

УДК 811.161.2'27'373.4:17.026.3

doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.30970/vpl.2019.70.9916>

THE EMOTION CONCEPT OF JOY IN THE ENGLISH LINGUACULTURE

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The article deals with the research of the means of verbalization and defines the structure of the concept *joy* in the English linguaculture applying the method of cognitive definition suggested by Jerzy Bartmiński. The direct nominations of the lexeme *joy*, its synonyms, antonyms and metaphors constitute the material of the study. By analysing the systematic data material of the English language drawn from etymological and monolingual explanatory dictionaries and thesauri, the etymology of the lexeme *joy* is described as well as its inner form is identified, and the lexical means are marked out.

The comprehensive overview of the major theories of emotions is given. The conceptual analysis of *joy* is presented within Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach. The conceptual structure of *joy* is described in terms of conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies, related concepts and cognitive models suggested by Z. Kövecses.

Keywords: emotion concepts, theories of emotion, the concept of JOY, cognitive model, cognitive scenario, conceptual metaphors, English linguaculture.

Problem statement. The requirements for further integration of linguistic, cognitive and psychological components of linguistic studies have highlighted the research of a human being as biocognitive-social system as well as examining his conscience, thinking process and emotions embodied in language.

Emotions have many facets. They include feelings and experience, physiology and behaviour, cognitions and conceptualisations. Therefore the language of emotions constitutes an exciting research domain in its own right.

The four kinds of evidence to which one may appeal in attempting to understand emotions can be outlined. First, there is *the language of emotions*, which comes replete with ambiguity, synonymy (or near synonymy), and an abundance of lexical gaps and linguistic traps. For some categories of emotions, a language like English provides a relatively large number of tokens, thus reducing the need for metaphorical descriptions of emotional quality. It becomes necessary to identify one of the words in the category as unmarked form or category label.

The second kind of evidence comes from *self-reports*. Because emotions are subjective experiences, like the sensation of colour or pain, people have direct access to them. So, in normal cases, self-reports of emotions can be treated as valid.

The third kind of evidence is *behavioral*. Research on emotions during behaviorist and postbehaviorist era has been dominated by approaches based on *the characteristic behaviour* associated with emotions. It is important to point out that actual behaviour is a response to an emotional state in conjunction with the particular initiating event. On the other hand, emotions are important determiners of motives. Thus, the problem lies in the fact that the same behaviour can result from very different emotions (or even from no emotion at all), and that very different behaviours can result from the same emotion.

Finally, the fourth kind of evidence is physiological. While the physiological responses of emotional experiences are of indisputable importance, they throw relatively little light on the cognitive components of emotion.

The article is aimed at explicating the etymological layer and the lexical means of the concept *joy* in the English worldview presented in the English linguaculture. The analysis of the concept *joy* has been carried out by applying the method of cognitive definition suggested by Jerzy Bartmiński. The data is drawn from the most authoritative etymological, explanatory, idiomatic dictionaries and thesauri of the English language.

The relevance of the research is justified by the integrative cognitive-linguistic-cultural approach to the investigation of the structure and linguistic realization of the emotion concept *joy* in the English linguaculture. It seems important and timely to research the conceptualisation and verbalisation of *joy* with a view to its affiliation to basic emotions and insufficient level of the research by domestic and foreign linguists.

Analysis of recent studies and publications. Robert Plutchik's *psychoevolutionary theory of emotion* is one of the most influential classification approaches for general emotional responses [22]. He considered there to be eight primary emotions — *anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, anticipation, trust, and joy*. His theory of basic emotions includes ten postulates: 1) The concept of emotion is applicable to all evolutionary levels and applies to all animals including humans; 2) Emotions have an evolutionary history and have evolved various forms of expression in different species; 3) Emotions served an adaptive role in helping organisms deal with key survival issues posed by the environment; 4) Despite different forms of expression of emotions in different species, there are certain common elements, or prototype patterns, that can be identified; 5) There is a small number of basic, primary, or prototype emotions; 6) All other emotions are mixed or derivative states; that is, they occur as combinations, mixtures, or compounds of the primary emotions; 7) Primary emotions are hypothetical constructs or idealized states whose properties and characteristics can only be inferred from various kinds of evidence; 8) Primary emotions can be conceptualized in terms of pairs of polar opposites; 9) All emotions vary in their degree of similarity to one another; 10) Each emotion can exist in varying degrees of intensity or levels of arousal.

