TERMINOLOGY IN THE MEDIA ANALYSIS OF WAR: NAMING CONFLICT, STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS

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The representation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the world media and political communication has long been based on vocabulary with prevailing euphemistic and «approximate» components. Lack of precision and factual focus in definitions is a specific form of underrepresentation. «Underdefinitions», whether declared or implicit, signal policies that lead to frozen conflict. Ukraine has no choice but to work together with international politicians through responsible media to enable progress in approaches to conflict.

Key words: political discourse, rhetoric, representation, analysis of conflict, language of propaganda, construction of identity, term, concept, interpretation, frame, scenario, narrative, meme, euphemism, oxymoron, mediation.

Definition as a means of information warfare and part of info-shield

The word «term» is usually associated with definite meaning and is viewed as something entirely opposite to emotions and subjectivity. This positive bias of strictness and neutrality, originating in science, is to a large degree challenged by the terminological practice of political communication and journalistic discourse dealing with social reality. The type of definitions that media use for discerning a world of politics can most adequately be called «rhetorical definitions», whose function of shaping attitudes prevails over the role of factual measurement. Even if terms of political analysis have strict conventional meanings, they denote an ever-shifting, and more importantly, multi-subject reality.

Media discourse surrounding major political events are usually filled with radically different, sometimes mutually exclusive visions and versions of the same situation. This is especially true for assessing war scenarios, in which words compete for diverse senses: crisis vs. war; occupation vs. «peacekeeping operation»; «civil war» vs. «international military conflict». Definitions in discourses representing military conflict become so antagonistic because they are intertwined with structurally different parts of wider picture of events. This wider, panoramic picture regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and its terminological representation is at least 3D-structured. There are Ukraine’s definitions, Russia’s definitions, and the struggle for each sides’ terms and policies to define for the international community and outside observers.

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Each particular terminological network within the national discourse is organized around some key concepts that give name to the political-military scenario. We will view such core concepts as a macro-frame, or headlines of meta-narrative of war that outline an approach to the entire conflict. The names of war highlight definitive characteristics of an military event, referring to different aspects and parameters of conflict: 1) sense of war (i.e., «for liberation», «patriotic war» or against something); 2) scale to indicate real or postulated extension, from «local conflict» to «international» (i.e., «Third World War», «global hybrid war»); 3) involvement of an outside force («civil» vs. «interstate»); 4) methods («hybrid», «direct military invasion»).

The main qualitative characteristics of a conflict are intertwined with other net-constituting signifiers and typical narrative ingredients of the story. Macro-frame, or the key definition, subordinates elements of the entire war scenario: a) cause of war; b) participants (leaders, nations involved); c) goals, etc. This subordination is not only structural, but also ideological for each strain of terms. If Russia's actual military conflict with Ukraine is dubbed as a «civil war» in Russian mainstream political interpretation, no wonder that the whole story stresses a «coup» as its origin, refers to participants as «rebels», mentions «people's republics» instead of «occupied territories», and eventually proposes negotiations with «republics' leaders» as the principal possible solution to the «local conflict». In contrast, for Ukraine, such an interpretation is inappropriate together with its practical implications and applications that lead to preserving an occupational status quo. Therefore, in a practical sense, the name of war is the «entry» word for strategic programming of outcomes. By giving name to the scenario of war, each interested group orders a certain path of conflict resolution.

If to theoretically assess meaningful relations in the group of terms and emotive signifiers that give name to the entire scenario of Russian-Ukrainian encounter, we will see gradation of definitions from «crisis» to «military conflict» and «war». The words placed on a virtual scale of semantic differentials will differ according to increasing and decreasing qualification of the real character of war. The bipolar space between «not a war» and «military conflict» actually corresponds to the choice between radical recognition of truth or detachment and escape from reality. Even more significant for media assessments of the scenario is the opportunity to represent conflict as «Ukrainian» or «Russian-Ukrainian». In fact, the semantic scale in this case, concerning the degree and number of other states involved, is even more far-reaching, from «local conflict», to «interstate», and finally to «international».

