

УДК 323.21:327.57:323.1:327.8  
DOI 10.30970/vir.2019.46.0.10135

## NEOREALISM AND THE EU–UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT: INSIGHTS AND SHORTCOMINGS

**Oksana Khomei**

*National Institute for Strategic Studies of Kyiv,  
7A, Pyrohova Str., Kyiv, Ukraine, 01030, tel. (044) 234-50-07,  
e-mail: oksana.khomei@gmail.com*

In this article, the role of the EU as a normative power in Ukrainian case is examined. The major goals of the Association Agreement and its significance for Ukraine's national security are identified. Russia's assessment of the EU's involvement in Ukraine is analyzed, while the costs and benefits for each side of the implementation of the Agreement are considered. Moreover, the shortcomings of neorealism in explaining the current geopolitical game between the EU and Russia – the main prize of which is Ukraine – are examined.

The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement is not simply a trade or an ordinary international bilateral agreement. It goes beyond the logic of 'low politics'; the full implementation of the Association Agreement will not only transform Ukraine as a country, but will also establish a new balance of power in the international arena.

Neorealism explains Russian military actions in Ukraine as driven by Moscow's striving for 'great power' status and control over the post-Soviet space. Russia sacrifices its 'low politics' benefits to 'high politics' aims. However, neorealism has significant shortcomings in explaining the importance of European values for Ukrainians, especially Ukrainians' readiness to defend them during the Orange Revolution and Revolution of Dignity; it also cannot explain the complex supranational structure of the European Union itself.

**Key words:** European integration; national security; Association Agreement; EU; Ukraine; neorealism; normative power; reforms.

### **Abbreviations**

AA: Association Agreement

EU: European Union

DCFTA: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

FTA: Free Trade Area

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IR: international relations

## Introduction

The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement is not simply an ordinary international trade agreement. It goes beyond the logic of «low politics».

27 June 2014 – the day on which all parts of the agreement were signed – represents a milestone in Ukrainian history. Nonetheless, there is still doubt about whether the Association Agreement is will ever be fully implemented [27]. It is necessary to stress that the full implementation of the Association Agreement will not only transform Ukraine as a country but will also establish a new balance of power in the international arena.

The aims of this article are to: examine the role of the EU as a normative power in the Ukrainian case; identify the main goals of Association Agreement and its significance for Ukraine’s national security; analyse Russia’s stance on EU’s involvement in Ukrainian transformation processes; review the costs and benefits of implementing the Agreement for each; and identify puzzles that neorealism cannot explain in this game.

### I. The Association Agreement and the EU as a normative power.

The notion of the EU as representing a normative power in international relations was developed by Ian Manners [22, p. 239], based on the definition originally introduced by Hedley Bull [22, p. 235–236].

First of all, the EU is built upon norms that became the legislative basis for its *acquis communautaire* [23, p. 10]. The founding principles that the EU strives to promote, are «respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights» [13, Art. 2, TEU]. As a normative power, the EU is able to change «norms» in international relations, however this does not exclude possible conflicts that can arise from the diffusion of European norms to other countries [23, p. 10].

Let us examine the dissemination of European norms in Ukraine through the Association Agreement. Negotiations on a treaty began in 2007. The EU proposed several unprecedented provisions concerning closer integration with Ukraine, although no membership perspective was included [1, p. 4]. After both sides signed the political chapters in March 2014 and the remaining ones (related to the creation of a DCFTA) in June 2014 [34] much more than economic benefits was then at stake.

The Association Agreement envisages closer political and economic integration between the EU and Ukraine. It drastically uplifts the status of Ukraine as a strategic partner in the EU’s external policy. Meanwhile, the DCFTA goes beyond traditional FTAs, and its future implementation requires the full adoption of the EU’s legislation in trade, phytosanitary standards, competition, and public procurement. The final goal of the DCFTA is full integration of Ukraine into the European single market [16].

Yet, perhaps the greatest significance of the Association Agreement is its impact on driving forward the reform agenda in many areas, from broader efforts to enact change the civilian security sector and the judiciary to specific issues like decentralization, anticorruption, and constitutional reform [17]. Moreover, in the realm of political dialogue it foresees not only Ukraine eventually becoming part of

the European political and security areas [10, p. 2135, Art. 4, AA], but also even includes the possibility of military cooperation that will improve Ukraine's national security [10, p. 2135, Art. 10, AA].

