

**INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCED MIGRATION  
DURING THE WAR: CHALLENGES FOR UKRAINE**

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The scale of migration processes as a result of the war creates a humanitarian challenge that Ukraine has never faced in its modern history. The collection of statistical information from various sources, as well as numerous sociological surveys in general, provide a comprehensive statistical picture and geography of Ukrainians' movements both within the regions of Ukraine and abroad. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as of December 2022, about 5 million people were internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Ukraine. As of the end of November, there are more than 4 million Ukrainian refugees in mainland Europe. Most refugees with temporary protection status are in Poland, followed by Germany and the Czech Republic, Spain, France, Slovakia, Austria, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

The reasons for the return of both IDPs and refugees include the perception of a security situation, reunification with family, difficulties in finding housing or work, temporary return to collect belongings, see family or evacuate loved ones. Reasons for not returning to Ukraine: families with children who will go to school or enter a higher education institution abroad; those who have a higher education, speak foreign languages, had a high level of income and are more mobile; people who planned to leave Ukraine before the start of a full-scale war; those who seasonally or permanently worked abroad; people with disabilities who receive better social and medical care abroad and are less mobile, etc.

Migration challenges for Ukraine are: the continuation of hostilities and martial law in the long term, which will be deepened by socio-economic and demographic consequences; restoration of the full functioning of urban/rural infrastructure; the increase in the level of unemployment and the burden on the state budget regarding the payment of financial assistance to both unemployed and displaced persons; development of both short-term and long-term effective migration social policy regarding the return of the majority of citizens with the adoption of relevant regulatory and legislative documents, etc.

*Key words:* internally displaced persons, refugees, forced internal and external migration processes.

**Statement of the problem.** Since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion, it is estimated that more than 10 million Ukrainians have changed their place of residence. Some of them went abroad, most of them moved to conditionally safe regions in Ukraine. Such scale of displacement creates a humanitarian challenge for Ukraine that it has never faced in its modern history. The war has made forced changes in the life of every Ukrainian, resulting in a new reality in which millions of people in the early days decided to stay at home or go to safer regions of the country or abroad. Each month is characterized by its own trends, each internally displaced person or refugee has its own circumstances, determining needs, and therefore motives and life goals for deciding to return to their homes.

**The purpose of the article** is to find out the scale of internal and external migration processes as a result of the war based on the results of numerous sociological studies and statistical information from various sources. One of the tasks is to find out the origin and location of displaced persons, their immediate needs, perception of security and discrimination by host communities; the duration of stay in the IDP/refugee status and the reasons for their return or non-return to their homes. Also to highlight migration challenges and prospects for Ukraine in general and the preconditions for the return of displaced persons.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has reported that by mid-May 2022, the number of people fleeing war in Ukraine had exceeded 6 million, the most severe refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. According to a recent report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Russian invasion, which began on 24 February, has caused mass displacement, with more than 8 million Ukrainians displaced within the country [8]. Most refugees entered the European Union through border crossings in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, where volunteers and governments have tried to help them find housing and support.

During these three months, forced internal and external migration at home and abroad already shows certain trends: numbers and waves; directions of natural movements; origin and location of war displaced persons; adoption of state legislative decisions; urgent needs and their resolution by host communities; perceptions of security and discrimination; and the decision to return or not to return to the previous place of residence.

I want to share my insights in the context of research on contemporary migration processes, on the one hand as a researcher, as their study is my scientific interest [10, 11], and on the other hand as a volunteer. From the beginning of March 2022, I received both internally displaced persons (IDPs) in my home and in the countryside (Kiev residents lived for 2 months, Kharkiv residents for almost 3 months) and those who were passing through the city of Lviv (as a volunteer I helped more than 30 people, mainly women with children and elderly people). I organised their accommodation at home; searched for temporary or permanent housing/shelter among relatives/friends/

ves/friends/neighbours and various opportunities to go abroad; solved a number of problems related to living conditions, registration of internally displaced persons, relations with the city labour office, district administration, schools and humanitarian aid centres for refugees, etc.

