

УДК 327

DOI 10.30970/vir.2019.47.0.10984

ETHNO-NATIONAL INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE UKRAINIAN- RUSSIAN CONFLICT IN THE LIGHT OF MODIFICATION AND HYBRIDIZATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN, SECURITY AND MILITARY POLICY

Oksana Shamborovska, Igor Izhnin, Kostiantyn Polishchuk

*Ivan Franko National University of Lviv,
1, Universytetska Str., Lviv, Ukraine, 79000, tel. (0322) 96-41-32,
e-mail: irds.dep.intrel@lnu.edu.ua*

This article examines the main characteristics of the nowadays conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine from the point of its ethnic background, allowing to understand its ethnic implications as well as contradictions. The contexts of the modern international relations system and internal Ukrainian situation are used. Factors influencing the process of ethnic instrumentalization and internationalization of the conflict are revealed. The brief analysis of the current updates and modifications of fundamental Russian doctrines in foreign, security and military policy is provided. The article proposes the possible variants of the outcomes of internationalization of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

Key words: ethnic conflict; ethnic identity; «greed versus grievance» theory; instrumentalization and internationalization of the conflict; hybridization of foreign policy; humanitarian intervention; responsibility to protect.

The majority of the modern ethno-national conflicts are traditionally perceived as an internal affair of the particular nation-state. Ethnic groups confront one to another in the framework of the existing social organization or particular ethnic group is involved into struggle with the central government over issues of its rights and power distribution. The conflict in the Eastern Ukraine is precisely the last case.

According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research ¹ there is a total of 50 conflicts counted in Europe in 2018. Almost 60 percent of the conflicts in Europe remained on a non-violent level. Moreover, Europe's only war in recent years, taking place in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region, de-escalated to a limited war in 2018 for the first time since the conflict's outbreak five years ago. The conflict, primarily over the secession of the Donbas region, between several militant antigovernment groups, including the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics,

¹ Conflict Barometer // Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK) [online]: <https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en> (accessed 14.11.2019)

(military) backed and supported by Russia on the one hand, and the Ukrainian government on the other. According to the UN, up to 13 000 people in total and at least 3 318 civilians have been killed and between 7 000 and 9 000 injured since the beginning of the conflict in April 2014.

There is neither political, nor academic consensus on what to call the crisis in Ukraine. Russians usually call it a civil war, underlining the ethno-national component of the conflict. The language of civil war is seen, however, as a capitulation to Russia by many people in Ukraine. That's why representatives of the Ukrainian government, supported by Western countries emphasize the Russian aggression, invasion and annexation (Crimea), avoiding the word (interstate) «war» in the official, but exploiting it in unofficial, «political» language. Some sort of internationally recognized name of the conflict could stand the official and consensus term of the OSCE, who is dealing with «the crisis in and around Ukraine», providing high-level diplomacy and multilateral dialogue; monitoring the security situation on the ground; promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and strengthening democratic institutions and practices. In fact, Ukraine faces nowadays a very complex set of military, political, economical, social, informational etc. challenges, including elements of ethno-national conflict, separatism, aggression of a much stronger (nuclear) super-power, occupation and annexation, war on terrorism, civil and interstate war. First of all, Kyiv has to deal with Russian Federation, although there is no (official) war between the both countries. The non-violent crisis over territory, international power, and resources between Russia and Ukraine escalated to a violent crisis. Since 2013 the conflict was affected by both the contested status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the limited war in Donbas. The war over secession, the orientation of the political system, and resources in the Donbas region between several militant anti-government groups, including the self-proclaimed Donetsk (DPR) and Luhansk (LPR) People's Republics supported by Russia on the one hand, and the Ukrainian government, supported by Western countries on the other, deescalated recently to a limited war.

Assuming the fact that nowadays international system is based on the principle of state sovereignty it is used to camouflage the existing ethno-national conflict as an issue of entirely internal affair of the state. However, due to the growth of interdependence in a globalized world and development of more elaborated humanitarian standards, ethno-national conflicts and the status of the ethnic minorities have become the systemic problem of the international relations at least since the end of World War II. The problem remains actual until now.

In order to understand the internal dynamics and escalation capabilities of the ethno-national conflicts we need to consider the key concept of ethnic identity and ethnic self-identification. The process of self-identification is based on the opposition of two affiliation concepts: «we» and «they». This dichotomy becomes of particular importance in conflict two or more ethnic communities and exists primarily in consciousness of the persons affiliating themselves with the particular ethnic group. The dichotomy can be described as a counterpoise to the contact with «others», who in their turn perceive «us» as «other/different in some way».