The James-Lange theory is one of the best-known examples of a *physiological theory of emotion*. Independently proposed by psychologist W. James and physiologist C. Lange, their theory suggests that emotions occur as a result of physiological reactions to events. When one sees an external stimulus that leads to a physiological reaction, his or her emotional reaction is dependent upon how a person interprets those physical reactions [23].

Another well-known physiological theory is the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion, according to which, emotional expression results from the function of hypothalamic structures, and emotional feeling results from stimulations of the dorsal thalamus. The physiological changes and subjective feeling of an emotion in response to a stimulus are separate and independent; arousal does not have to occur before the emotion. Thus, the thalamic region is attributed a major role in the theory of emotion, which is therefore also referred to as the *thalamic theory of emotion* [7: 106–124].

In *motivation theories* emotions are considered to be a constituent part of motivation process. Psychologist William McDougall was one of the first to write about the instinct theory of motivation. He suggested that instinctive behaviour was composed of three essential elements: perception, behaviour, and emotion. Human beings have a perceptual predisposition to focus on stimuli that are important to his goals. Also, humans have the drive and energy which is called “emotional core” between perception of the goal and the movement towards it [17].

Instinct theories of motivation became unpopular after their emergence. One reason is because these theories simply label instead of showing the mechanisms of behaviour. In addition, instincts are quite difficult to empirically test and observe.

M. Arnold, A. Ellis, R. Lazarus, S. Schachter and J. Singer have been prominent in the development of the *cognitive theory of emotions* and collectively propose that there are two steps in the process of cognitive interpretation of an emotional episode: the interpretation and appraisal of stimuli from the external environment; and the interpretation and appraisal of stimuli from the internal autonomic arousal system.

Also known as the *two-factor theory of emotion*, the Schachter-Singer theory is an example of a cognitive theory of emotion. This theory suggests that the physiological arousal occurs first, and then the individual must identify the reason for this arousal to experience and label it as an emotion. A stimulus leads to a physiological response that is then cognitively interpreted and labeled which results in an emotion.

According to *appraisal theories of emotion*, thinking must occur first before experiencing emotion. Richard Lazarus was well renowned for his cognitive-mediational theory of emotion. According to this theory, the sequence of events first involves a stimulus, followed by thought which then leads to the simultaneous experience of a physiological response and the emotion. Lazarus defines emotions according to “core relational themes” which are intuitive summaries of the “moral appraisals” (e. g. of relevance, goal conduciveness) involved in different emotions. These themes help define both the function and eliciting conditions of the emotion. They include: *anger* – a demeaning offense against me and mine; *fear* – facing an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger; *sadness* – having experienced an irrevocable loss; *disgust* – taking in or being too close to an indigestible object or idea (metaphorically speaking), *happiness* – making reasonable progress toward the realization of a goal [15].

Magda B. Arnold, an American psychologist, developed the appraisal theory of emotions, which moved the direction of emotion theory away from “feeling” theories (e. g. James-Lange theory) and “behaviorist” theories (e. g. Cannon-Bard theory) and toward the cognitive