### **The first period of migration was the first month of the war**

The war activities forced a significant part of the population to leave their permanent place of residence: 22% of the Ukrainian population changed their place of residence within Ukraine (in particular: those aged 18-24 and 25-34 – 36% and 34% respectively), 6% were forced to go abroad [15]. According to the estimates by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 5 million Ukrainians crossed international borders in mid-March, with 70,000 children becoming refugees each day. According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), this means that 55 children were fleeing the country every minute, or almost one child every second [16]. An accurate assessment of the distribution of forced migrants outside Ukraine is currently impossible, as they change their plans and country of destination, sometimes not even registering for temporary protection, but exercising their right to stay in EU countries for 90 days without registration.

Another social and humanitarian challenge is internal displacement. For example, according to the estimates by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 6.48 million people became internally displaced in the first month of the war in Ukraine, among whom the share of the most vulnerable groups is significant [1]. Due to the continuation of hostilities, these numbers are not definitive, so the likelihood that IDPs will change their place of residence and seek permanent residence and work increases. This in turn will lead to changes in the labour market structure, which will be another new challenge for the Ukrainian economy.

Think tank Cedos conducted a study [1] of how many people left Ukraine in the first month of hostilities. Thus, according to the data analysed, some 3.6 million people migrated abroad and another 6.5 million, according to the International Organisation for Migration, left their place of permanent residence and moved into the country. Meanwhile, the State Border Guard Service [4] says that by 20 March, the number of queues to leave Ukraine had decreased significantly at the borders with EU countries.

**Internal migration.** According to the estimates made on the basis of a nationwide IOM survey [6], the largest number of people in Ukraine left from its eastern part (2.35 million), the Kiev region and the city itself (almost 2 million) and the north (1.3 million) of the country. Some of the internally displaced people continued to move both within Ukraine and abroad. Approximately half (44%) of Ukraine's population was forced to temporarily separate from their families during the war.

Some people are leaving their homes for a second time. Thus, since 2014, many IDPs have lived in regions and cities currently in the war zone. According to the Ministry of Social Policy [13], in 2021, the largest number of IDPs was in the Donetsk (512,000) and Luhansk (282,000), Kyiv (163,000) and Kharkiv (136,000) regions. Among the

cities with a high percentage of IDPs before the full invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation were: Severodonetsk (44%), Mariupol (20%), Izjum (13%), Bucha (11%), Irpin (9%) and others.

Movements within the country took place in waves depending on the hostilities in a particular region or settlement. According to the estimates from a nationwide IOM survey [6] conducted from 9-16 March 2022, 48% of displaced persons in Ukraine left their place of residence after the start of the war, 45% left when the war reached the areas they inhabited, and 5% left their homes in anticipation of the conflict.

Available evacuation methods include evacuation trains organised by the Ukrainian Railways, personal car transport and evacuation buses from the war zone. From 1 to 20 March, Ukrainian Railways evacuated 2.77 million people [21].

According to IOM estimates, the largest number of people moved to the western macro-region – more than 2.5 million [6]. However, data published by state administrations in the western regions do not agree with these estimates. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that only a fraction of people choose to report their arrival to local authorities: registration is most likely to occur in cases where newcomers are seeking settlement or humanitarian assistance.

According to my observations, the first massive wave of displacement occurred at the beginning of March – every day there were up to a dozen calls from relatives/friends/acquaintances about the possibility of coming and staying in Lviv. The first to arrive were three women from Kharkiv with small children, who, after an exhausting journey of more than a day on the evacuation train, asked for a rest and together decided to cross the border by bus, where – already in Poland – they met up with familiar volunteers and from there travelled to Germany. Then there were the residents of Kharkiv, Kiev, Odessa, refugees from the towns of Irpin and Chernihiv. Someone decided to stay in the relatively safer city of Lviv; all those going abroad – among the refugees I know – had prior agreements or personally sought such opportunities from fellow researchers, allowing them to stay in Poland, Germany, Spain or Italy. There was no case of them going ‘nowhere’. It was a kind of guarantee for them that they would be welcomed there, accommodated and given initial social and humanitarian assistance. Each of them had his or her own experiences relevant to the decision to leave home: someone had rescued young children from the war; someone could not be under constant shelling because there was nowhere to go down during air raids; one would simply have to live in the Kharkiv or Kiev metro. The refugees from Chernigov and Irpin were leaving their homes for the second time, the first being the experience of moving from Luhansk in 2014. There were also those who came from relatively safe cities to travel further abroad. In the first month of the war, Lviv received more than 200,000 refugees from various regions of Ukraine.