The variability of names for conflict creates a vast space of manipulative possibilities. Self-definitions and other flexible linguistic means supply material for rhetorical operations that coordinate with military ones. Rhetoric, the two-sided sword, also provides instruments for correcting distorted images. The media serves as a «host» for the permanent negotiation process concerning verbal and practical approaches to conflict. What happens in the public space appears to be a permanent informational war surrounding nominative suggestions. Some major media battles are related to recognition of some facts: 1) Ukraine is confronted with a challenge of war, not crisis; 2) aggression is caused and carried out by an outside source with unprecedented military potential, which makes it clearly the Russian-Ukrainian war; 3) the conflict has extensive reach and implications (Russia’s hybrid war with the world’s democracies and Russian-Ukrainian military conflict as part of global confrontation).
The scene of information encounters and mediation never remains the same. Global informational space contains considerable distortions as a result of hybrid war, but media discourse is being transformed and always preserves a chance to switch to a greater degree of factual accuracy. A need to maintain a balance of global security is a compelling motive for such transformations.

Participants and observers of conflict: pragmatics of their siding with the name

For Ukraine, the encounter with Russia is viewed through the key words war, aggression, and occupation. Of course, such terms were derived not from Russian leaders’ official statements, but from their deeds. The annexation and occupation were a much more powerful statement of Russia’s war intentions than any formal declaration of war. The fact of war directly influenced rearrangement of the socio-political vocabulary in Ukraine. Names aggressor and occupier have become habitual for Ukrainian media analysis of the situation. They appear in the everyday news stream: «The aggressor expels Ukrainians who refused Russian passports from occupied Crimea» [4]; «In the JFO [Joint Forces Operation] zone fire still rages, the occupants continue to violate the ceasefire» [1]. Formerly neutral or slightly ironical word «neighbor» acquired the accentuated connotation «aggressive neighbor», the notion of «partner» ceased to exist as a conventional frame (the remaining economic ties acquire pragmatic meaning and are viewed as a disputed issue), and the expression «strategic partner» regarding Russia became entirely ruled out for national security discourse. Instead, Russia appeared as a side of juridical responsibility.

The pragmatic scenarios «neighborhood», «trade», and «security cooperation» in relation to Russia were eliminated or reconsidered, and dissociation with former definitions, both lyrical and legal, has turned out to be massive. The war situation has brought the demythologization process to completion, erasing the remaining post-Soviet pathetic notions of «nation brothers» or «common culture». Ukrainian experts who refuse to participate in political talk shows in Russia explain their decision by the belief that their appearances in studio as «opponents» in fact add legitimacy to propagandist «team» of the occupation army (the remaining participants either have next to identical views with Russian «opponents» or believe that even partial representation of Ukrainian position during such performances makes sense). Referring to Russia as an enemy in the battlefield, Ukrainian public discourse keeps decisive about a conclusive part of reasoning and planning the conflict strategies: if this is war, it should come to an end, the occupied territories need to be liberated, and the occupant and aggressor should be not only stopped, but punished.

The Russian war-naming case is a practice of hiding indications of this country’s massive involvement in the conflict and projecting its own faults onto the victim. The aim of projections and distortions is legitimizing its own activities, denying accusations, and avoiding responsibility. Since «responsibility» ultimately means tribunal over war crimes, the stakes of Russian propaganda are high and its activities are cynical and intense.

