

## ІСТОРИЧНА ПАМ'ЯТЬ ТА ІСТОРИЧНА ПОЛІТИКА

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### COMPETITIVE OR MULTIDIRECTIONAL? COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF THE HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

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In this article I discuss the question of the place which the Holocaust occupies in the memory politics and popular image of history in the Ukrainian society. In particular, I analyze the perception of the Holocaust in the context of other tragedies of the twentieth century using the concepts of «competitive victimhood (W.Jilge, J.Dietsch, etc.) and «multidirectional memory» (M. Rothberg). The conclusions are based on the results of the representative statistical survey «Region, nation and beyond: interdisciplinary and intercultural reconceptualization of Ukraine» (2013, 2015).

*Keywords:* collective memory, the Holocaust in Ukraine, competitive victimhood, multidirectional memory

In the times of the World War II the territory of contemporary Ukraine became one of the major «bloodlands» in Europe with millions of civilian victims, among whom the estimated number of Jewish victims was from 1 to 2 millions [11 p.403, 20]. Various historical experiences of war have resulted in contradictory versions of historical memory, the dividing lines of which went along XX ct. changing borders. The Soviet ideological narrative of the «Great Patriotic War» versus glorification of the struggle of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUNs) and the Ukrainian Insurgency Army (UPA) represent two extremes of this divergent memory. As many scholars argue, neither of these narratives is inclusive of the memory about the Holocaust in Ukraine [4, 12, 16, 5 et al.]. The role of the local population, the auxiliary police and members of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the annihilation of Jews still remains one of the most controversial and sensitive topics in discussions about the Holocaust in Ukraine. Fragmented, eclectic and often contested historical policy of Ukrainian state has become the subject of many academic studies. However, the perception of the Holocaust by various «communities of memory» in Ukrainian society has very rarely been addressed. Most of researchers studied this question collaterally in the context of other related issues – such as the oral history and collective memory of World War II (H. Hrinchenko, I.Sklokina),

historical and regional identities (V. Sereda, N. Chernysh), commemoration in urban spaces and place memory (O. Musiyezdov, O. Mikheyeva, L. Males, U. Blacker, M. Lewicka, V. Sereda), studies on anti-Semitism and xenophobia in Ukrainian society (V. Paniotto, N. Panina, I. Krzeminski), or studies on trauma in post-modern Ukrainian literature (I. Starovoyt). A number of authors considered the level and context of the inclusion (or rather exclusion) of the Holocaust in Ukraine's official historical discourse and politics of memory [5, 4, 9, 17, 12, 2, 16]. Particular attention was paid to the representations of the Holocaust in school textbooks as one of the main «instruments» of state politics towards history [3, 17, 12]. Despite the fact that these researches focused on specific political, spatial and media contexts, little attention was paid to the perception of the Shoah on popular level in the Ukrainian society. Among the exceptions we can name several interesting case studies. Polish scholar Anna Wylegala analysed the collective memory and forgetting about the Holocaust in the Western Ukrainian town of Zhovkva, while Olena Ivanova compared awareness and memory of the Holocaust among university students in Lviv and Kharkiv [3, 24]. Comprehensive study on anti-Semitism in Ukrainian and Polish societies was conducted by the international group of scholars and revealed interesting tendencies on perceived historical guilt [19].

In this article I aim to consider the question of the place that the Holocaust occupies in the popular imagination of Ukrainian history as a «national» project which individuals construct from a variety of sources and channels and internalize according to prevailing cultural standards, values and attitudes. This approach is derived from Benedict Anderson's concept of a nation as an «imagined community», in which an understanding of the past is constructed by power institutions of memory management through discourse, rituals and symbols in order to provide legitimation and to mobilize the population for political purposes [7]. Therefore, I will focus on the perception of the Holocaust in the context of other historical narratives. At the same time, the dominant memory discourses can be contested by various communities of memory and perceived differently on popular level. My conclusions are based on the results of 2013 and 2015 all-Ukrainian quantitative surveys, conducted in frames of «Region, nation and beyond» research project.