As a result of the signing of the treaty, institutions on the Ukrainian side have been established to implement reforms. Central state executive bodies, together with a number of other state agencies, have adopted guidelines on the implementation of the Association Agreement and on the harmonization of Ukrainian legislation with that of the EU; therefore, the country has already begun its ambitious reform agenda [5]. Accordingly, given these facts, we can state that the Association Agreement assures the continuing influence of the EU as a normative power in the case of Ukraine.

It is necessary to highlight that the Ukrainian government has declared that the Association Agreement is an instrument to achieve its final goal – membership in the EU [35]. Integration to the European Union was defined as one of the key goals in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine adopted in 2015 [6].

Thus, the Association Agreement went beyond «low politics» aims such as including Ukraine into the single market, but instead has produced considerable high politics effects, making the EU a rival to Russia over Ukraine [18, p. 2].

## **II. Russia-the EU: conflict of interests over the Association Agreement.**

Russia found itself perplexed when the Association Agreement, ready for signature, was put by the European Union on the table on the eve of the Vilnius Summit, held on November 29, 2013. Suddenly, a one week before the Summit, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich decided to put a stop to European integration, changing the country's foreign policy direction in favour of Russia [36].

Ukraine's outward pursuit of European integration began with his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko. The latter became president in 2004, after the Orange Revolution brought about a successful transition of power from the pro-Russian President Leonid Kuchma to a democratic coalition. After succeeding to the presidency in 2010, Yanukovich promised to continue pursuing the goal of European integration [4]. However, all in all the foreign policy of Ukraine under Yanukovich was a failed attempt to pursue neutrality while balancing Russia and the EU [4]. The precise nature of the offer made to President Yanukovich in exchange for his official rejection of European integration remains behind closed doors; however, pressure from Kremlin was likely immense on the eve of Vilnius, and finally Yanukovich conceded.

Ukrainians perceived Yanukovich's refusal to sign the AA as a betrayal of national interests. Thousands poured into Independence Square, or Maidan (later renamed Euromaidan) in Kyiv; more than one hundred people died, defending the rights of the Ukrainian nation to choose the future of their country, based on European values. What became known as the Revolution of Dignity brought a new pro-European elite to power, ready to sign the AA and transform the country in line with the agreement's provisions [35]. The reaction from Kremlin soon followed, however, with the annexation of Crimea and the occupying of industrial parts of eastern Ukraine adjoining Russia [11].

Preliminary, the AA was to come into force in November 2014. However, due to ongoing military tensions, its enforcement was delayed until December 2015. This move is regarded by some analysts as a victory to Russia [32].

Following from Waltz's theory, structure in international relations forces Russia to focus on security and power [30, p. 38]. Acting in an anarchic system with no sanctioning authority [30, p. 38; 24, p. 74], Russia tries to prevent the loss of its sphere of influence and, correspondingly, decrease of power in international relations. From a realist point of view, those reasons prompted Putin to «act immorally» [21, p. 55]. Similarly, in line with neorealist assumptions as underlined by Morgenthau, Putin acts and makes decisions «in terms of interest defined as power» [25, p. 5]. As neorealism puts it, the reason is simple – international politics is nothing more than a struggle for power [19, p. 10].

For the Kremlin, the Association Agreement was an act of intrusion by the EU into the former Soviet Union, which Russia regards as its own sphere of influence. Even after Baltic states joined the European Union, Russia has been trying to influence these countries. Moreover, Russia perceives the EU as its major rival on the European continent, despite the latter lacking sufficient military assets to be regarded as a high-politics actor. Nevertheless, structural realism acknowledges the so-called «latent» power of the EU, power composed of economic and social ingredients [24, p. 73]. More importantly, Russia acknowledges the EU as a main opponent not only in Ukraine, but also in Moldova, Georgia and other Caucasus states [8]. According to Russia's 2008 Foreign Policy Doctrine, cooperation with CIS countries was a high regional priority for Kremlin [3]. The 2013 revision of that document further specified that its goal is to include Ukraine as a strategic partner into Russian-led integration processes in the Post-Soviet space [2], namely the Eurasian Economic Union [2, c. 44], as an alternative to a DCFTA with the EU. Under Russian pressure, Armenian government have chosen the Eurasian Economic Union, when the Association Agreement with the EU was on the table. In consonance with the new Putin Doctrine of 2014, the EU's proposal of AA to Ukraine was evaluated by Russia's president as «crossing the line». The West lost its partner status [7; 7], and became a *de facto* rival.