approaches which dominate today [1; 2]. Her theory of emotions emphasizes the cognitive factors associated with emotional behaviour that involves a continuous sequence of reaction and appraisal where a series of information-processing steps take place. In the first phase of processing, the person typically perceives some event, object, or person and is prepared to evaluate it in a particular way: as “good”, which leads to approach behaviour, as “bad”, which leads to avoidance behaviour, as “indifferent”, which leads to ignoring the event. The next phase is *appraisal*, where the person decides whether what is happening will hurt, help or have no effect on her/ him. The third and fourth phases are *bodily change* and *emotion*, both of which usually occur at almost the same time. Phase five is *action*; some individuals in certain situations skip from the bodily changes in stage three and go directly to stage five. Arnold's theory assumes that the entire appraisal sequence takes place in an instant. Arnold distinguishes among a few basic emotions that are simple reactions to the appraisal of basic situations: dislike, love (liking), aversion, despair, desire, anger, fear, hope, daring, sorrow and joy. This theory stresses that the intuitive, spontaneous appraisal in an emotional episode is supplemented by a deliberate value judgement, especially in adults, and it functions in the same way that one's sensory knowledge is complemented by cognitions. Emotions can be socialised where social attitudes and customs influence one's intuitive appraisal of events, and where affective memory preserves one's previous encounters with intense emotion-arousing stimuli [23: 37].

There are theories of emotions that were developed within the domain of Gestalt psychology (J. I. Volkelt). The central principle of gestalt psychology is that the mind forms a global whole with self-organizing tendencies. This principle maintains that when the human mind (perceptual system) forms a percept or “gestalt”, the whole has a reality of its own, independent of the parts, in other words, the mind understands external stimuli as a whole rather than the sum of their parts. The wholes are structured and organized using grouping laws. These laws deal with the sensory modality of vision. Contrary to the behaviorist approach to focusing on stimulus and response, gestalt psychologists sought to understand the organization of cognitive processes.

The *theory of constructed emotion* (formerly the conceptual act model of emotion) is a scientific theory to explain the experience and perception of emotions proposed by Lisa Feldman Barrett [3; 4]. It suggests that basic emotions are not biologically hardwired, but instead are phenomena that emerge in consciousness “in the moment” from more fundamental ingredients. The key point of the theory is as follows: in every waking moment, our brain uses past experience, organized as concepts, to guide our actions and give sensations meaning. When the concepts involved are emotion concepts, our brain constructs instances of emotion [4: 1–23].

Instances of emotion are constructed throughout the entire brain by multiple brain networks in collaboration. Ingredients going into this construction include *interoception*, *concepts*, and *social reality*. Interoceptive predictions provide information about the state of the body and ultimately produce basic, affective feelings of pleasure, displeasure, arousal, and calmness. Concepts are embodied knowledge (from a culture), including emotion concepts. Social reality provides the collective agreement and language that make the perception of emotion possible among people who share a culture [4: 1–23].

“The Cognitive Structure of Emotions” by A. Ortony, G. L. Clore and A. Collins is a theoretical psychology work, striving to develop a cognitive framework for human emotional repertoire that will structure the existing empirical data and guide future research. They made an attempt to explain “how people’s perceptions of the world – their construals – cause them to experience emotions” [21: 12]. Their general plan was to impose some structure on the limitless number of possible emotion-eliciting situations. Thus, the researchers view emotions as elicited by specific types of appraisals, positive or negative judgments, made by an individual. Emotions can be differentiated in strictly cognitive terms according to the aspect on which the eliciting judgment focuses: *events* are judged by their consequences, *agents* by their actions, and *objects* by their presumably intrinsic properties. These aspects are not exclusive; for example, people can be judged as agents or as objects, depending on whether one focuses on their behaviour or their characteristics as individuals. The three aspects lead to three major classes of emotions: appraisals of objects correspond to likes and dislikes of various kinds, appraisals of agents to pleasure and displeasure, and appraisals of events to approval and disapproval. The latter two classes have a rich internal structure. For example, the class of event appraisals bifurcates according to whether the event in question affects oneself (fortunes-of-self) or someone else (fortunes-of-others). Fortunes-of-self emotions are further differentiated by whether the appraised event has already occurred (joy, distress) or is prospective (hope, fear). Fortunes-of-others subdivides according to the desirability of the event from the appraiser’s point of view, yielding the emotion types happy-for, resentment, gloating, and pity. Altogether, 28 emotion types are distinguished [21].