### **The Holocaust in post-Soviet memory politics in Ukraine**

Before analyzing the popular perceptions of history, it is important to sketch main tendencies in memory politics towards the Holocaust in post-1991 Ukraine. As a number of scholars argue, a nationalist re-evaluation of the history of WWII became a central element in constructing an anti-Soviet, new Ukrainian narrative [17, p. 104]. Such an approach also found its vivid reflection in new school textbooks and history curricula. Most of the history manuals published in the mid-1990s followed a monolithic narrative perspective presenting the Ukrainians as an almost homogeneous nation with special emphasis on its victimization. Following the decades of Soviet oblivion [14], in most schoolbooks the history of the Holocaust is still widely marginalized. However, in W. Jilge's opinion, there is a positive change in comparison to Soviet schoolbooks, where any special mention of the murder of Jews was completely suppressed. The author points out the problem of disconnection of the Holocaust from Ukrainian «national history». The events of the Shoah in Ukrainian school manuals were usually presented for different European countries, but not for Ukraine. Thus, he concludes,

this limited information about the Ukrainian context of the Holocaust in Ukrainian history textbooks leads to paradoxical consequences: the result of silence is not only an exclusion of the «dark sides» from the national narrative but also an exclusion of the Ukrainian «Righteous Among Nations» who risked their lives to save their Jewish neighbours [17]. Analyzing the representations of the Holocaust in the manuals on Ukrainian and world history, Swedish scholar Johan Dietsch comes to similar conclusions, accentuating the structural reasons behind such exclusion. Thus, as author argues, in the post-Soviet period Ukrainian history has been constructed as nation-centered rather than state-centered and Ukrainians were put in the core of a historical narrative, leaving little space for other people's story [12]. At the same time, both authors analysed school manuals, issued in 1990-s and early 2000s, while later developments still need to be reconsidered.

Above-cited W.Jilge's essay on the image of the 'other' in the Ukrainian narratives on World War II was entitled «Competing Victimhoods». Many other scholars tend to describe post-communist tendencies in East-European memory cultures precisely in terms of rivalry of sufferings [22, 16, 12]. At the same time, as Alexander Etkind and Uilleam Blacker argue, a more nuanced approach to memory cultures in Eastern Europe is needed. While competitive victimhood is indeed a strong tendency in this region, one needs to be careful when mechanically applying Western memory studies paradigms to local contexts. As the authors claim, there is no doubt that reflections on the Holocaust in post-war Europe shaped the idea of human rights. This concept, in turn, became an important framework for discussing communist crimes after the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, memories of the Gulag, the famines and other socialist atrocities have also contributed to the formation of Western ideas of human rights [13].

As a possible alternative to *competitive memory* – a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources – the American scholar Michael Rothberg suggests the concept of *multidirectional memory*: a subject of ongoing negotiation and cross-referencing. Bridging Holocaust and postcolonial studies, the author considers «a series of interventions through which social actors bring multiple traumatic pasts into a heterogeneous and changing post-World War II present» [21, 4]. I would argue that the models of Eastern-European Holocaust memory should be understood in the dynamics of both competition and multidirectionality. In the Ukrainian case, this tendency can be brightly illustrated by the memory activity of Viktor Yushchenko – the 3<sup>rd</sup> President of Ukraine who was notorious for his priority-driven historical politics. On the one hand, he paid quite a lot of attention to Shoah commemoration, e.g. by mentioning the Holocaust in his inauguration speech<sup>1</sup>, emphasising the priority of fighting anti-Semitism and xenophobia in his politics, or by initiating and co-organising the II World Forum of Holocaust Memory during the 65<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Remembrance of the Babyn Yar Tragedy. However, in Yushchenko's speeches, commemorative activities and legislative

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<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, Yushchenko inscribed Holocaust victims in a «glorious» narrative by calling to commemorate «the heroes who fought for the victory: the martyrs of Auschwitz and Gulag, the victims of Holodomors, deportations and the Holocaust». The full text of the inauguration speech from 23 January 2005 can be accessed at: <http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2005/01/23/3006391/> (Retrieved on 1 October 2016).

initiatives<sup>1</sup>, the Shoah usually appeared along with the Holodomor, the latter becoming the core of new official historical narrative. In the internal policy such a juxtaposition was meant to «evoke empathy between two suffering people» and to approximate the catastrophe of the Jews to average Ukrainians, while at the international level this framework was often used to promote the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, Yushchenko's politics featured attempts to «surpass» the number of Shoah victims (by emphasizing the debatable number of 10 mln Holodomor victims<sup>3</sup>). Moreover, his approach to Holocaust commemoration reached the «glass ceiling» of openly discussing the role of Ukrainians in the Shoah, particularly members of the Ukrainian nationalistic underground who were now promoted as new «national heroes»<sup>4</sup>.