These processes are not a sign of conflict by themselves. They are natural stages of self-identification of person / persons in society and one of the mechanisms to maintain unity in the society / community group. Nevertheless, based on the results of this self-identification intra-group communication systems appear that allow the community to maintain its ethnic self-sufficient (in terms of ethnicity) existence, especially when the later is bind to coexist with other ethnic groups / communities. However, pre-established and rigid image of «stranger», «ethnically other» begins to play rather specific role under conditions of conflict – on the one hand «otherness» is justifying the conflict itself and on the other – legitimizing the demands, claims and complaints of one ethnic group on another. Finally, Lewis Coser in his book «The Functions of Social Conflict» pointed to the fact that the conflict with the «outer» group is helping to create a more coherent and cohesive community². Under such conditions the process of ethnic self-identification, focused primarily on group solidarity and confrontation with ethnical «aliens», almost always hinders the possibilities of democratization in the framework of existing social structures.

Another dichotomy, trying to explain causes of ethno-national intrastate conflict is the so-called «greed versus grievance» theory³. Proponents of the greed argument argue that armed conflicts are caused by a combatant's desire for self-enrichment. These motivations are manifested in multiple ways, including economic gain through control of goods and resources or by increased power within a given state, what we can observe in the Eastern Ukraine, where the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR, represented by the former criminals, mercenaries and terrorists (designated by the Ukrainian government), are generally driven by self-enrichment. «Grievance» stands, on the other hand, for the argument that people rebel over issues of identity, e.g. ethnicity, religion, language, attachment to another (russian) culture, history, traditions etc., rather than over economics. That argument looks more legitimate in the eyes of international community and is more convenient for separatists and their protectors in Moscow, which is promoting and playing this ethno-national «grievance-card» in its internationalization efforts in the Eastern Ukraine.

In the context of Ukrainian-Russian conflict it should be noted that social mobilization of groups opposing the central Ukrainian government was multidimensional in nature and took place along several key lines of separation and self-identification.

First, the above mentioned military opposing to the government groups do affiliate themselves not so much as belonging to Russian ethnicity, as with the Russian-speaking community (which is determined by the lack of skills and a desire to use the Ukrainian language). The language issue for actually the whole period of existence of an independent Ukrainian state was politicized and used by variety of political entrepreneurs in the domestic political struggle, first of all, to create and retain electoral base. At least initially it was the language issue which became a starting point for the process of politicization of ethnicity in Ukraine.

² Coser L. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Florence. KY: Routledge, 1998, p. 87.

³ Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2002. Greed and grievance in civil wars. CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-01, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.

Secondly, the ideological values and «myths» contributed to the formation of a sense of «otherness» and non-affiliation with Ukraine in some regions of the state – namely confrontation of ideological legacy of the Soviet Union and new Ukrainian state official nationally-oriented ideology (including pro-communist sentiments and nostalgia for the Soviet era in much of the population Crimea and Eastern Ukraine; their rejection and misunderstanding of images and figures, symbolizing the struggle for Ukraine’s independence). These differences – as in the case with the language issue – have been actively used by different political forces to obtain electoral support in different part of the country.

Thirdly, the socio-economic structure of the industrial region of Donbass and the Crimea contributed to identification of specific ethno-linguistic «Russian-speaking» social group. In these socially depressive regions a significant proportion of the population imposes the responsibility for the economic difficulties inherent to economic transformation processes at the central government of Ukraine perceiving it as hostile.

Another aspect of the problem lies in the area of international / intergovernmental relations. It concerns the calls for the protection of «compatriots» outside their state, which often becomes a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of states with the multinational / multi-ethnic population. One of the most discussed instruments in this context is a humanitarian intervention, which involves the threat and use of military forces against another state, with publicly stating its goal is to end human rights violations in that state, interfering in the internal affairs of a state by sending military forces into the territory or airspace of a sovereign state that has not committed an act of aggression against another state, responding, however, to situations that do not necessarily pose direct threats to states strategic interests, but instead is motivated by humanitarian objectives⁴. To its proponents (Moscow), it marks imperative action in the face of human rights abuses, over the rights of state sovereignty, while to its detractors (Kyiv) it is often viewed as a pretext for military intervention often devoid of legal sanction, selectively deployed and achieving only ambiguous ends.