Therefore, by annexing Crimea and occupying part of eastern Ukraine, Russia is attempting to regain its sphere of influence, and thus – its status of power in international relations [18, p. 23; 20, p. 1]. The famous Kremlin geopolitician Aleksander Dugin states that the status of a regional power is incompatible with Russia's views of itself [20, p. 114]. Russia clearly is on a quest for greater power [20, p. 13], however, what kind of power and with which limits seems unclear.

The collapse of the USSR deprived Russia of hegemony status, which is always cyclical and comes to an end, according to Gilpin's theory [30, p. 48]. Nevertheless, Putin's politics aims to reestablish the importance and prestige of Russia in the system of international relations. Russia wants to be treated as an equal partner, being aware of its weaknesses and strengths with regard to the EU [9].

However, as mentioned earlier, Russia's motivation to obtain «Great Power» status [14, p. 13] intersects with Brussels' ambitions to assert its normative power identity in the Ukrainian case.

Russia's actions could be justified according to offensive realist John Mearsheimer as a «good strategic sense», when states seek greater power, and even pursue hegemony. As structural realism preaches, power in itself is a guarantee of the state's survival [24, p. 73].

### **III. Game changer: implementation of the Association Agreement and its impact on Ukraine's security situation.**

Indeed, successful implementation of AA could become a «game changer for Ukraine» [27]. It will open up huge trade possibilities for both sides, improve Ukrainian business standards in line with those of Europe, and will also «Europeanize» Ukraine in terms of strengthening well-functioning democratic institutions, fostering national security and speeding up economic development [27].

Therefore, if it successfully implements the AA and harmonizes its legislation accordingly, Ukraine will not only gain enormous impetus for economic growth, but will be also transformed as a country, with renewed respect for the rule of law, more transparent democracy, and well-functioning public institutions [17]. This model of a new European Ukraine differs drastically from the Russian view of the country's further development and its further integration into Western structures. Therefore, it seems that the Russian grip over Ukraine and its battles to regain its lost influence will continue.

Implementation of AA equals winning over Russia both for Ukraine and the EU. Ultimately, EU wants stability at its borders, which can be achieved through building prospering economy and democratic regime in Ukraine [27]. Another important benefit of successful AA implementation will be the possibility for Ukraine to increase expenditures for military spending and have better chances to defend itself as a result of economic growth. Although the AA/DCFTA does not include a membership perspective, this can still be evaluated positively for three reasons: first, as Ukraine adopts the agreement's provisions and transforms its legislation like a decent partner, but also in the long run, as it becomes a trusted partner on equal footing with the EU; secondly, Ukraine will be able to conduct its own independent foreign policy and even become a regional player; and thirdly, if Ukrainian leadership will decide to join EU, it can apply under the Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty [13, Art. 49, TEU] and will have more chances to succeed in its goal, which is one of Kyiv's top priorities according to the latest National Security Strategy.

Simultaneously, implementation of AA will strengthen the position of the EU as normative power on international arena. Russia itself can potentially change its geopolitical doctrine, e.g. by focusing more on Central Asia.

So far, the West recognized European aspirations of Ukrainians, as shouted out to the world at Euromaidan. The EU has allocated significant financial assistance to support reforms, in addition to financial aid from the IMF and World Bank [33, p. 1–3]. Ukraine has to do its homework on approximating its legislation and developing reforms to implement the Association Agreement [29].