Transnational communities of memory – such as the EU – often play the role of catalyst in the rethinking of «national» historical paradigms. As many scholars argue, the Holocaust became one of the negative founding myth of united Europe. The genocide of the European Jewry was invented and started in Nazi Germany and carried, in various degrees, by almost all European nations [13, p.20]. Therefore, different forms of official recognition and commemoration of the Holocaust as well as local participation in it have become a kind «entry-ticket» into the European Union [2].

Even though Ukraine has not yet become the official candidate of the EU, new European and global strategies of coming to terms with difficult past have also had an influence on the politics of memory as well as on popular attitudes. Ukraine did not join the Task Force for International Cooperation (ITF), though signing the IHRA<sup>5</sup> Stockholm Declaration did contribute to including Holocaust education in school and university curricula. Democratization of the public sphere as well as closer contacts between Ukrainian and Western intellectuals fostered discussions on the «white spots» of Ukrainian history, including the Holocaust and the local population's roles in it (as bystanders, saviors or perpetrators). While most such debates have been limited to professional circles, there were several important public

<sup>1</sup> In 2008 Yushchenko submitted to the Supreme Council a draft of a new article 4421 for the Criminal Code of Ukraine prohibiting «Public denial of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 as genocide of the Ukrainian people and of the Holocaust as genocide of the Jewish people». More on the issue at: [http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?za\\_publichne\\_zaperechennya\\_golodomoru\\_ta\\_golokostu\\_yushhenko\\_proponuye\\_zaprovaditi\\_administrativnu\\_ta\\_kriminalnu\\_vidpovidalnist&objectId=1048328](http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?za_publichne_zaperechennya_golodomoru_ta_golokostu_yushhenko_proponuye_zaprovaditi_administrativnu_ta_kriminalnu_vidpovidalnist&objectId=1048328) (Retrieved on 1 October 2016).

<sup>2</sup> For example, in his speech at Knesset on 14 November 2007, Yushchenko stressed the importance of Israel's recognising the Holodomor as genocide, thus emphasising the similarity of the historical fate of two nations. See more at: [http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/indepth/story/2007/11/071114\\_yuschenko\\_israel\\_oh.shtml](http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/indepth/story/2007/11/071114_yuschenko_israel_oh.shtml) (Retrieved on 1 October 2016).

<sup>3</sup> According to the latest report by the Institute for Demography of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the total number of human losses caused by the Holodomor in 1932–1933 was around 4.5 mln people. These numbers, however, are a still subject of debate. The report is available at [http://www.idss.org.ua/arhiv/2015\\_26\\_11\\_press\\_release.pdf](http://www.idss.org.ua/arhiv/2015_26_11_press_release.pdf) (Retrieved on 1 October 2016).

<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed analysis of Yushchenko's politics towards the Holocaust, see: T. Stryjek, Ya. Hrytsak [6, 2]

<sup>5</sup> International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. See: <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/> (Retrieved 1 October 2016)

discussions on the responsibility of Ukrainian auxiliary police and nationalistic movement members in the Shoah – namely in the *Krytyka* academic journal<sup>1</sup> and on the «Istorychna pravda» [«Historical truth»] Internet portal<sup>2</sup>. Two major all-Ukrainian NGOs are directly involved in improving Holocaust research and education, these are the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies (Kyiv, since 2002) and the Tkuma Center for Holocaust Studies (Dnipro, since 1999). The latter has also initiated and co-created the Museum «The Memory of the Jewish People and the Holocaust in Ukraine» in Dnipro (opened in 2012). However, both Centres lack state support and rely mostly on international funding. As Tomasz Stryjek points out, the civic factor has largely predominated state in Holocaust commemoration in Ukraine, and in some cases even substituted its role [6].

### **The Holocaust in the popular memory: regional and socio-demographic aspects**

The results of a research project called «Region, nation and beyond: interdisciplinary and intercultural reconceptualization of Ukraine» (2012-2015)<sup>3</sup> give us the opportunity to address the question of Holocaust memory in Ukraine in a complex way. The general goal of the project was to challenge the dominance of the nation-state paradigm in analyses of Ukraine by illustrating the interrelationship between national and regional dynamics of change. Among the five focus areas (economy, religion, language and literature, history), historical memory was studied as an identity-building factor. The project included both quantitative (an all-Ukrainian statistical surveys, February 2013, N=6000 and February-March 2015, N=6000) and qualitative (in-depth interviews and focus group discussions in 12 Ukrainian regions) parts.