*Registration of IDPs.* Some territorial communities started to register IDPs soon after the Russian invasion. The census system established was used by local authorities, in particular to record humanitarian aid (food, personal hygiene products, clothing, footwear) provided to IDPs.

On 13 March, the government introduced changes to the registration and issuance of the IDP registration certificate [18]. As a result, people who have moved from regions where active hostilities have been taking place since 24 February are considered internally displaced persons. Such legally approved regions [19] currently include Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Kiev, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernihiv and the city of Kiev.

On 21 March, the Government of Ukraine, together with the UN, launched two payment programmes for forced migrants in need of additional protection [23]. The first is the IDP support programme, which aims to provide social assistance to displaced persons, compensation to employers for employment and compensation for utilities to individuals and communities who have provided shelter for free. In particular, the state will pay a minimum monthly cash allowance of 2,000 hryvnias to IDPs and 3,000 hryvnias to persons with disabilities and children. The second programme – for forced migrants who need additional protection – allocates UAH 2200 per month for each family member. Money for this will be provided by foreign partners. The UN World Food Programme will deposit these funds into the recipient's bank account within three months.

Therefore, during the first month of the war, a mechanism was proposed for the registration and provision of social assistance to IDPs and compensation to the host party. According to my personal observations, IDPs who applied for temporary shelter in schools, kindergartens and private accommodation had to go through the procedure of such registration at regional government offices or administrative service delivery centres (TsNAP). The middle of March was particularly difficult, as thousands of people needed such registration each day – this created queues, registrations in such queues for the following days; various conflict situations that required the involvement of a significant number of additional social protection department staff. All those who were accepted by Lvivians free of charge into their homes underwent such registration after 13 March 2022, also with a view to receiving the minimum monthly benefit in the future. Lvivians were also able to offset the cost of utilities at 450 hryvnias per person per month if the resettlers were registered at their residential address. Those who rented flats were in most cases not registered as IDPs, as they were able to pay rent and utilities and could not apply for monthly assistance. During registration, IDPs were required to provide bank documents proving the absence of deposit accounts. The presence of such accounts was a reason for denying such financial assistance. As far as UN assistance was concerned, there was also a procedure of signing up in queues several weeks in advance. And it was already possible to register for cash assistance at a certain time of the day.

**External migration.** Most people left Ukraine between 27 February and 9 March. More than 150,000 people left every day. Since 17 March, the number of those leaving has been decreasing, indicating that the first wave of refugees has subsided. According to the data from border crossings, 2,144,244 people crossed the state border in Poland, 555,021 in Romania, 371,104 in Moldova, 324,397 in Hungary and 271,254 across the Russian border (however, these are Russian government figures, which may not be accurate and include people who were deported to its territory); 256,838 persons from Ukraine crossed the border into Slovakia and 4,938 into Belarus (according to the Belarusian authorities, which may be inaccurate and include forcibly displaced persons) [4].

At the same time, according to the information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine [12], Russian invaders have already forcibly deported some 6,000 residents of Mariupol to Russia on 24 March; another 15,000 residents of the city's left-bank district are at risk of deportation. In addition, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reports that Russian troops have forcibly evacuated residents of settlements in the Luhansk region. According to the Mariupol City Council, the deportees were first directed to so-called filter camps, where their documents and phones were checked. Then some people were deported to Russian cities, the fate of others is unknown.

For some migrants, countries bordering Ukraine are transit countries as they make their way to other EU countries, in particular Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, the Baltic States, etc. A relatively small number of Ukrainians also seek refuge outside the EU.