Through its annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, the Russian Federation violated principles outlined by the UN statute, Geneva Conventions, and hundreds of other normative documents. Representing the act of annexation as a campaign for saving «Russian-speaking population» was a key of self-justification rhetoric in Russian propaganda. Russian authorities later included the stolen peninsula into new territorial
structure, the Southern Federal District, hiding Crimea behind the new name. The clear-cut pattern of military conflict in Donbas has embraced trans-border shelling and invasion of tactic groups from Russia, Russian leadership of acting two army corpuses, forcing out the pro-Ukrainian population, and abandoning Ukraine from access to its border. These signs of Russia’s participation in «war in Donbas» are literally repressed and excluded from the Russian media space. When the revealing facts further unavoidably appear in the other side’s (Ukrainian and international) discourse, they become distorted, diminished, and replaced by «alternative» versions. In turn, Ukrainian media exposes lies of Russia propaganda by ironically mentioning them as memes type of «military on leave», «lost soldiers», and «weapons from mines» (a way Russian military presence in Ukraine was explained by Russian officials, in particular during hearings in court).

Reframing procedures, which have been deployed by Russian media workers and trolls, are directed at limiting the war scenario as Ukraine’s «inside» problem. Propagandists use numerous terms and topics for reloading the international agenda and downplaying the fact of military conflict in general. Russian media and diplomats lead a permanent «refocusing» campaign through discussing a variety of «urgent issues», in particular proposing «alternative» reasons (a «coup» in Kyiv, «Ukrainian nationalism», etc.) for calling the UN General Assembly, in order to divert attention from their own abuses of international law.

A simple category of «interest» clearly exposes a reason for both «distraction» strategies and multiple distortions and projections. They all become intensified in decisive phases of war. Theoretically speaking, informational warfare in its relation to military actions 1) can be relatively «autonomous» in the pre-war phase of the interstate relationship, 2) serves as a prelude to military conflict, and 3) is used to supplement and serves as an umbrella for military scenarios. In «submerged» military-informational operations, alternative stories sound remarkably nonsensical but diversified. Since 2014, the Kremlin has managed to elaborate and spread up to ten «principal» fake versions about the crash of the MH-17 civilian flight, an example of directly instrumental and also entirely false informational «cover up» for military attacks and terrorist actions.

For Western politicians and media, siding with one party of the Russian-Ukrainian encounter has been a challenge against double standards. Using names and terms describing Ukrainian problems, foreign politicians and media 1) define responsibilities on both sides, and also 2) choose the degree and form of their own participation or distancing from the conflict. If the conflict is a domestic one («civil war»), not mentioned or referred to in euphemistic forms («Ukraine does not control its borders»), international actors can accept not much obligating position of being outside conflict or beyond it (with roles of distant advisors and reluctant mediators). The definition «Ukraine is under attack» would sound more alarming and require action instead of reiterating polite words.

In the beginning of the war, the cautious reaction of global political community to military conflict in Donbas was reflected as the term «Ukraine crisis», which overshadowed involvement of external forces. Statements about «concerns», pronounced by international leaders, became ironic memes in Ukrainian media. In contrast to the «Ukraine crisis» approach, a «stronger» focus on the Russian «authorship» of the military situation means changing relations inside the global «nuclear club», making steps for new level of global security (revisiting the Budapest Memorandum possibility and revising the veto rule in the UN), and eventually imposing strict measures on the aggressor. Without resettling and recharging global security mechanisms, international mediators will serve only as
firefighters who extinguish flames on margins of vast territory but do not look into activities and do not stop the arsonist.

**Rhetorical forte, piano, and just noise:**

**euphemisms vs. terminological «resolutions» in media analysis of conflict**

Since the beginning of Russian military aggression, the Ukrainian media has been paying close attention to Western reactions to the conflict represented as both opinions and practical moves. The actions and actors of the outside influence, according to major media topics, include «European and US negotiators», «European observers», and «Western sanctions». The fact of reaction as such has always been inspiring for the Ukrainian public. However, the «Ukraine crisis» approach restricted both Western rhetoric and deeds. The peace-talking options often considered Russian interest rather than Ukrainian; years-long «observation» were not followed by anti-freezing measures, and impact of early «cosmetic» sanctions looked hardly detectable. Besides, some international actors intentionally set barriers to Western restrictive measures against military and information expansion of the Russian Federation.