As with any other methodologies, a statistical questionnaire has its pros and cons as a tool of studying the phenomenon of collective memory. Thus it allows us to speak about general tendencies in collective remembrance while the personal dimension as well as the motivations behind certain choices remain beyond its scope. A number of questions concerning the perception of different positive/negative events in Ukrainian history was asked in both 2013 and 2015 «Region, nation and beyond» statistical surveys. In order to avoid giving any possible hints to respondents or imposing a certain frame of answers to them, a set of open questions about positive/negative events and personalities in Ukrainian history was on purposely placed prior to another set, which included close-ended questions measuring the respondents' attitudes towards pre-given events/personalities. As a result, the survey provides

<sup>1</sup> See: Hrachova, S. and the subsequent discussion [2].

<sup>2</sup> The Ukrainian translation of John Paul Himka's article [15] was published in 2012 and evoked a wave of comments and discussions, including a 40-page response from the lawyer Serhiy Ryabenko attempting to prove the OUN's innocence: <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2013/02/20/112766/> (Retrieved 1 October 2016).

<sup>3</sup> The project was launched jointly by the St. Gallen University (Switzerland) and the Center for Urban History in Lviv. The project has been sponsored by the SNF Grant CR1111L\_135348 «Region, Nation and Beyond. A Transcultural and Interdisciplinary Reconceptualization of Ukraine.» More information on the project and its outcomes can be accessed at: <http://www.lvivcenter.org/en/researchprojects/stgallenproject/> (Retrieved on 15 October 2016).

us interesting information about the structure of the respondents' perceptions of Ukrainian history and the level of their having internalised the official discourse. In the following part I will analyse the question of Holocaust memory in this context.

As we can see in Table 1, the Great Famine (the Holodomor), occupies a central place in the narrative of collective suffering – almost a quarter of the respondents recalled it as the most negative event in the history of Ukraine (open question). All in all, this may be understood as the evidence of significant influence of official memory politics on public opinion. As the results of another sociological survey («Rating group», 2010–2015) show, since V.Yushchenko's presidency, the support for recognizing Holodomor as genocide has been steadily growing in the Ukrainian society: from 61% in 2010 to 80% in 2015<sup>1</sup>.

Table 1. Negative events in the history of Ukraine, 2013	Number	Percentage
Holodomor	1415	24.4%
WWII	1201	20.7%
Collapse of the USSR	815	14.1%
Soviet period, repressions	513	8.8%
Chornobyl	448	7.7%
Political and economic problems of the 1990s	412	7.1%
Orange Revolution	384	6.6%
Holocaust	53	0.9%
DK/NA	964	15.6%

Table 1 also vividly reflects the diverse nature of Ukrainians' collective vision of the past: while for 8.8% the Soviet regime and its political repressions signified the most negative historical experience, more than 14% mourned the collapse of the USSR. Another example is the Orange Revolution, which the respondents mentioned as both the most negative (6.6%) and the most positive (4.9%) events in the history of Ukraine. The Holocaust was named among the most negative event only by 53 respondents (less than 1%), in 23 cases along with the Holodomor. Similar situation could be observed in 2015, when only 35 respondents mentioned the Shoah among the calamities of Ukrainian history. While this indicator is indeed very low, the Holocaust appeared to be the only tragedy of a group other than Ukrainians that was included in the list of the most negative events. Thus, even though the year 2013 marked the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Volyn massacre, which was accompanied by heated debates in the media, the respondents did not mention it at all.

Additionally, the respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of 15 pre-listed events/periods in the history of Ukraine on a 5-point scale (where 1 and 2 meant 'not important', 3 meant 'neutral' and 4 and 5 meant 'important'). In 2013 the majority named World War II as the most important event, which can be explained not only by its centrality in Soviet and Ukrainian memory politics but also by its deep-rootedness in family histories and biographical memories. However, in 2015 the WWII was only fourth most important event – preceded by the state-founding «pillars» of Ukraine's official historical narrative:

<sup>1</sup> See the report by Rating Group: [http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dinamika\\_otnosheniya\\_k\\_golodomoru\\_noyabr\\_2015.html](http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dinamika_otnosheniya_k_golodomoru_noyabr_2015.html) (Retrieved on October 1, 2016).