*Registration of Ukrainian refugees.* 4 March 2022. The Council of the EU launched the Temporary Protection Directive [20]. It allows persons who left Ukraine on or after 24 February 2022 to stay in EU countries for one year, renewable up to three years. Persons with this status are granted the right to work, full access to the health, education and social assistance systems.

However, the registration process has only just begun in many countries, the procedure and duration varies from country to country and is still in the process of being established in many places. The registration process for each person (from application to temporary protection) can also take a long time. The reason is that the relevant authorities do not have sufficient resources to receive and process a large number of applications. This is largely influenced by a country's experience in previously receiving refugees, the presence of adequate infrastructure, and developed mechanisms for interaction between authorities [1].

In conclusion, it is important to note that for many fleeing war, the experience of being in another country and dealing with bureaucratic institutions is something new. Therefore, a number of refugees with whom I am still in contact did not register with one authority or another because, at the time, they did not understand how to do so and/or have some reservations about such procedures – for example, that receiving temporary protection would prevent them from returning home after the war.

### **The second migration period is the second and third months of the war**

**Internal migration.** The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) conducted Round III [7] from 11 to 17 April 2022 and Round IV [8] from 29 April to 3 May 2022 of a representative express assessment of Ukraine's population to gather information on internal displacement and mobility flows and to assess local needs. This general population assessment serves as a primary source for identifying areas of high humanitarian need and targeting the response to assist war-affected populations. The estimates are based on population data from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which the humanitarian community considers as a baseline for the population in Ukraine. The study does not take into account those currently outside Ukraine[1].

The results of the survey showed that as of 17 April 2022, 17.5% of the total population are internally displaced persons within Ukraine, or 7.7 million people. This is 568,000 more IDPs (+8%) than on 1 April (Round II) and 1220,000 (+19%) more compared to 16 March (Round I). By macro-region, the west received 2852 million, the centre 1773, the east 1464, Kiev and the north 1233, and the south of Ukraine 231,000 IDPs.

Among current IDPs, willingness to relocate further has increased since 1 April. Among IDPs in the west, 52% of respondents intend to relocate further (in any direction, including return), in the central macro-region 45%, in the north 40%, in the south 30%. In the eastern macro-region, the share of IDPs intending to move further is lower: 17% intend to change their place of residence. Regarding further relocation from their current place of residence, among IDPs only: 44% said "yes", 41% have no intention and 12% said that it would all depend on the situation. 2% do not know and 1% of IDPs cannot say due to the security situation (or because the territory is occupied).

Since 16 March, the share of IDPs considering further relocation has more than doubled compared to the relatively small and stable share of Ukrainians who remain in their current places of residence (they are stable at 3–4% in all rounds). In the first round it was 18% (16 March 2022), in the second 30% (1 April 2022) [6], in the third 42% (17 April 2022) [7], in the fourth 44% (3 May 2022) [8].

*Origin of current war displaced persons.* The data obtained show a difference in the intensity of migration flows at the macro-regional level. Among the 10% increase in the total number of IDPs in Ukraine in Rounds II and III, the largest increase was in the east of the country: the share of IDPs who lived in the east before displacement now accounts for 45% of all IDPs (33% in Round II). The share of IDPs from Kiev in the total number of IDPs has decreased and now represents 19% of all IDPs.

*Residence of war displaced persons.* Despite an overall increase in the number of IDPs across the country, the number of IDPs in Kiev has decreased significantly since the second round (1 April) and remained insignificant compared to other macro-regions. In the southern, western and northern macro-regions, the number of IDPs has also decreased by more than 250,000 people in the total number of IDPs admitted. The number of IDPs in eastern Ukraine increased significantly – by 70% after the second

round of this survey. The number of IDPs in the central macro-region has increased by more than 30% since 1 April [7, 8].

*Needs.* Of all respondents, 33% said they were most in need of financial support. However, among IDP respondents, this need is particularly acute: 45% of IDPs indicated that they needed money the most, followed by medicines (5.9%). In Round IV, IOM assessed the purposes for which respondents needed cash assistance and identified the preferred means of obtaining it. 76.5% of respondents indicated that they would prefer to receive financial support on a bank card, such as a card for pension or social security payments.