The book entitled “The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind” was written by the cognitive scientist Marvin Minsky [19]. He argues that emotions are different “ways to think” that our mind uses to increase our intelligence. He challenges the distinction between emotions and other kinds of thinking. His main argument is that emotions are “ways to think” for different “problem types” that exist in the world, and that the brain has rule-based mechanisms (selectors) that turn on emotions to deal with various problems. Each of our major “emotional states” results from turning certain resources on while turning certain others off, and thus changing some ways that our brains behave. The main theses of Minsky’s book are as follows: 1) We are born with many mental resources; 2) We learn from interacting with others; 3) Emotions are different ways to think; 4) We learn to think about our recent thoughts; 5) We learn to think on multiple levels; 6) We accumulate huge stores of commonsense knowledge; 7) We switch among different ways to think; 8) We find multiple ways to represent things; 9) We build multiple models of ourselves [19].

In recent years, the “history of emotions” has emerged as a new multidisciplinary field of cultural history, literary studies, textual analysis and hermeneutics (Dixon 2003; Palmper 2015). This has led to an increased interest and attention to the cultural and historical specifics of emotion concepts.

Cognitive semantics deals with investigating the relationships between experience, the conceptual system and the semantic structure encoded in a language. There is a number of theories in cognitive semantics such as Blending Theory, Conceptual Metaphor Theory

by G. Lakoff [14], Frame Semantics, Mental Space Theory, Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM Theory), Principled Polysemy and approaches to linguistic semantics such as cognitive lexical semantics and encyclopaedic semantics [8].

The Natural Semantic Metalanguage or NSM method was developed by Anna Wierzbicka [26]. The method depends on findings from a decades-long program of cross-linguistic research which indicate the existence of a small set of elementary meanings (*semantic primes*) that constitute the basic building blocks of linguistic meaning in all or most languages. Together, semantic primes and their associated grammar make up the Natural Semantic Metalanguage. Using this metalanguage allows researchers to decompose complex, language-specific meanings into text-like configurations, known as semantic explications of simple cross-translatable concepts. Also, Wierzbicka believes that it is necessary to differentiate between similar-but-different emotion concepts in a single language, e. g. English *happy*, *pleased*, *satisfied*, as well as across different languages.

The NSM technique for explicating emotion meanings depends on linking a feeling (usually a good feeling or a bad feeling) with a prototypical cognitive scenario involving thoughts and intentions. The model thought in the cognitive scenario serves as a kind of reference situation by which the nature of the associated feeling can be identified. Like any other set of complex entities, emotion concepts can be classified in many different ways. Wierzbicka divided them into six groups based on the following general themes: 1) “something good happened” (joy or being happy); 2) “something bad happened” (sadness or grief); 3) “something bad can/will happen” (fear or anxiety); 4) “I don’t want things like this to happen” (anger or indignation); 5) “thinking about other people” (envy); and 6) “thinking about ourselves” (shame or remorse). Each of these themes is linked with some aspect of the cognitive scenarios which underlie the emotion concepts included in a given group [26: 49].

Joy is not a very common everyday word in modern English, and its frequency is much lower than that of the adjective *happy*. The cognitive scenario of *joy* is simpler than that of *happy* or *happiness*, and partly for this reason *joy* is a better starting point for the analysis of “positive emotion terms”. There are two crucial cognitive components in the *joy* scenario, an evaluative one: “something very good is happening”, and a volitive one: “I want this to be happening”. A full explication of *joy* follows:

Joy (X felt joy)

- (a) X felt something because X thought something
- (b) sometimes a person thinks:
- (c) “something very good is happening
- (d) I want this to be happening”
- (e) when this person thinks this the person feels something very good
- (f) X felt something like this
- (g) because X thought something like this

One clear difference between *happy* and *joy* has to do with the personal character of the former (highlighted by expressions such as *pursuit of happiness* or *personal happiness*), and the non-personal, “selfless” character of *joy*. Unlike being *happy*, *joy* can be shared with other

people and can be seen as open to everyone (the *joy of Christmas* or *the joy of knowledge*). If *joy* implies that “something very good is happening”, *happy* implies that “some good things happened TO ME”.