A whole political layer was formed worldwide that is manipulated by Russia and, in turn, trying to manipulate the issue of sanctions policies in their native countries. Decoding the messages of Russian supporters who try to weaken already approved measures is therefore an important counter-strategy in Russian-Ukrainian informational war. Ukrainian and foreign authors identify the manipulation techniques, and in particular direct their criticism towards such sources and emanations of pro-Russian sentiment as 1) language of the leaders’ political statements; 2) language of diplomacy; and 3) media narratives that avoid terms implying responsibility of Russia for the war.

There is a number of politicians whose names serve as recognizable personality symbols of the intention to undermine unity (pretty vague and achieved in difficult way) of Western democracies in the question of agreed policies regarding the aggressor: «Russia always did it [tried to use Western controversies] and even managed to receive its Trojan horses in European community personified by Hungarian Prime Minister Orban, Czech president Zeman, and now also Italian Prime Minister Conte» [9]. Miloš Zeman, one of the most populist European heads of state, considers annexation of Crimea «a complete fact», so he does not see a problem in cancelling «restrictions in cooperation with Russia», and stresses that his view is in line with «leading politicians from Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Italy» [7].

The pro-Russian activities of Western politicians usually are the outcome of Russia’s strategy to invest in West and then play on money obligations and business dependencies. Sometimes pro-Putin cooperation takes on personal, even private shapes, like in case of Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl dancing with Putin at her own wedding. The way the media introduce her profile, «an independent politician supported by the pro-Russia Austrian Freedom Party», [14] explains the origin of friendship, however it is worth noting that combining words «independent» and «pro-Russian» sounds oxymoronic. Russia takes advantage of both leftist and right-wing movements. Episodes of cooperation between Putin’s United Russia party and the Italian populist League party is a clue to explanation of why the former League Secretary and acting Interior Minister Matteo Salvini has coopted the Russian interpretation of events in Ukraine and justifies Putin’s aggression [2].
Those belonging to the «European friends of Putin» club actually call for forgetting Kremlin crimes, but express their views in an indirect way. Their discourse produces a series of soft expressions with clear pragmatic subtext, a type of «saving face» (appearance of Putin’s reputation), «capsulate the problem [of military conflict]», «take a pause [in a search for real solution to the war]», and «engage in dialogue» (imitate relations). Many of such euphemisms echo in the Ukrainian public space as ironic memes. All the formulas of «economic diplomacy» as justification for Russia appeal to positive values like avoiding pain, repairing broken entities, being civilized and opposing isolation: «normalization», «maintain relations», «keep the door open». It is very probable that the peaceful mind of the average European takes these calls at face value. Yet it appears to be a typical manipulation because the term «relations» is used to denote a two-sided exchange (Russia-Europe) in the case that is actually three-sided, but excludes Ukraine from calculation. Anti-sanctions agenda completely abandons the political view of restrictions in favor of their economic interpretation. If to consider Ukraine’s interest, economic restrictions are not «pain», they are made to avoid pains of war.

Influential European officials sometimes combine declarations against «what Russia has done to Crimea and Donbas» with claims that Russia has already been punished too much. The European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker had long referred to the Russian president as «my friend Vladimir Putin», called Russia «a big player» (objecting to Obama’s attempt to downplay its rank to «just a regional power»), and called to finish «demonizing Russia» and restore relations in many fields «where cooperation is possible» [12]. The word «demonizing» implies non-fair unfounded attitude towards the country that occupied part of the other state. According to such an upside down vision, the problem is not that Russia’s victims are dying physically, but Russia suffering pain of prejudiced attitude. Given absence of serious punishment, the attitude is, on the contrary, unjustly nice.