Moreover, this issue is fixed in official documents of particular states and becomes one of the central provisions of the foreign policy concepts and doctrines. After 2014 Russia appears to be entering a new cycle of updating several national security strategy documents. According to the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by the Russian President on November 30, 2016 as a main objective of the State’s foreign policy is «to ensure comprehensive, effective protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad, including within various international frameworks; to strengthen Russia’s role in international culture; promote and consolidate the position of the Russian language in the world; raise global awareness of Russia’s cultural achievements and national historical legacy, cultural identity of the peoples of Russia, and Russian education and research; consolidate the Russian-speaking diaspora; ... to further the consolidation of compatriots living abroad so as to enable them to better

⁴ Alton Frye. 'Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine'. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000

realize their rights in the countries of residence, and to facilitate the preservation of the Russian diaspora's identity and its ties with the historical homeland, as well as voluntary relocation of compatriots to the Russian Federation...»⁵. In fact, the Russian and Russian-speaking (sic!) minorities living in Russia's «near abroad» (the term used by Russians to describe the newly independent states created after the fall of the Soviet Union) are playing a key role in increasing Russia's power in the region by influencing Russian politics and helping Russia re-create its own national identity. So-called Russian compatriots have become an important instrument of the update hybrid Russian foreign policy in the post-soviet space.

In addition to the Foreign policy concept the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2015) points out: «The Russian Federation has the legitimate right to employ the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies ... to protect its citizens abroad in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation...»⁶. One of the main tasks of the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies in peacetime (sic!) is: «to protect citizens of the Russian Federation abroad from armed attack on them»⁷. It should be mentioned, that it is rather difficult to define clearly what the term «legitimate interests» imply and to determine the critical threshold of rights violation of (Russian / Russian-speaking) ethnic community enough for initiation of protection, especially when the system of decision-making in the Russian Federation is sufficiently voluntaristic and obviously has a problem with democracy and transparency. In the light of a new updated or updating Russian foreign, security and military policy approaches we can expect a continued emphasis on non-military methods before and during military conflict, operationalized by the Russian military leaders in Ukraine and Syria. In the recent strategy speech in March 2019⁸ Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov noted that although the decisive role in conflict is still played by military force, the role of non-military methods in the achievement of political and strategic objectives has only increased over time. He directed military scientific research organizations to continue to improve these strategy concepts. However, the «strategy of active defence» that he outlined signaled growing preparedness for more proactive use of military means «for the pre-emptive neutralization of threats». The “strategy of active defence» label for existing Russian practices also appears to be a rhetorical and propaganda tool to characterize Russia's long-term multi-domain campaign to

⁵ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации от 30 ноября 2016 г. [On-line]: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (accessed 14.11.2019).

⁶ Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, в редакции от 2015 г. [On-line]: http://stat.doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/more.htm?id=10339919@egNPA (accessed 14.11.2019).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Strategy speech of Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov at the Russian Academy of Military Science [On-line]: <https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3557155.html> (accessed 14.11.2019).

undermine the existing global order as a defensive reaction to what Moscow claims is a Western hybrid campaign against Russia.

So we shall assume, that Russia will use the ethnic and social discontent of the people in the former soviet republics (within the spheres of «historical» Russian influence: Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldavia, Baltic States, South Caucasus and Central Asia) to increase its influence over them, trying to exploit political, regional, religious, social, and ethnic conflicts and to influence the foreign and security policies of each country. One of the ways to achieve these objectives is to take advantage of ethno-national differences. Russian people and other Russian-speaking communities are regarded as sources of regional influence by political decision-makers in Russia, and the Kremlin thinks that creating as many privileges as possible for the Russian diaspora means investing in a loyal social and political structure suitable for supporting Russia's state policy. To increase this sort of resources Moscow uses the policy of so-called passportization – simplified issuing of Russian passports for the people in conflict areas to enlarge their number and relevance for a potential humanitarian protection, namely intervention. As the number of Russian passport holders in regions of adjoining nations grows, Russia then invokes its national interest in defending its citizens by promoting the independence or annexation of these regions.