There is also the temporal dimension and, so to speak, the quantitative one. Unlike *joy*, being *happy* can be understood as a long-term state, and as an emotion, it can be seen as a more “settled” one than *joy*. In some ways, *joy* can be seen as more intense, more thrilling than being *happy* and more likely to be a short-term emotion. Moreover, there is one further important difference between being *happy* and *joy*, which links the former with contentedness: the implication that one doesn’t want anything else, that one has all one wanted [26: 50–51].

Moreover, there are other constructions which can be *body-image expressions* and *psycho-collocations*. Wierzbicka termed the first of these “internal body-image” constructions, and hypothesised that they are present, to a greater or lesser degree, in all languages. English examples include *I was boiling inside with rage* and *My heart sank*. The second phenomenon, “psycho-collocation” refers to a phraseme based on an ethnopsychological noun in combination with an adjective or verb, that designates an emotional state or personality trait. The ethnopsychological noun may be identical to a body-part word, such as *heart* or *liver* or it may be closer to the English word like *soul* or *spirit* [26: 297–302].

Zoltán Kövecses, Professor of Linguistics at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, suggests that the conceptual structure of *happiness / joy* can be described in terms of four cognitive components: conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies, related concepts and cognitive/cultural models [13].

A set of correspondences between a more physical source domain and a more abstract target domain is meant by *conceptual metaphor*. Kövecses distinguishes the three types of conceptual metaphors: general emotion metaphors, metaphors that provide an evaluation and metaphors that provide much of the phenomenological nature or character of *happiness/joy* [13: 132].

General emotion metaphors

HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER: She was *bursting with joy*.

HAPPINESS IS HEAT/FIRE: *Fires of joy were kindled* by the birth of her son.

HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE: I was *overwhelmed* by joy.

HAPPINESS IS A PHYSICAL FORCE: He was *hit* by happiness.

HAPPINESS IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR: They live a life *ruled* by happiness.

HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT: She was *seized* by joy.

HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL: All joy *broke loose* as the kids opened their presents.

HAPPINESS IS INSANITY: The crowd *went crazy* with joy.

HAPPINESS IS A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF: He was *beside himself* with joy.

The example of a metaphor providing an evaluation is HAPPINESS IS LIGHT (He was *beaming* with joy). Metaphors providing the phenomenological character of happiness can be illustrated by the metaphor HAPPINESS IS WARMTH (What she said made me feel *warm* all over).

Conceptual metonymies can be of two general types: CAUSE OF EMOTION and EFFECT OF EMOTION, with the latter being much more common than the former. The specific conceptual metonymies that apply to *happiness/joy* correspond to behavioural, physiological, and expressive responses. For instance, behavioural responses: jumping up and down for joy, dancing/singing for joy; physiological responses: flushing, increased heart rate, body warmth, agitation/excitement; expressive responses: bright eyes; smiling.

Related concepts are emotions or attitudes that the subject of emotion has in relation to the object or cause of emotion. In prototypical cases, happiness assumes *being satisfied* with a certain outcome. Happiness also entails *a feeling of pleasure*. Finally, when we are happy, we tend to *feel harmony* with the world [13: 133].

A collective wisdom and experience of any culture is laid down in knowledge structures, variously called as cognitive models, cultural models or folk models. A particular emotion can be represented by means of one or several cognitive models that are prototypical of that emotion. Prototypical cognitive models can be thought of as folk theories of particular emotions. The most schematic folk theory of emotions in general can be given as follows:

Cause of emotion → *emotion* → (*controlling emotion* →) *response*

This general folk theory of emotions derives from the application of the generic-level conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES. In the model, whatever leads to an emotion is conceptualised as a cause that has enough force to effect a change of state, and the emotion itself is also seen as a cause that has a force to effect some kind of response (physiological, behavioural, and/or expressive) [13: 135].