European «anti-demonizing» support is in tune with Russia’s strategic self-description as a victim of «Russophobia», which constructs image of exaggerated negativity. Russian political observers allude to the symbolic meanings of the word «McCarthyism» as a historical parallel to present from their viewpoint excessive suspicions concerning Russians’ involvement in global affairs. These complaints do not matter for a simple reason. Russian leaders and ideologists time after time demonstrate a habit to speak to the world while keeping finger on a virtual nuclear button. Announcements starting from the slogan «Iskanders laugh» to Putin’s accentuated remark «Why would we need a world without Russia» [16] definitely sends the message: «how do you dare not to be afraid of us?» Politicians themselves created this image and now complain that it is like this. So, their request for compassion is more than false.

Arguments of Russian propaganda infiltrate Western discourses the same way Russian money infiltrates Western economies. Critics indicate that money-driven «pragmatism» is a disguise word for hypocritical practices deteriorating the basic norms of Western political worldview: «Pragmatism... is a beautiful word that includes the principle of freedom and democracy for us, but for you only depending on the obstacles» [10]. Human rights and the rule of law are neglected if not to react to Russia’s criminal practices, in particular the massive arrests of Ukrainian citizens under fabricated charges of «terrorism». Exactly in relation to such context, critics remark that «European values» become substituted by «interests of business». Most radical metaphorical images stress a large-scale economic dependence: «Political Europe gradually turns into a kind of supermarket, with Gazprom
slowly going inside and putting one influential politician after another into his basket” [10]. Tropes in critical discourses sometimes sound emotional, even grotesque, but they draw proper attention to tendency called the «Schröderzation» of European politics.

Emotive statements with some totalizing effect usually regard a certain part of political spectrum. In reality, patterns of attitudes towards Ukraine are represented by different trends and discourses within each particular country. In German politics, Angela Merkel used to be a skillful mediator between responsible security-minded persons and business preoccupied «pragmatists». The same function she serves for Europe in general trying to make sense of all the political currents, counter-currents, and undercurrents. Thanks to Merkel, and in spite of much noise, European sanctions on Russia for Crimea were not cancelled. Obstacles to their strengthening, however, remain, and in particular they look like the moderate mainstream in foreign politics: «If you look at German Federal Foreign Office website, you will find there many sections on actual problems, in regard to which the ministry voices its position. In case of Russian aggression against Ukraine the corresponding section is called «Ukrainian conflict» or «Ukraine crisis» [3]. It is easier for such definitions to coexist with activities promoting Nord Stream 2 and similar projects.

Criticism regarding anti-sanction actions and motives coexists in Ukrainian public discourse with numerous stories about Western help and understanding. In order to create a real objective picture of the «outside influence», Ukrainian media draw on a strategy of differentiated images and also reflect on evolution in approaches, at least particular, related to certain groups and personalities. For instance, Czech Republic in Ukrainian media landscape is associated not only with Zeman. Radio Svoboda introduces sound ideas of responsible international law experts in this country, resulting in a book project, who see «not a Ukraine «crisis» and «civil war», but definitely Russian aggression against Ukraine» [11].

By choosing the word «war» foreign politicians demonstrate solidarity (strategic or situational, «institutional» or personal) with Ukraine. One live communication context, where different terms signified positions of foreign governments and media on Ukraine’s stance in war, was a widely cited case with Russian journalist asking Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski about the «crisis in Ukraine». The Minister declined the way question was formulated and accentuated that there is no such a notion. Instead, he used a «stronger» word answering the question: «There is Russian-Ukrainian conflict caused by Russia» [8]. The rhetorical figure of correction was used in that case to suggest more adequate term and prevent a false direction of the entire conversation.

Canadian political and legal analyst Ariana Gic, critic of Russian propaganda and its impact on the world networks, in social media exposes numerous cases of media language that represent Russia-oriented bias. One of her Facebook posts shows a screenshot on 23 August 2018 to BBC News report titled, «Ukraine crisis: Five soldiers killed in clashes in east». The article not only uses the definition «Ukraine crisis» as a general frame of misinterpretation, but describes an «assault by separatist forces» referring to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. The author of the post provides a link to the original statement on the Ministry’s site, which said that Ukrainian troops were killed by «Russian occupational forces», so in fact the source uses different language than the «translation» in the BBC News.