*Since 1 April, the perception of safety* has improved significantly in Kiev and the north, while it has remained virtually unchanged in the other regions. People are returning, but 29% of returnees do not feel completely safe and 5% lack a sense of security altogether. The majority of IDPs who feel they remain 'in total danger' are now in the east (8%). Only 8.5% of returnees feel that their current place of residence is completely safe [7].

Regarding *perceptions of discrimination*, 6.5% of IDPs surveyed reported unfair treatment or discrimination against them because they are not members of the community to which they had to move. (This indicator was not assessed in previous rounds). In contrast, 4.2% of respondents who had not been resettled reported negative perceptions of the arrival of new IDPs in their communities. This is 2.6% more than in Round II (1 April). In contrast, 81% have a positive perception of IDPs [8].

*Return situations.* In the III round, IOM [7] provided a first estimate of the number of re-emigrants. The decision to add this indicator to the survey was prompted by field observations of large-scale return movements in Ukraine. For the purposes of this survey, a respondent is considered to be a returnee if, at the time of the interview, he or she reported to be in his or her usual place of residence but had left it since 24 February 2022 due to the war for a period of at least 14 days. Of all respondents who are currently in their usual place of residence, 8.9% indicated in Round IV that they returned after at least two weeks in another region as an IDP. It is too early to infer the nature of these returns, i.e. whether people are returning permanently or temporarily. Among Round III respondents, 15% of re-emigrants (or around 416,000) indicated that they intended to leave home again. A decrease of only 2% compared to Round III indicates that the proportion of returnees continues to increase, although a significant number may have left home again, which offsets the number of returnees who returned but later moved elsewhere again.

36 days is the average length of stay on IDP status among returnees as at 3 May 2022, i.e. within 68 days from the outbreak of war [8]. As I have already mentioned, no conclusions can be drawn at this stage on the nature of such return movements. IOM intends to continue to assess these trends, including through surveys monitoring flows at key transit points.

The vast majority of re-emigrants do not intend to leave their usual place of

The vast majority of re-emigrants do not intend to leave their usual place of residence in the future. It should be noted that the percentage of re-migrants who plan to leave again because of the war is highest in the western macro-region: 28% of re-migrants are considering leaving.

Among IDPs, 14.6% responded that they plan to return to their usual place of residence within the next two weeks. IOM data shows that the majority of IDPs who plan to return home in the next two weeks are from Kiev and the northern macro-region of Ukraine.

Geography of internally displaced persons – 47% of respondents returned to another city/region in their home region, 46% to another region in Ukraine. Only 7% of respondents (approximately 190,000 people) among the re-emigrants indicated that they returned to their usual place of residence from abroad. This indicator does not coincide with the official statistics of border crossings, according to which 1.4 million Ukrainian citizens have entered the territory of Ukraine as of 28 February 2022 (DPSU, UNHCR). However, official statistics, regarding border crossings, do not necessarily reflect the number of returnees. These statistics may also include other types of movement, as well as repeated entries and exits. These flows may be fluctuating, given that the situation remains extremely volatile and unpredictable [8].

The number of returnees increased the most in the north of Ukraine: from 861,000 on 17 April to over 1 million on 3 May. In contrast, the southern macro-region has seen a significant decrease in the number of re-emigrants: from 144,000 in Round III to 95,000 in Round IV. The majority of re-migrants returned to large cities or suburbs (57% in total), 23% moved to small towns or villages and 19% moved to the countryside [7].

My personal observations suggest that a decrease in movements from Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa should be noted in the second period. In general, evacuation trains mainly came from the places of most intense hostilities in the south and east of Ukraine. Therefore, the residents of Kiev and even Kharkiv, where there was still a serious threat, began to return their homes. Panic and fear subsided. Most of the IDPs in Lviv did not react at all to the air alerts, as they pointed out each time how they were suffering from the constant alerts and bombardments, as they already distinguished between aerial bombardment and missile attacks with hailstorms and tornadoes. There was a certain acceptance of the irreversibility of certain processes during the war: someone returned so as not to lose their job in Kiev; someone tidied up their partially destroyed houses and paid their utility bills in Chernigov and returned to Lviv; someone made the final decision to return to Kharkiv because others – acquaintances, relatives – live there and with the conviction that there are safer areas, and will move there to visit friends or relatives if the situation worsens.