According to Kövecses, the general concept of *happiness/joy* is best described as having three prototypical cognitive models and many nonprototypical ones clustering around the three prototypes: 1) happiness as an immediate response; 2) happiness as a value; 3) happiness as being glad [13: 137–138].

In *happiness as an immediate response* a person responds with a form of happiness to a desired outcome. The form of happiness that is involved is commonly referred to as *joy*. The immediate response model is dominated by highly noticeable behavioural, physiological, and expressive responses and also by conceptual content that is provided by conceptual metaphors suggesting intensity and control, leading to a loss of control.

The Cognitive Model of JOY

Cause of joy: You want to achieve something. You achieve it. There is an immediate emotional response to this on your part.

Existence of joy: You are satisfied. You display a variety of expressive and behavioral responses including brightness of the eyes, smiling, laughing, jumping up and down. You feel energized. You also experience physiological responses, including body warmth and agitation/excitement. The context for the state is commonly a social one involving celebrations. You have a positive outlook on the world. You feel a need to communicate your feelings to others. The feeling you have may “spread” to others. You experience your state as a pleasurable one. You feel that you are in harmony with the world. You can’t help what you feel; you are passive in relation to your feelings. The intensity of your feelings and experiences is high. Beyond a certain limit, an increase in intensity implies a social danger for you to become

dysfunctional, that is, to lose control. It is not entirely acceptable for you to communicate and/or give free expression to what you feel (i. e., to lose control).

Attempt at control: Because it is not entirely acceptable to communicate and/or give free expression of what you feel, you try to keep the emotion under control: You attempt not to engage in the behavioral responses and/or not to display the expressive responses and/or not communicate what you feel.

Loss of control: You nevertheless lose control.

Action: You engage in the behavioral responses and/or display expressive responses and/or communicate what you feel. You may, in addition, exhibit wild, uncontrolled behavior (often in the form of dancing, singing, and energetic behavior with a lot of movement).

HAPPINESS as a value is characterized by a quiet state with hardly any noticeable responses or even a clearly identifiable specific cause. *HAPPINESS as being glad* most commonly occurs as a mild positive emotional response to a state of affairs that is either not very important to somebody or whose positive outcome can be taken to be a matter of course. In such a situation, people do not produce highly visible responses and do not have to control themselves [13: 139–140].

Bartmiński suggests the seven basic concepts of cognitive ethnolinguistics: the linguistic worldview, the values underlying that worldview; stereotype as a component of the linguistic worldview; the cognitive definition as a method of describing stereotypes; viewpoint and perspective; profiling, and the conceptualising and profiling subject [5: 19].

Furthermore, Bartmiński proposes to study the way in which one can reconstruct the linguistic worldview characteristic of an individual community. He considers the lexis, phraseological units+collocations+metaphors (which implies seeing most metaphors in terms of phraseological units), grammar, and texts, which are the central elements” [5: 33].

Results. The origin and etymology of *joy* are described as Middle English, from Anglo-French *joie*, from Latin *gaudia*, plural of *gaudium*, from *gaudēre* to rejoice; probably akin to Greek *gēthein* to rejoice [9].

The definitions of *joy* have been compared and analyzed from 5 various dictionaries: 1) Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (OALD) [12]; 2) New Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language (NWDT) [20]; 3) Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and Thesaurus (CALDT) [6]; 4) Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDCE) [16]; 5) Collins English Dictionary (Collins Thesaurus) (CEDT) [8].

All of the analysed dictionaries suggest the first meaning of *joy* (an uncountable noun) as *a feeling of great happiness*, implying that this is the most frequently used meaning and provide the second meaning of *joy* (a countable noun) as *something or someone that gives/causes joy/happiness*. However, the NWDT suggests the more extensive definition: *that which gives rise to this emotion, or on which the emotion centers*. The third meaning of *joy* specified as British informal (usually with negative and taking –ing form of the verb) is listed by all the studied dictionaries except the NWDT, and is described as *success or satisfaction*. In addition, there is one more meaning of *joy* as *the outward expression of the emotion / outward show of pleasure or delight* suggested by NWDT and CEDT respectively. We can argue that most dictionaries do not provide this latter meaning only because it is de facto incorporated in the first core meaning “a feeling of great happiness”.