The examples provided above are indicative of the dynamic unfolding in politics and media that is characterized on the one hand by intensity of information warfare against
definitions explaining substantial features of hybrid war and military conflict, and on the other hand some signs of growing widespread acceptance of real nature of the conflict together with its global implications.

«This is war»: a terminological transition to reality’s gradual recognition

In the beginning of Russia’s military operations against Ukraine, vocabulary of the world’s «concerned» leaders signaled to Ukrainians that rhetoric would not be followed by resolute actions. Later on, politicians and media outlets became more receptive to the idea of calling things by proper names. There were two crucial factors in further «upgrade» of terminology and vision of war, namely Ukraine’s own «standing the ground» at international arena and the fact that many Western countries became affected by Russia’s hybrid war, felt vulnerable and thus motivated to raise security awareness.

It has been more than three years after the Russian military campaign in Donbas started when author Adrian Bonenberger wrote in the New York Times about the «intrusion» and its far-reaching implications, like a threat of «broader European conflict», as the «war that nobody notices» [13]. He assessed Obama’s strategies in response to military conflict as unsatisfactory and also the ones of his successor, Trump, as far from being sufficient: «With the not-war in eastern Ukraine now in its fourth year, President Trump has failed to accomplish even the most modest improvement on President Obama’s dismal record managing Russia’s intrusion on Ukrainian territory» [13]. This was written in June 2017, just about two months before Trump signed new sanctions imposing restrictions on Russia’s energy and defense sectors. Amidst scandals and in spite of backward moves, the course for tougher measures later continued.

The consolidated position of the U.S. Congress, progressive media, and experts led to new level of support for Ukraine by means of both declarations and practical actions. One of the most potent voices instrumental in spreading a real vision of war in eastern Ukraine at international arena is Kurt Volker, the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine, who is trying to prepare the ground for meaningful decisions and solutions by clear formulations. «This is not frozen conflict. This is Russian aggression in hot phase», Volker said this after his personal visits to Donbas war zone [5].

One more opposition, «separatist movement» vs. «Russian-Ukrainian military encounter», with the same function of redefinition suggestion, appears in the speech of another observer, American congressman Will Hurd who concluded after his visit to Ukraine: «Kyiv, not Kiev. This is not separatist movement. 920 tanks in east Ukraine are Russian. The Russian officers rule there» (The VOA chasmine). This public exposure of the occupant’s resources and consistent recognition of Ukraine’s vulnerability is a promising sign for further practical solutions. Meanwhile, this type of approach does not let Russian leadership to cross the red line of a potential offensive.

Ukraine’s own way to official recognition of Russia as aggressor had been long, but parliament gradually approved necessary definitions. «The law about measures for implementation of state sovereignty over temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts» (the «law about de-occupation»), adopted in 2017, refers to Russia’s actions in Ukraine as «military aggression of the Russian Federation» and calls the actors of conflict «illegal Russian and pro-Russian military formations»: «Verkhovna Rada recognized that this territory is occupied by Russian Federation, it is now not controlled
by Ukraine» [8]. Ukraine has also deployed more meaningful and radical terms switching from ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) to JFO (Joint Forces Operation).

The «Ukraine conflict» has turned out to be hotter than hybrid and also wider than Ukrainian. The notion of a «hybrid war» has long been used in international discourses, but appeared to be only part of truth about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. What this term rightly captures and catches is 1) the use of informational warfare and psycho-technologies of influence as addition to military power; 2) proxy-component, manipulating the local population; and 3) corruption and financial pressure on governments and political groups in many countries. In a certain sense and context this term is opposite to full-scale war, and within this partial and particular opposition («oh, it’s just hybrid») it could be a form of diminishing the real scale of the encounter. So, it is not correct to view Russian-Ukrainian conflict as «entirely» hybrid due to the 1) cross-border fire and invasion of Russian troops in summer of 2014; 2) military convoys with weapons and supplies from the RF to Donbas, 3) the Russian army commanders and controllers on occupied territory.