External migration. In April 2022, the number of people crossing Ukraine's state border increased sharply compared to the first weeks of full-scale hostilities by Russia in Ukraine. Between 24 February and 20 April, 1 million 100,000 people returned to Ukraine [14]. Most of these people left Ukraine after the Russian invasion had begun.

According to the State Border Service of Ukraine [4], 25-30,000 people return to Ukraine every day. On 16–17 April, the number of entry crossings on the Ukrainian-Polish border exceeded the number of exit crossings for the first time since 24 February [2]. According to the DPSU, at the beginning of the full-scale military invasion, mainly men of conscription age returned, and in the second month of the war – women, children and the elderly.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees interviewed [22] 518 people who were at the border between 3 and 19 April and were planning to enter Ukraine from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova. According to the results of the survey, 84% of the respondents plan to return to the place where they previously lived in Ukraine.

The majority of people who have left their place of permanent residence say they plan to return soon or after the war ends. According to the results of a nationwide survey conducted on 26 April by the sociological group ‘Rating’, almost a quarter of those who have left their place of residence plan to return soon, a third intend to return later. At the same time, 43% are ready to return home after the war ends [3].

*Return/no return to Ukraine.* One of the main reasons for returning to Ukraine will be security. Sedos researchers also point out the following circumstances: family reunification; problems, difficulties (risks) in finding affordable and comfortable housing; difficulties in employment; lack of own financial resources and limitations of social insurance; limitations of the administrative system of the country or in Ukraine; functions of EU policies towards Ukrainian citizens, etc.

According to the results of a survey by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 20% of respondents are returning to Ukraine for a short period of time. Among *the reasons for a short-term return* are the need to collect belongings, take relatives or pets away, check the integrity of housing, see relatives and then go again to a safer place in Ukraine or outside Ukraine. In addition, some people planned to take their relatives, especially children and elderly relatives, to a safe place abroad and return [17].

The longer the hostilities continue and the refugees and displaced persons remain in the communities that received them, the less likely they are to return to Ukraine [5]. For the most part, the following will not return: families with children who will go to school or university abroad; those who had higher education, spoke foreign languages, had high incomes and were more mobile; people who planned to leave Ukraine before the full-scale military operations began; people who worked seasonally or permanently abroad; people with disabilities who receive better social and medical care abroad and are less mobile, etc.

According to my observations, only those who temporarily went abroad from their safe places of residence in the western region were returning to Ukraine, none of the refugees I know from other regions of Ukraine have made such a decision so far. Of course, all the reasons given for return/non-return will vary over time and depend

primarily on the course of the hostilities and the security situation in Ukraine.

### **Conclusions**

*For the first period of wartime migration*, a characteristic feature of internal and external mobility is the decision to leave their permanent place of residence. Displaced persons decided to move to border or safer regions of the country to their relatives, acquaintances or friends or to rent accommodation if they could afford it. Kindergartens, schools, theatres, private rooms, etc. were equipped to be shelters or temporary accommodation for the refugees, which were a kind of transit sites for up to a few days. The decision to cross the border was also influenced by the presence of relatives/friends/acquaintances, who took the lion's share of assistance in welcoming refugees from Ukraine. This period is characterised by the adoption of a state registration mechanism and the provision of social, humanitarian and material assistance to both internally displaced persons in Ukraine and refugees abroad.

As far as the second period of migration during the war is concerned, it is characterised by the continued collection of statistical information from various sources (data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Social Policy, the Ukrainian Railways, the State Border Service, etc.) and the conduct of already numerous social surveys (International Organisation for Migration, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Cedos Analytical Centre, Rating Sociological Group, etc.). Overall, these results give us, on the one hand, a complete statistical picture and geography of movements both internally between Ukrainian regions and abroad. On the other hand, it is important to highlight the origin and location of current war displaced persons, their urgent needs, perceptions of security and discrimination by host communities; the length of stay in IDP/refugee status and the reasons for their return or non-return home.

