use the mechanisms offered by these institutions.

An ideal system should have a capability to sustain both types of participation, as each performs functions that may be vital for the stability of a multiethnic society. However, it is worth stressing that the possession of such a capability is not a prerequisite. Conditional on the circumstances, a society can be stable and ethnic groups may co-exist peacefully even if a system is clearly skewed towards one particular type of participation. Moreover, in some societies it can be expedient to focus on one of the types, creating a system that would be biased towards providing more channels for either latent or manifest participation.

Nevertheless, a political system which has both types of participation (or the ability to generate a missing one when needed) is more flexible and better able to adjust to the changing circumstances. For example, an antagonistic society clearly divided along ethnic lines may benefit from the arrangements facilitating the manifest participation as they guarantee secured representation, provide mechanisms for promoting specific ethnic interests and also make it easier for people to monitor the distribution of power and resources. However, after a while, one of the groups may become internally fragmented with some subgroups developing interests different from those of the mainstream ethnic parties. The position of these groups will be difficult to express through the manifest channels (monopolised by the established ethnic parties), thus suppressing and marginalising them. To avoid this system should provide some alternative channels these groups can use to secure access to political participation.

The importance of having both manifest and latent channels of participation is also paramount for the societies consisting of groups, which differ in terms of identity composition. While one group may well be homogeneous and possess a clear and coherent identity and, therefore, find manifest channels perfectly adequate for its political expressions, other groups may be structured in a way not allowing them to enjoy the benefits of the manifest channels. An internal fragmentation or a weak identity of any of the groups can make it very risky to rely entirely on manifest participation in divided societies.

Thus, any political system (regardless of what range or which types of mechanisms it offers) may be either conducive or detrimental for ethnic conflict prevention depending on the circumstances it has to function in. Each system can effectively function over a long period of time. However, creating a channel only for one type of participation makes the situation more contingent on conditions and reduces the functionality of the system. Such a system is likely to be characterised by increased rigidity and inability to adjust to the changing conditions. Therefore, the ability to embrace both types of participation or to be capable of opening channels for any of the types at any time improves the performance of a system making it multifunctional and able to respond effectively to different kinds of ethnic conflict.

Discussing the potential for an ethnic mobilisation, it has to be concluded that latent mechanisms are more likely to contain such a mobilisation. Instead of encouraging ethnic consolidation and establishing a uniform channel of access to political institutions, latent participation diversifies the ways in which an ethnic group may seek to express its interests and grievances. By doing this, the latent mechanisms help activate internal cleavages, disperse organisational resources and develop crosscommunal links. As a result, a system using latent channels hampers any attempt to orchestrate a unanimous collective action by an ethnic group, making such an action very difficult to organise.

The Institutional Models for Diverse Societies

Analysing different constitutional models (mentioned above) in terms of the types of participation, it is easy to see that each of the main systems tends to favour one specific mode and may or may not allow another mode to exist and function alongside. Consociationalism is a rather exclusive system organised to provide extensive range of manifest modes, however its ability to generate (if necessary) latent channels is minimal. The features of consociationalism that were discussed earlier make participation largely confined to groups, which are represented by political organisations. These limited opportunities leave very little room for manoeuvre, hence, forcing political organisations to try to monopolise ethnic loyalties and prevent the emergence of potentially competitive organisations. On the other hand, a pure majoritarian model is designed to be instrumental in providing a multiplicity of latent channels, but is rather problematic as an effective means to ensure a group's representation. Although, there are mechanisms a group can utilise to express itself as a collective unit, these mechanisms are not straightforward and may result in a false perception of a group's exclusion.

Therefore, a system to be successful in maximising chances for a long-term conflict settlement should either be capable of offering both modes at ones, or be able to generate new channels when they are needed. Both options require a system to be reflective, which means that the mechanisms of representation should accommodate any type of participation emerging as a response to the changing social and political environment. Technically, however, such a system is hard to built. Nevertheless, there are several models that manage to effectively combine the elements of both extremes (pure consociational and majoritarian models). One of the possible solutions was offered by Horowitz [10, 11] and was briefly outlined above. This system aims to boost intra-group competition and to stimulate inter-group co-operation. The practical arrangements suggested by Horowitz [10, p. 592 - 600] to achieve this task are of two types. On the one hand, an administrative devolution and a territorial autonomy are intended to increase the number of organisational units representing one ethnic group and force these units to compete for a limited number of seats. On the other hand, it is proposed to create electoral inducements for alliances through a proportional system. Here Horowitz draws on a widely held belief (see for example Taagepera and Shugart [23]) that PR allows more parties to secure representation, thus making a coalition government almost a necessary prerequisite of stability within a state. However, both elements of Horowitz's suggestions have their drawbacks - autonomies may raise secessionist demands and they may not be a suitable solution since (as in the case of Hungarians in Transylvania) even compactly settled ethnic groups may still constitute a minority in a given locality. On the other hand, although PR normally entails some coalition agreements, there is no guarantee that parties representing different ethnic groups will necessarily form such a coalition. One ethnic group may be in a position to compose a government of parties representing only this group. Also, under PR politicians are normally required to indicate to which of the ethnic groups they belong. Thus, it becomes quite challenging to hide an ethnic affiliation, which makes a latent channel of participation more difficult to create. Nevertheless, in some circumstances this model (or some of its elements) may be a feasible solution and play an important role in preventing ethnic conflicts.