Ukraine has recognized that it has «real» military conflict (not a «crisis» or «civil war»), and the West has learned that it is in a state of hybrid war with Russia («Russia’s global hybrid war against Western democracies»). The concept of Cold War has been revived, and images of World War III or World War IV are discussed in media as not quite metaphorical battles, since they address present threats and try to prevent the full-scale scenario. Many countries had recently received their own wake-up calls regarding Russia’s intentions to interfere with their policies, including the U.S., Great Britain, Switzerland, and Greece. Identical facts resulted into generalized vision of the aggressive and expansionist strategy: «Russia’s murderous hit squads insult nations that uphold the rule of law» [15].

Is there any progress on the world media and political scene in bringing terms in correspondence with the reality of war? The answer is rather positive. As time goes and conflict lasts, there has been a «terminological transition» from weak and indecisive definitions to strict and substantial ones. With assessments becoming more definite and continuing investigation of aggression and occupation cases, Western politicians become more motivated to adopt efficient measures against violations of international law. Considered as a process and dialogue, global public space shows signs of hope for resolution of conflict caused by aggression of the Russian Federation.

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ТЕРМІНОЛОГІЧНІ МАКРОФРЕЙМИ
У МАС-МЕДІЙНОМУ АНАЛІЗІ СЦЕНАРІЮ ВІЙНИ:
НАЗВА КОНФЛІКТУ ЯК ПРОГРАМА ЙОГО СТРАТЕГІЙ І РОЗВ’ЯЗОК

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Стаття досліджує термінологічні макрофрейми у мас-медійних дискурсах аналізу вогенного протистояння, зокрема назви сценарію конфлікту і підпорядковані їм термінологічні мережі. У групі дефінітивних характеристик російсько-української війни виокремлені означники за мірою інтенсивності протистояння (криза – вогнівний конфлікт, війна), методами (гібридна – повномасштабна, пряме вторгнення), визнанням загученості сторін («громадянська війна» – міждержавний конфлікт), масштабом (локальний, міждержавний, глобальний рівень).

Для мас-медійної риторики вогенного конфлікту характерна варіативність і емотивна забарвленість термінів, зумовлена їхньою контекстуальною належністю. В основу аналізу дискурсу різних груп покладено прагматичний сценарій, в якому найважливішими є рольові позиції – 1) нападник, 2) сторона захисту, 3) медіатори, посередники. Риторики безпосередніх сторін вогенного противитворства є цілковито антагоністичними, а в дискурсі вони взаємодіють за принципом контрастування.

Соціокогнітивний підхід дозволяє детально проаналізувати, як терміни на означення елементів сценарію вогенного подій стають інструментами досягнення цілей. Назва конфлікту означає стратегічне програмування його результату. Семіотична визначеність дає шанс стороні, що зазнала нападу, домогтися підтримки партнерів, а також захищати свої позиції у судових інстанціях. Вибір термінологічно-дефінітивної лінії сигналізує про наміри учасників перемовин.

Протягом часу вогенных дій тривав процес переорієнтування дискурсу міжнародних медій на візію «війни в Україні» як міждержавної, на противагу локальної, громадянської. Еволюція термінологічного позиціювання міжнародних інституцій та акторів позитивно корелює з їхніми рішеннями практичними діями на підтримку України.

Ключові слова: політичний дискурс, риторика, репрезентація, аналіз конфлікту, мова пропаганди, побудова ідентичності, термін, поняття, інтерпретація, кадр, сценарій, наратив, мем, евфемізм, оксюморон, посередництво.