In general, we can determine two main reasons for the internationalization of contemporary ethnic conflicts that are fundamentally different in their nature and grounds. The first reason is the massive violations of the rights of ethnic groups and communities in a certain country, that lead or may lead to mass violence, massacre and civil war with a subsequent ethnic cleansing, genocide, humanitarian disasters, etc. (as the examples of such situations serve Rwanda in 1994, the states of the former Yugoslavia in 1992–1995 and 1998–1999, Somalia in 1992 to date). In this case, the motivation for internationalization or even direct intervention of third parties or international organizations into the conflict, above all, is a moral duty of the international community to provide and ensure the minimal humanitarian standards regardless of ethnic, national or religious affiliation. The second reason is protecting national interests of particular states and pursuing of states' foreign policy objectives (primarily it refers to the state, claiming the global or regional leadership and implement active / aggressive foreign policy, as it is exemplified by acts of the Russian Federation interference into events in Ukraine in 2013–2015). Such a classification of is more analytical and it is difficult to argue that we can define and trace independently two aforementioned causes of internationalization of ethnic conflicts in actual international politics.

However, on this background a conceptual problem appears that has not yet found its solution: how to reconcile and maintain a balance between the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and providing humanitarian law and the right of nations to self-determination.

It should also be noted that the very modern system of international relations imposes limits on the ability to solve this problem. These limits have either an objective or subjective nature. Nowadays the international community objectively does not possess the opportunities and resources that could permit to solve effectively

all the ethnic conflicts that threaten international security and stability. There is no objective common framework of norms that would regulate the issue and provide an effective procedure for resolving ethnic conflicts – in fact you can talk about long-term unreadiness of the international community to predict and solve ethnic-national contradictions, especially those which involve armed violence. Therefore, the international community is forced to react to any given conflict *ad hoc*, like launching the Normandy contact group format – irregular meetings or calls of senior representatives of four countries – Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and France with the goal of finding a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. On the other hand, there are restrictions on the level of the existing institutional system – the most obvious illustrations of this are, for example, the system of decision making at the UN Security Council with its «veto» institute for great powers; consensus decision by all 57 members of the OSCE; the lack of developed institutional infrastructure for peacekeeping. To this we must add the efforts of states to implement their own national interests at the expense of interests of others; differences in geopolitical approaches to foreign policy. One of the modern sophisticated instruments in this context is an approach, introduced in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and called «Responsibility to protect». It found that the sovereignty not only gave a state the right to «control» its affairs, it also conferred on the State primary «responsibility» for protecting the people within its borders. When a State fails to protect its people – either through lack of ability or a lack of willingness – the responsibility shifts to the broader international community.⁹ Responsibility to protect seeks to establish a clearer code of conduct for partly discredited humanitarian interventions, criticising and attempting to change the discourse and terminology surrounding the issue of humanitarian intervention. It argues that the notion of a «right to intervene» is problematic and should be replaced with the «responsibility to protect». It includes not only post-conflict reaction, but four key elements: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace keeping, and, for the first time, post-conflict peace-building – so-called prevention-consolidation continuum.

Basing on the said above and experience of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in the Eastern Ukraine we can formulate the define factors that influence the process of internationalization. One of the most important factors in the internationalization of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in author's opinion, is the availability of ethnically related communities abroad. Of course, it happens because of possibility to involve the ethnic compatriots from abroad into the conflict. Moreover the very conflict could be inspirited from abroad. In our case, self-identification of the Russian-speaking population of the Eastern of Ukraine with Russian ethnicity and its cultivation (internally in Ukraine as well as from abroad) cumulated into ethnic-national conflict¹⁰

¹¹.

⁹ «The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty» (PDF). ICISS. December 2001. [On-line]: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/iciss_report.pdf (accessed 16.11.2019).

¹⁰ T. Gurr. *Ethnic conflict in world politics*. – Boulder, 1994.

¹¹ T. Gurr. *Why men rebel*. – Princeton University Press, 1970.

Another important factor may be an external ideological support that parties to the conflict receive from ideologically allied actors of international relations. In the case of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, separatist groups find understanding and support among Russia's population and the widest circles of Russian political establishment in the context of ideas to restore the mightiness of Russian state; building of the so called «*Russkiy Mir*»; unity of all Slavs under the auspices Russia and mental proximity of all Russians. Moscow mobilized many state institutions to promote these ideas, first of all, the *Russkiy Mir* Foundation (Russian World, funded by both the federal government and private companies with a network of approximately sixty-five centers), which helps develop policies on Russian diaspora and conducts activities related to public diplomacy. The objectives of the *Russkiy Mir* Foundation are to promote Russian language instruction in Russia and around the world; to introduce Russia's history, art, and culture to the world; and to reconnect the Russian population abroad with their homeland by establishing strong ties with them and supporting cultural and social programs, exchanges, and voluntary resettlement.