In spite of the EU's sanctions [15], Russia absorbs its economic losses (in «low politics») to win the game (in «high politics»). At the same time, the EU is disturbed

from within as member states call for the lifting sanctions due to economic losses of their own [31]. It remains in question if the EU will stay unified in its position and ready to sacrifice any costs in pursuit of «high politics» goals.

#### **IV. The shortcomings of neorealist theory in explaining actors' behaviour in the case of the Association Agreement.**

Neorealism does not explain the drive of Ukrainian people towards European integration (inspired by the successful examples of neighbours from the former socialist bloc), nor does it account for the willingness of people to change their country and defend European values even at the cost of their own lives, as proved during Revolution of Dignity.

Another weak point is the focus of neorealism solely on states, leaving out other actors such as NGOs, civil society, transnational corporations, etc. [30, p. 41]. In Ukraine, an active civil society sector played an important role in the nation's ultimate choice of a Western vector in foreign and domestic policies. Both the EU and US significantly supported the development of civil society in Ukraine since its independence [28, p. 15–18].

By contrast, neoliberalism introduces the concept of «soft power», as opposed to military means («hard power»), which explains the attractiveness and increasing role of the EU in international relations. As Nye puts it, «if a country represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead» [26, p. 5].

Also, the EU itself is an enigma for neorealists. It is an anomaly with a combination of anarchical and hierarchical elements in its structure [12, p. 410]. Yet somehow, this «hybrid system» [12, p. 410] plays «high politics». It is another puzzle for neorealism, according to which states cooperate only in the «low politics» domain [12, p. 402]. Taking this assumption, it is hard to analyse the evolution of the EU as an entity, given the emergence of the principle of supremacy of the EU's legislation over that of member states.

Finally, according to Waltz's «balance of power» theory [30, p. 42] the best solution to would be for the EU to return Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence to re-establish a balance of powers on the Eurasian continent, with the West thus ending at the eastern border of Poland. However, it does not take into account the aspirations of the Ukrainian nation, as demonstrated by the Orange Revolution and Revolution of Dignity. Ukrainians clearly showed that they are not just the inhabitants of a particular geographic territory, but first of all a nation, which itself deserves to choose its own future and to be a subject, not an object, in international relations.

#### **Conclusion**

The price for signing the Association Agreement – the high death toll during Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of military conflict in eastern Ukraine – proves its significance in the triangle of EU-Ukraine-Russia relations. The Association Agreement goes beyond economic integration («low politics»), which allows us to state that the EU acts as normative power in realms of «high politics», contesting Ukraine with Russia. The successful

implementation of the AA is beneficial for Ukraine (healthy economy, transparent democracy) and the EU (stability at borders, increasing role as normative power in international relations), while its rejection would trigger significant loss of power in IR by West in favour of other actors (Russia, BRICs, etc).

Neorealism as a theory justifies Russian military actions in Ukraine as striving for «great power» status and control over the post-Soviet space. Russia perceives the game seriously, sacrificing «low politics» benefits (trade with the West) to «high politics» aims. However, neorealism has shortcomings in explaining Ukrainians' defence of European values in both 2004 and 2013. It also cannot explain the EU itself as a system and does not take into account the desire of the Ukrainian nation for «Euro-integration».