This period is characterised by internal and external reverse migration movements – returns. It is worth noting a number of challenges related to the return of displaced persons: the security situation at the time in the area of previous residence; damaged or destroyed buildings; the availability of the previous place of work, the possibility of finding a job or registering at a labour office; the lack of a final settlement of the procedure for short-term and long-term return to Ukraine; obtaining legal refugee status and its duration; difficulties in registering identity cards and other documents due to their loss or border crossing, etc.

The migration challenges for Ukraine are: the continuation of hostilities and martial law in the long term, which will exacerbate the socio-economic and demographic consequences; the restoration of fully functioning urban/rural infrastructure; the increase in the level of unemployment and the burden on the state budget in terms of financial assistance payments to both unemployed and displaced persons; the development of both short-term and long-term effective migration policies for the return of the majority of citizens with the adoption of relevant regulatory, legislative documents, etc.

Forced internal and external migration updates the question of the institutional

Forced internal and external migration updates the question of the institutional capacity of the state to prepare and apply comprehensive solutions to problems in this area. Today, in Ukraine, it is necessary to verify the compatibility of the declared migration policy with the actual state of affairs – the capacity of the authorities to adequately respond to the migration challenges and solve a range of life situations of displaced persons, such as housing, employment, psychological, social, information and communication, medical, economic, political, integration, adaptation, etc. problems.

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## **ВНУТРІШНЯ ТА ЗОВНІШНЯ ВИМУШЕНА МІГРАЦІЯ В ЧАСІ ВІЙНИ: ВИКЛИКИ ДЛЯ УКРАЇНИ**

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Масштаби міграційних процесів внаслідок війни формують перед Україною гуманітарний виклик, з яким вона ще не стикалась у сучасній історії. Збір як статистичної інформації з різного роду джерел, так і проведення численних соціологічних досліджень загалом дають цілісну статистичну картину та географію переміщень українців як всередині між регіонами України, так і за кордоном. За результатами Міжнародної організації з міграції (МОМ) станом на грудень 2022 року близько 5 млн осіб були внутрішньо переміщеними особами (ВПО) в межах України. Станом на кінець листопада в материковій Європі перебуває більше 4 млн українських біженців. Найбільше біженців зі статусом тимчасового захисту в Польщі, слідом йдуть Німеччина та Чехія, Іспанія, Франція, Словаччина, Австрія, Велика Британія, Нідерланди та Швейцарія. Серед причин повернення як ВПО, так і біженців можна виокремити сприйняття безпекової ситуації, возз'єднання з родиною, складнощі з пошуком житла або роботи, тимчасове повернення, щоб забрати речі, побачитися з родиною або евакуювати близьких. Не повернуться в Україну: родини з дітьми, які підуть у школу або вступають у заклад вищої освіти за кордоном; ті, хто має вищу освіту, володіє іноземними мовами, мали високий рівень доходу та є більш мобільними; люди, які до початку повномасштабної війни планували виїхати з України; ті, хто сезонно або постійно працювали за кордоном; люди з інвалідністю, які отримують кращу соціальну та медичну допомогу за кордоном і є менш мобільними тощо.

Міграційними викликами для України є: продовження бойових дій та воєнного стану у довгій перспективі, що поглиблюватиметься соціально-економічними та демографічними наслідками; відновлення повноцінного функціонування міської/сільської інфраструктури; зростання рівня безробіття і навантаження на держбюджет щодо виплат матеріальної допомоги як безробітним, так і переміщеним особам; розробка як короткострокової, так і довгострокової ефективної міграційної соціальної політики щодо повернення більшості громадян з прийняттям відповідних нормативно-законодавчих документів тощо.

*Ключові слова:* внутрішньо переміщені особи, біженці, вимушені внутрішні та зовнішні міграційні процеси.

Стаття надійшла до редколегії 07.09.2022

Прийнята до друку 13.11.2022