While Russia has embraced soft power, developments in Ukraine over the last few years show that Russia will also apply hard power in order to achieve its national goals of increasing its authority in the region and reestablishing its spheres of influence under the pretext of Russian diaspora. Jeremy Bender states that since Putin declared that Russia has the right to intervene when Russian minorities are in trouble, a Russian intervention in Eastern Europe or Central Asia could be a problem in the future¹².

The third factor concerns can be defined as concerns of political elites, and sometimes the broader groups of population of the neighboring countries, on political and social processes that could destabilize the situation in the region or their own country. Such concerns on situation in Ukraine can be traced in the media coverage of Russian media. Although in this case it should be noted that Russian media coverage of crisis in Ukraine is lacking objectivity and it is biased by propaganda and political discourse. A recent now-controversial survey, conducted by marketing agency New Image Marketing Group for newspaper *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* and think tank Institute for the Future¹³, interviewed 1 606 residents of the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk and showed, that 76 % of people living in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts believe that Ukraine is experiencing a civil war, not fighting against Russian-backed militants; that the three groups most responsible for the war in Donbas are Ukraine's current government, the United States and the activists who participated in the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution, which overthrew pro-Kremlin President Viktor Yanukovich; 86 % of people from the occupied Donbas believe that the Kremlin didn't start the war, and roughly the same percentage believes that Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 was intended to «legally defend

¹² Sencerman, Oncel. Russian-Diaspora as a Means of Russian Foreign Policy. // *Revista de Stiinte Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques* 49 (2016): 97-107.

¹³ Survey Done in Ukraine's Occupied Territories Reveals Startling Opinions. [On-line]: <https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/opinion-poll-in-ukraines-occupied-territories-reveals-startling-truths> (accessed 16.11.2019).

Russian-speaking citizens alienated by Ukraine» at the time. It might also be because of the media they consume. The vast majority of respondents (84 %) said they get their news from Russian television, including TV channels like Rossiya 1 (43 %), NTV (26 %) and Rossiya 24 (19 %), which regularly air pro-Kremlin propagandistic coverage and talk shows. In fact, according to the survey, the second most respected person among residents of the occupied Donbas (after Russian President Vladimir Putin) is pro-Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, who works for Rossiya 1.

Another factor is the involvement of the superpowers into the ethnic conflict. The issue of superpowers involvement is tightly connected with the problem of the structure of the international relations system, as well as with the dynamic of their interrelated and contradictory interests. Combination of them will define the possibilities and scope of internationalization of the conflict.

One of the most interesting aspects of the problem is the factor of politicization of ethnicity in international relations. It could be defined as determination of the foreign policy of the states by interethnic relations under the influence of potential or actual ethnic conflict. This process could be facilitated by the existence and proliferation of ethnic Diasporas; economical, cultural, political or even personal ties with the particular ethnic communities; historical events of considerable resonance connecting to the particular ethnic group etc.

We cannot omit such factor as public opinion. Apart from the direct involvement of neighbouring countries or the superpowers, the internationalization of ethnic conflict could have other dimensions. The development of new communication tools, agencies and strategies can become decisive for the way of the conflict evolution. World public opinion, especially in the West, can be quickly mobilized with the help of the media in favours of one of the parties to the conflict, which certainly affects the approaches to its resolution. The events round the peacekeeping mission in Somalia in the early 90-ies of the XX century and Yugoslavia in the mid and late 90-ies of the XX century clearly demonstrated the powerful effect of media onto the foreign policy even the biggest and most influential states (like USA). Massive information and propaganda campaign has been launched by the Russian Federation in connection with the events in Ukraine with the aim to discredit the new Ukrainian government and to win internal Russian public support for the pro-Russian separatist / terrorist groups operating in the east of Ukraine. It is just again confirming the significance of this factor. Despite the ongoing «reforms» of the 1990s and 2000s in key institutions of international security (OSCE and NATO), none of them actually appeared to be sufficiently prepared for action in the new conditions – the conditions of hybrid warfare. Russia's hybrid operations transform the entire international security zone into a single «risk zone», where hybrid aggression can be resolutely against any country or group of countries, accompanied by militaristic or quasi-militaristic methods.

The last but not the least factor which has to be taken into the consideration is the activity of international organization and associations such as UN, OSCE, EU, in spite of the restrictions inherent to the nature of the modern international institutional

system mentioned above. The UN has the unique power to intervene in ethnic conflicts (as well as in other types of internal conflict) basing its actions on the norms of the UN Charter (Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, Ch. VI, VII).