Other possible models include representational mechanisms based on the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and a mixed two-ballot electoral systems. STV is a very complex system and due to its technical complexity it is not used as often as it deserves. However, the potential of the STV to offer a wide range of channels for participation and the ability to adjust these channels to changing needs make this system an extremely suitable solution for multiethnic societies (especially in terms of a long-term sustainability). STV establishes opportunities for group representation and personal competition alike. The parties usually present the lists of candidates they support on the nation-wide level, but they also allocate them between geographical constituencies. So, in fact, every party's nation-wide list is composed of several shorter local lists. This system also allows for independent candidates to run alongside political parties and electoral unions. The voters cast their votes for individual candidates and they can normally support only one candidate. However, the

votes given for candidates count for their parties and are eventually transferred to those whom a party prefers on the nation-wide level. An individual can be directly elected (either as a member of a party or as an independent candidate) in case he/she collects enough votes to surpass the simple quota (calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast in the constituency by the district magnitude⁴). After individual candidates are allocated seats the remainder is distributed between the parties. The number of votes cast for a party is divided by a simple quota to calculate the number of seat this party is entitled to receive. Sometimes, only those parties that managed to surpass the electoral threshold are allowed to take part in the seats' distribution. In some cases, after the elections, the party lists are rearranged and those who received higher number of votes are placed at the top. The seats are distributed separately in every constituency between the parties that surpassed the simple quota. If there are some seats left they are given (usually using the d'Hondt method⁵) to the parties that have either surpassed an electoral threshold or succeeded to gain a certain number of seat in the previous rounds of seats' distribution (for example three seats) on national level. These seats are called compensation seats.

An obvious advantage of the STV system is its great inclusiveness, which allows voters to support both individuals and groups. The participation of political parties ensures the possibility of the representation of ethnic groups and provides a space for collective interests and specific ethnic problems to be channeled to the parliaments, local councils and other elected bodies. On the other hand, the personal participation and the dominant role played by individuals encourage cross-party alliances and help boost co-operation between the members of different ethnic communities. Every party interested in maximising its social base is likely to attempt to recruit people who may bring some extra votes to the party's list. A similar benefit of list PR is not so effective because normally the majority of people is aware only of a handful of politicians on the top and has no option to cast a ballot for a particular individual. For example, a prominent politician from an ethnic minority may decide to leave an ethnic party (for whatever reason), in which case he has two options – either to run as an independent candidate or to join some other (non-ethnic party). Running as a party candidate entails considerable advantages as a person can benefit from the party's financial and organisational support. However, if a person defects from his party under list PR system, he is not very likely to be placed on the top of the list of his new party, which reduces his chances of being elected and makes his contribution

⁴ Number of seat allocated to a constituency.

⁵ Also known as the highest-average method of determining the allocation of seats to political parties after an election. The method was devised by a Belgian, Victor d'Hondt. Under this method, the party winning the most votes in a constituency is awarded the area's first seat, which goes to the candidate at the top of the winning party's list. The total vote of this party is then divided by two, and the amount is then compared with the totals of the other parties. The party with the greatest number of votes at this point receives the next seat to be awarded. Each time a party wins a seat, its total is divided by the number of seats it has won plus one. The process continues until all the seats in a constituency are awarded. The d'Hondt method slightly favours large parties.

to the overall performance of the party less significant (his/her presence in the list is simply more difficult to notice). Under STV, the effect of these shortcomings is minimal – first of all, such a person has a chance of being elected regardless of how far he/she is on the list (obviously provided he/she enjoys reasonable popular support) by gaining enough votes to surpass the simple quota. Secondly, the host party is more certain to benefit, as many people will cast their votes for him/her personally, which will eventually be counted towards the party's overall tally. Therefore, STV seems to be capable of giving rise to the development of horizontal coalitions, based on corporate or regional interests and has fewer mechanisms to reinforce existing inter-group barriers. Analysing the model in terms of the types of participation, it seems evident that both the latent and manifest channels can exist and effectively function alongside each other. A group can seek a representation putting forward an ethnic-based list and trying to capitalise on the ethnic loyalties, but also the members of a group may access vital resources and decision-making structures or be elected in the representative bodies without manifesting their ethnic belonging or even while collaborating actively with the members of other ethnic groups.