The derivatives of *joy* include *joyless*, *joyful*, *joyant*, *joyous*, *unjoyous*, *joysome* (6 adjectives); *joylessly*, *joyfully*, *joyously* (3 adverbs); *joylessness*, *joyfulness*, *enjoyment*, *joyance*, *joyancy*, *joydom*, *joyment*, *joyousness*, *joyhood*, *joygasm*, *killjoy*, *joystick* (12 nouns), *enjoy*, *overjoy*, *rejoice* (3 verbs).

The common synonyms of *joy* listed by all the dictionaries are: *pleasure*, *happiness*, *delight*. Moreover, all the dictionaries apart from LDCE suggest such synonyms as *bliss*, *felicity* and *exultation* and apart from CALDT — *elation*. In addition, the synonyms listed in the three out of five dictionaries are: *euphoria*, *ecstasy*, *glee*, *gaiety*, *gladness*, *transport*, *rapture*. Only OALD and CEDT list the following synonyms: *exhilaration*, *enjoyment*, *ebullience*, *gladness*, *exuberance*, *joyfulness*, *jubilation*, *radiance*, *triumph*. CALDT and NWDT have one more common synonym not mentioned in the others such as *mirth*. Finally, synonyms suggested only by a single dictionary or thesaurus are: *delirium*, *gratification*, *satisfaction*, *rejoicing*, *savour*, *merriment*, *cheer*; *contentment*, *festivity*, *exhilaration*, *hilarity*, *ravishment*. Thus, the greatest number of synonyms of *joy* is given by the Collins Thesaurus (total number is 27) [8].

As antonyms are concerned, Webster's Thesaurus [20: T-32] lists 5 antonyms of *joy*: *affliction*, *depression*, *despair*, *grief*, *wretchedness*. The other four dictionaries do not provide any antonyms. According to the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, the antonyms of *joy* include *calamity*, *ill-being*, *sadness*, *unhappiness*, and *wretchedness* [25]. Also, the antonyms of *joy* include *infelicity*, *joylessness*, *sorrow*, *misery*, *melancholy*, *discouragement*, *mourning*, *woe* according to Roget's 21st Century Thesaurus [24]. Thus, the total number of antonyms of *joy* is 17.

OALD suggests the following idioms with *joy*: *full of the joys of spring*; *somebody's pride and joy*; *dance /jump / shout for joy* [12]. CALDT gives the four idioms: *bundle of joy* (meaning a baby); *jump for joy*; *someone's pride and joy*, *be your pride and joy* [6]. LDCE lists the idioms: *jump for joy*; *somebody's pride and joy*; *be transported with delight / joy or be in a transport of joy*; *glow with joy*; *hug yourself with joy* [16].

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs suggests some more idioms with *joy* not mentioned above: *burst with joy*; *leap for joy*; *weep for joy* [18].

While analysing the idioms with *joy*, it is obvious that most of them deal with the expression of the emotion of *joy* and correlate with the most common meaning of *joy* as the *outward expression of the emotion*. The following idioms can serve vivid examples: *dance for joy*; *jump for joy*; *shout for joy*; *glow with joy*.

At the same time, the idioms *pride and joy*; *bundle of joy* illustrate the second basic meaning of *joy* as *something or someone that causes joy, or on which the emotion centers*. For example: *Three days after the birth, Sandra took home her little bundle of joy*.

Conclusions. The lexeme *joy* denotes the basic positive emotion that has rather non-personal, "selfless" character that means it can be shared with other people; *joy* is seen as more intense feeling and more thrilling than *happy*, *glad* and more likely to be a short-term emotion. The *joy* scenario consists of two crucial cognitive components – an evaluative one: "*something very good is happening*", and a volitive one: "*I want this to be happening*".