the Kyiv Rus period, the Cossack state and the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991. Undoubtedly, the experience of Euromaidan and war in the East became the turning point for Ukrainian's perception of their country history, overshadowing still strong Soviet narrative. As for the Holocaust, it was estimated as a rather significant event both in 2013 and 2015 (average 3,8–3,9 out of 5) but, most importantly, only 1,5% of respondents in 2013 and 1,7% in 2015 stated have never heard about it. To compare, around 13% declared a lack of knowledge regarding the Austrian-Hungarian period in the history of Ukraine and roughly 10% of respondents had never heard anything about the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or Mazepa Uprising.





Fig. 1. Estimated importance of selected events/periods in the history of Ukraine (mean<sup>1</sup>)

The question regarding the importance of different events in the history of Ukraine also revealed regional divisions in their perception. As we can see from the maps below (Fig. 2), how the Holocaust is perceived does not simply fit into the «East-West divided memory» model. Various factors – such as the activity of the local Jewish communities, the NGOs and educational initiatives – could have influenced such heterogeneous differentiation and further research is needed to answer the question of the reasons behind it. Moreover, socio-demographic factors (such as education, gender and age) turned out not to have significant influence on the estimated importance of the Holocaust in Ukrainian history. However, in 2015 survey the correlation between size of settlement and estimated importance of the Holocaust

<sup>1</sup> On the scale between 1(not important at all) and 5 (extremely important)

could be observed – thus the inhabitants of large cities (more then 500 000 inhabitants) tended to evaluate higher the importance of this event in Ukrainian history.

2013



2015




Fig. 2. Regional distribution of the estimated importance of the Holocaust in Ukrainian history (2013 and 2015)

Factor analysis of the perception of the above-mentioned historical events produced 4 factors. When it comes to the results of 2013 survey, factor I («Ukrainian narrative») was explained by six variables: Ukrainian Cossacks, Mazepa's uprising, the Ukrainian



National Renaissance of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Ukrainian National Republic, the OUN-UPA, the declaration of Ukrainian independence – all of these reflect the official canon of Ukrainian history after 1991. Factor II («Imperial history») was explained by three variables: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire. Factor III («Traumatic memory») was explained by three variables: World War II, the Holodomor and the Holocaust. And, finally, Factor IV («Soviet narrative») was explained by four variables: Kyiv Rus, Ukrainian Cossacks, the Pereyaslav Treaty and Ukrainian SSR, thus representing the Soviet vision of Ukrainian history. As we can see, the same historical events appeared within various factors and can be interpreted differently, e.g. Kyiv Rus can be understood as either a «proto-Ukrainian state» or «the cradle of three fraternal nations», depending on the point of view of either the Ukrainian or Soviet narrative. These factors represent four specific models of the historical past as (re)produced by the respondents: one model stresses the impact of foreign states/empires, the other focuses on a victimised discourse, the third one emphasises the importance of the Soviet legacy and the last one highlights the importance of contemporary Ukrainian historical narrative. As can be observed, the Holocaust appears here along with the other calamities of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which supports our hypothesis of both multidirectional and competitive character of traumatic memories in Ukraine. In 2015 survey, the «traumatic memory» factor was explained with the same variables with the edition of most recent traumatic experience – the annexation of Crimea and conflict in the East.

As for the above-discussed issue of «competitive victimhood», in 2013 the question regarding the different groups that were affected by the tragedy of World War II was asked. The respondents were to estimate the level of suffering of different nations during the war on a scale between 1 (they did not suffer at all) and 7 (they were victims of genocide). The pre-given list included only ethnic groups, therefore, some groups of victims of Nazi atrocities were not mentioned (e.g. gay people, POWs or Jehovah witnesses).