In any case, today only UN and other international organizations under the UN mandate have the legitimate right to intervene into the internal conflicts – so it is the only reasonable platform for the development of more efficient prospective international mechanism of ethnic conflicts resolution.

The mentioned above, highly praised R2P-approach was discredited in some cases (Lybia, Syria 2011) and implicates a risk of infringement upon national sovereignty. The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. These and other reasons let the question of military intervention under the R2P remain controversial.

In the light of all mentioned above there are several probable outcomes of internationalization of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict we can draw:

a) escalation of the conflict through direct military intervention of the Russian Federation (because of inefficiency of the international crisis management mechanisms, however with considerable losses for interventionist due to systemic reaction of other international actors;

b) the prolongation of the conflict as a result of the infiltrations, indirect intervention of external forces, and finance support for parties to the conflict;

c) reducing the intensity of the conflict as a result of consolidated international pressure (in the case of Russia will take more appeasable position);

d) the reconciliation of the parties to the conflict because of the involvement of a third party as a mediator (the neutrality and authority of the mediator should be ensured as well as peace proposals acceptable for all parties to the conflict);

e) inversion of the conflict, in other words, conflict will have only extrinsic ethnic feature, in all other aspect it will turn into another type of conflict;

f) the conflict will remain «frozen»^{14 15}.

It should be noted that above mentioned options for possible consequences of the internationalization of the conflict is not necessarily self-sufficient, and can transform gradually from one to other, randomly change each other or several of them may be realized at once. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict mainly seems to be the case of gradual transformation of one option to another.

¹⁴ Lake D., Rothchild D. Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 41-75.

¹⁵ *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* / Ed. by D. A. Lake, D. Rothchild. – Princeton, New York, 1998.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice.(1945). San Francisco. Retrieved May 29,2015, from <https://treaties.un.org>.
2. Coser L. (1998). *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Florence. KY: Routledge.
3. Gurr T. (1994). *Ethnic conflict in world politics*. Boulder.
4. Gurr T. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
5. Концепція зовнішньої політики Російської Федерації. (February12, 2010). Retrieved May 28, 2015, from <http://www.mid.ru>.
6. Lake D., Rothchild D.(1996). *Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict*. *International Security*. Vol. 21. No. 2, 41–75.
7. Lake D., Rothchild D. (Ed.). (1998). *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Princeton, New York.
8. Sencerman, Oncl. *Russian-Diaspora as a Means of Russian Foreign Policy*. // *Revista de Stiinte Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques* 49 (2016): 97–107.
9. «The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty» (PDF). ICISS. December 2001.
10. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации от 30 ноября 2016 г. [On-line]:https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/asset_publisher/CptICkV6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (accessed 14.11.2019).
11. Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, в редакции от 2015 г. [On-line]:http://stat.doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/more.htm?id=10339919@egNPA (accessed 14.11.2019).

Стаття надійшла до редколегії 30.08.2019

Прийнята до друку 10.09.2019

ЕТНО-НАЦІОНАЛЬНА ІНСТРУМЕНТАЛІЗАЦІЯ УКРАЇНСЬКО-РОСІЙСЬКОГО КОНФЛІКТУ В СВІТЛІ МОДИФІКАЦІЇ ТА ГІБРИДИЗАЦІЇ ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ, БЕЗПЕКОВОЇ ТА ВІЙСЬКОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ФЕДЕРАЦІЇ

Оксана Шамборовська, Ігор Іжнін, Костянтин Поліщук

*Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка,
вул. Університетська, 1, м. Львів, Україна, 79000, тел. (0322) 964-132,
e-mail: irds.dep.intrel@lnu.edu.ua*

Розглянуто основні характеристики актуального конфлікту на сході України з точки зору його етно-національного підґрунтя, що дозволяє зрозуміти його етнічні компоненти та контрверзі. Використано новітні підходи до пояснення сучасної системи міжнародних відносин та внутрішньої ситуації в Україні. Виявлено чинники, що впливають на процес етнічної інструменталізації та інтернаціоналізації конфлікту. Наведено короткий аналіз сучасних оновлень та модифікацій базових російських доктрин у зовнішній, безпековій та військовій політиці. Запропоновано можливі варіанти та сценарії інтернаціоналізації українсько-російського конфлікту.

Ключові слова: етнічний конфлікт; етнічна ідентичність; теорія «жадібність проти нарікання»; інструменталізація та інтернаціоналізація конфлікту; гібридизація зовнішньої політики; гуманітарна інтервенція; «відповідальність захищати».