The general concept of *joy* is best described as having three prototypical cognitive models and many nonprototypical ones clustering around the three prototypes: 1) *joy* as an immediate response; 2) *joy* as a value; 3) *joy* as being glad.

It is important to point out that *joy* is used especially in literature. In everyday English, rather than say *they did something with joy*, people usually say that *they were (really) pleased / happy / glad to do it*.

Finally, having analyzed the lexicographical sources, it should be emphasized that the core of the concept *joy* in the English language and culture is formed by the lexeme *joy* with its semantic features such as *positive feeling / emotion, emotional state, cause of emotion, intensity, expression / outward show of emotion, success*. The peripheral zone of the concept *joy* includes the most frequently used synonyms and derivatives like *pleasure, happiness, delight, enjoy, enjoyment, joyful, joyous*.

Prospects for the use of research results. The research is not complete in the framework of the method of cognitive definition. Further prospects of the research include getting and analyzing the results of free word association experiment as well as collecting and analyzing the data explicated from various textual discourses. Moreover, the further research will include the comparative analysis of the means of verbalization and the structure of the conceptsphere *joy* in the English, Ukrainian and Polish languages and cultures.

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Стаття: надійшла до редакції 15.10.2018
прийнята до друку 13.11.2018

КОНЦЕПТ ЕМОЦІЇ РАДІСТЬ (JOY) В АНГЛІЙСЬКІЙ ЛІНГВОКУЛЬТУРІ

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Досліджено засоби вербалізації та структура концепту РАДІСТЬ/JOY в англійській лінгвокультурі. На матеріалі аналізу системних даних мови (етимологічного, тлумачних, ідіоматичних словників, тезаурусів) проаналізовано концепт РАДІСТЬ в англійській лінгвокультурі, шляхом створення когнітивної дефініції за методикою Єжи Бартмінського. Розглянуто семантичні властивості та особливості функціонування лексеми *joy*.

Охарактеризовано базові аспекти емоцій та проаналізовано осовні теорії емоцій, а саме: психоеволюційна теорія Р. Плучика, фізіологічні теорії Джеймса-Ланге та Кеннона-Барда, мотиваційна теорія психолога В. МакДугала, який стверджував, що інстинктивна поведінка людини складається з трьох ключових елементів: сприйняття, поведінки та емоції; теорія емоцій у межах гештальтпсихології, когнітивна теорія емоцій, до розробки якої доклалися такі вчені, як М. Арнольд, А. Елліс, Р. Лазарус, С. Шахтер і Дж. Зінгер, теорія Л. Ф. Баррет, згідно з якою емоції конструюються в нашій свідомості за певними зразками, набутими в результаті світопізнання. А. Ортоні, Дж. Клор і А. Коллінз запропонували класифікацію емоцій за когнітивним критерієм. Емоції розглядають як специфічні реакції людини на окремі аспекти дійсності, що поєднуються в групи агентів, об'єктів і подій. Під подіями розуміється когнітивне конструювання людьми того, що відбувається у світі; об'єкти розглядають як власне об'єкти; а агентами можуть виступати люди, предмети і навіть ситуації. Марвін Мінський у своїй книзі "Емоційна машина" стверджує, що емоції – це способи мислення для вирішення людиною проблем, які існують у світі.

Представлено аналіз концепту РАДІСТЬ за методом Анни Вежбицької у рамках теорії "Природна Семантична Метамова". Описано концептуальну структуру концепту РАДІСТЬ за чотирма когнітивними компонентами: концептуальними метафорами, концептуальною метонімією, спорідненими концептами і когнітивними моделями за методикою Золтана Ковечеса.

Ключові слова: концепти емоцій, теорії емоцій, концепт РАДІСТЬ, когнітивна модель, когнітивний сценарій, концептуальні метафори, англійська лінгвокультура.