Another system, which opens channels for both the manifest and latent participations, is a mixed proportional-majoritarian system. This system has a number of variations, but the common feature is that every voter casts two votes – one for a party and another for an individual. Thus the system tries to combine a list PR component with majoritarian elements. In most cases, people can vote for a party, which presents a nation-wide list but at the same time they vote for an individual, who may or may not be a member of any party. There are differences in the ways votes are translated into seats, but overall there are openings for personal competition alongside group competition. Sometimes the number of seats in the parliament is divided in two parts, one of which is elected on the proportional basis and another one on the majoritarian. In other cases, votes for individuals supported by a party are counted for this party if a candidate fails to be elected. Nevertheless, regardless of the differences, the essence of the system remains the same – a person does not need to stick to a political party to get elected and it is not necessarily damaging to the political prospects of an individual to change his/her political loyalty by defecting from an ethnic party.

Some variations of the PR system can also offer sufficient room for different types of ethnic participation. A system similar to the one functioning in Poland seems to be quite instrumental in moderating ethnic relations. This system retains the PR core – only parties are allowed to participate in elections and seats are allocated only to the parties that surpassed the electoral threshold. However, votes are cast for individual candidates and then are counted towards parties' overall results. Unlike a pure list PR, this system often requires a country to be divided into several constituencies and there may not necessarily be national party lists. The seats are allocated separately in every constituency and there are no compensational or adjustment seats (unlike in STV). This model, thus, creates incentives for the parties to recruit candidates, who are popular locally, which means that members of an ethnic minority are not necessarily confined to the ethnic parties but may

easily find a political refuge in other parties. The opportunities of being elected, however, are often limited compared with STV. In most cases, a party decides who can be elected by ranking candidates in the lists. This certainly limits the range of incentives for people defecting other parties to join another one. However, a party gaining a candidate capable of bringing a large number of votes can offer this candidate some other rewards (like positions in the local or central governments, an access to vital economic or social resources etc.). Overall, this system offers enough room for both latent and manifest participation and should certainly be considered in ethnically divided societies.

The systems outlined above are just a few of the significant models. There are others that can equally successfully embrace the mechanisms to ensure the availability of a maximum possible range of opportunities for political participation. Each particular model may emphasise either manifest or latent channels and, in general, it should be stressed once again that a selection of a representational system is very circumstantial and should always be considered in a particular context. However, while accepting that every system may succeed or fail depending on how the social environment changes, the systems outlined above possess greater flexibility to adjust to changing conditions and are better equipped to deal with the volatile dynamics of ethnic conflicts. These systems, being responsive to the changing realities, are more likely to be effective mechanisms of conflict prevention and more likely to retain the effectiveness over the long period of time. This is mainly due to the ability of those systems to embrace the latent and manifest modes of participation or to generate channels that would activate any mode required by the circumstances. Finally, the important advantage of the models presented in this section is their ability to disperse organisational resources (i.e. to prevent the emergence of strong and well-organised parties that establish a monopoly on the representation of a particular ethnic group) making it more difficult for the ethnic elites to consolidate ethnic groups, which in turn makes a powerful large-scale collective action far less likely.

Conclusion

The recognition, integration and inclusion of minority groups (ethnic, linguistic or migrant-based) in modern world is a serious challenge the importance of which is not contested. However, to make this integration and inclusion viable and to ensure that participation (either political, social or economic) is sustainable and effective, the crucial importance of institutional context should be acknowledged and appropriate institutional models adopted.

This paper explained how institutional context determines the modes of participation and can either facilitate or retard inclusion and integration in different social and political environments. By looking at several selected electoral models it demonstrated how the participation of ethnic groups can be effectively ensured (through either latent or manifest channels) without provoking conflict, mutual discontent or tension.

Concluding, it should be stressed that without a properly purposely-designed institutional model that offers channels of participation and structures the patterns of integration, the

peaceful and conflict-free integration in diverse societies is unlikely. Although this paper, by and large, focused on ethnic groups, the arguments presented are valid for virtually any other minority group (and especially recently-emerged migrant minorities) seeking recognition and inclusion. Building an appropriate system of institutions capable of providing mechanisms of accommodating the inter-group differences is a cornerstone of the construction of democratic inclusive societies where all the people and groups are respected, valued and recognised.

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УЧАСТЬ І ВКЛЮЧЕНІСТЬ У КУЛЬТУРНОБАГАТОМАНІТНИХ СУСПІЛЬСТВАХ: ІНСТИТУЦІЙНИЙ ПІДХІД

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Розкрито концепцію “соціально-політичні інститути”. Вивчено роль цих інститутів у підтримці та структуруванні участі та включеності в багатоетнічних та культурнорізноманітних суспільствах. З’ясовано, що інституційний контекст, у якому функціонують різні етнічні групи, є одним з ключових чинників, що визначають особливості політичної участі, провокують застосування стратегій конфронтації або компромісу. Вирізняють латентні та відкриті типи політичної участі. Пояснено, як різні інституційні моделі можуть сприяти або обмежувати доступ до різних форм участі. Проаналізовано кілька типів виборчої системи, що можуть слугувати прикладами інституційних механізмів участі чи виключення.

Ключові слова: участь, включеність, багатоетнічне та культурно різноманітне суспільство.

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