Fig. 3. Estimated suffering of different groups during World War II (mean)

As we can see from the fig. 9, the respondents perceived own group (Ukrainians) as the main victims of the WWII, however, Jews appeared to be the second group in this «rating». Thus, 68% of respondents agreed that Jewish people were victims of genocide; the non-response rate was very low (2%). We can therefore draw a conclusion that in general Ukrainians have heard about Jewish Holocaust, whereas, for example, the fate of the Roma people during WWII remains a blank page (only 24.8% of respondents believe the Roma were victims of genocide, whereas 20% stated they knew nothing on this topic). We also see a strong impact of the Soviet narrative of the war: the de-ethnicised and generalised category of the «Soviet people» is perceived as the major victim group along with Russians and Belarusians, while, for example, the Polish people are seen as having been much less aggrieved by the war. Even though a question about the role of different ethnic groups as the perpetrators in WWII was not posed, we can assume that this lower estimation of Polish suffering might be the result of the respondents' not willing to tackle the «uncomfortable» issue of the Volyn tragedy and the Ukrainians' role in it. Socio-demographic factors were influential here, as older people tend to estimate the level of the suffering of Jews, Soviet people, Russians and the Roma people higher as compared to the younger generations. The level of education correlated positively with the estimation of suffering of both the German and Roma people. One of the most interesting outcomes was the impact of the native language factor — thus bilingual people tend to express more empathic attitude, estimating the suffering of different groups higher than only Ukrainian or Russian language speakers.

As the statistical data shows, both the Soviet and national Ukrainian models of the historical past influenced the respondents' perceptions and attitudes towards the Shoah in Ukrainian history. It would be wrong to assert that average Ukrainians know nothing about the Holocaust: thus only 1,5% of respondents have never heard of it and 68% believe Jews became the victims of genocide during the war (while «own» group is considered as the one that suffered most). At the same time, one can assume that the general knowledge has been internalised not so much from education or official memory politics but from a globalised mass culture – e.g. movies like «Shindler's List» or «The Pianist» that were shown on Ukrainian TV on numerous occasions. Therefore, in further research it is crucial to address the memory of the Holocaust on a micro-level in order to investigate the peculiarities of local memory cultures. Analyzing qualitative interviews would be particularly beneficial in this context.

### Conclusions

Population movements and deportations, erasing memory politics of the Soviet era and the indifferent approach of the Ukrainian state have greatly influenced the formation of Holocaust memory in Ukrainian society. Official Ukrainian historical politics since 1991 is actively engaged in the processes of nation (re)building and the place that the Shoah occupies in it should be understood through the dynamics of both memory and oblivion, of competition and multidirectionality. The Holocaust still remains an «uncomfortable» topic for the formation of a common Ukrainian identity as it may question the positive image of the «we-group», from which Jews are still largely excluded. The attitudes towards Shoah are strongly influenced by the dominant tendency of understanding «Ukrainianness» in ethnic rather than civic terms, which is expected to have changed after the Euromaidan.

These tendencies and challenges find reflection in the popular memory. On the one hand, the Holocaust as a European tragedy is not unknown to average Ukrainians, as the majority recognize that the Jews became victims of genocide during the war. At the same time, the general knowledge about the Shoah is very likely to be derived from mass culture, which does not imply awareness of its local dimension.

The above-mentioned tendencies in Ukrainian discussions on Holocaust memory are diverse, dynamic and subject to constant changes. There is no doubt that the Euromaidan movement, the annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas became ultimate turning points in Ukraine's history which also strongly influenced the field of memory politics. For now it is still early to state what impact recent events will have on the perception of Ukrainian history in general and the Holocaust in particular. New tendencies – such as the impact of the discourses of European belonging and a civic Ukrainian nation, promoted at the Euromaidan, the growing role of the governmental Institute for National Memory, lasting tensions in Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue as well as the «information war» against Russian propaganda are beyond the scope of this article yet seem to strongly influence collective memory formation in contemporary Ukraine.

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## **КОНКУРЕНТНА ЧИ БАГАТОВЕКТОРНА? КОЛЕКТИВНА ПАМ'ЯТЬ ПРО ГОЛОКОСТ В УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ СУСПІЛЬСТВІ**

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У статті зосереджено увагу на питанні місця, що займає Голокост у політиці пам'яті та популярному уявленні про історію в українському суспільстві. Зокрема, розглянуто сприйняття Голокосту у контексті інших трагедій ХХ ст. через призму концепцій «конкурентної віктимності» (В. Їльге, Д. Дітч та ін) та «багатовекторної пам'яті» (М. Ротберг). Висновки статті ґрунтуються на результатах репрезентативного статистичного опитування в рамках проекту «Регіон, нація та більше: міждисциплінарне та міжкультурне переосмислення України» (2013, 2015).

*Ключові слова:* колективна пам'ять, Голокост в Україні, конкурентна віктимність, багатовекторна пам'ять.