To sum up, the reforms that are envisaged in the Association Agreement's commitments, once implemented, will result in strengthening and reviving Ukraine's economy, fostering the rule of law and improving the efficiency of Ukraine's public administration, as well as promoting the cooperation of state agencies with civil society. Such outcomes will have a spillover effect on reinforcing national security of Ukraine, while also reinforcing the EU as a normative power in the international arena.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Асоціація ЄС–Україна: що це дасть Вам? [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу : [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/virtual\\_library/association\\_115x170\\_uk.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/virtual_library/association_115x170_uk.pdf).
2. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным 12 февраля 2013 / МИД России. 18.02.2013 [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа : [http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F).
3. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации: сайт Президента России. 15.07.2008 [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа : <http://kremlin.ru/acts/785>.
4. Перші результати зовнішньої політики президента Януковича. Підсумки експертного опитування Інституту світової політики // Institute of World Policy. 16.06.2010 [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу : <http://iwp.org.ua/ukr/public/207.html>.
5. Постановва Кабінету Міністрів України «Про виконання Угоди про асоціацію між Україною, з однієї сторони, та Європейським Союзом, Європейським співтовариством з атомної енергії і їхніми державами-членами, з іншої сторони» № 1106 від 25 жовтня 2017 р. [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу : <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/npas/pro-vikonannya-ugodi-pro-asociaciyu-mizh-ukrayinoyu-z-odniyeiyi-storoni-ta-yevropejskim-soyuzom-yevropejskim-spivtovaristvom-z-atomnoyi-energiyi-i-yihnimi-derzhavami-chlenami-z-inshoyi-storoni>.
6. Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 6 травня 2015 року «Про Стратегію національної безпеки України»: Указ Президента України [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу : <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015>.
7. Рыжков В. Новая доктрина Путина // Россия в глобальной политике: проект журнала. 16.04.2014 [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа : <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Novaya-doktrina-Putina-16552>.
8. Тренин Д. Конец согласия: чего хочет Европа от России // Россия в глобальной политике: проект журнала. 23.12.2014 [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа : [http://www.globalaffairs.ru/ukraine\\_crisis/Konets-soglasiya-chego-khochet-Evropa-ot-Rossii-17229](http://www.globalaffairs.ru/ukraine_crisis/Konets-soglasiya-chego-khochet-Evropa-ot-Rossii-17229).
9. Тренин Д. Практичный подход к отношениям ЕС и России // Россия в глобальной политике: проект журнала. 28.01.2014 [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа : <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Praktichnyi-podkhod-k-otnosheniyam-ES-i-Rossii-16339>.

10. Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part // The Official Journal of the European Union. 29.05.2014. – P. 2135. [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0529\(01\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0529(01)&from=EN).

11. *Blair David*. Vladimir Putin's creeping annexation of eastern Ukraine is proceeding before our eyes. 29.08.2014 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/davidblair/100284506/vladimir-putins-creeping-annexation-of-eastern-ukraine-is-proceeding-before-our-eyes/> (consulted on 13.05.2019).

12. *Collard-Wexler Simon*. Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union // European Journal of International Relations / SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research. – 2006. – Vol. 12(3). – P. 397–432.

13. Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN>.

14. *Dragneva Rilka, Wolczuk Kataryna*. Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry? // Chatam House briefing paper / REP BP. 2012/01. – P. 1–16.

15. EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis // European Union Newsroom [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : [http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu\\_sanctions/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm).

16. EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. «What does the Agreement offer» [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : [http://eeas.europa.eu/images/top\\_stories/140912\\_eu-ua\\_aa\\_what\\_does\\_the\\_agreement\\_offer\\_v.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/140912_eu-ua_aa_what_does_the_agreement_offer_v.pdf).

17. EU-Ukraine: A European Agenda for Reform. Version: 4 July 2014 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : [http://ec.europa.eu/commission\\_2010-2014/fule/docs/ukraine/a\\_european\\_agenda\\_for\\_reform.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/ukraine/a_european_agenda_for_reform.pdf).

18. *Gehring Thomas*. Beyond Intergovernmental Coordination: EU Corporate Foreign Policy Action and the Crisis over Ukraine // Paper for the EUSA Fourteenth Biennial Conference, March 5–7, 2015. – Boston MA: Panel on Assessing EU External Actorness in Eastern Europe, 2015. – P. 1–28.

19. *Keohane Robert O*. Realism, neorealism, and the study of world politic // Neorealism and its critics / Robert O. Keohane (ed.). – New York : Columbia University Press, 1986. – P. 7–26.

20. *Leonard Mark, Popescu Nicu*. A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations // Policy Paper for the European Council on Foreign Relations. – 2007, November.

21. *Machiavelli Niccolò*. The things for which men, and especially rulers, are praised or blamed // The prince / Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (eds.). – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988. – P. 54–55.

22. *Manners Ian*. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? // Journal of Common Market Studies. – 2002. – Vol. 40. – No. 2. – P. 235–258.

23. *Manners Ian*. Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU // Panel 1D, European Community Studies Association: Biennial Conference. – 2001. – P. 1–30.

24. *Mearsheimer John J*. Structural Realism // International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity / Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.). – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2006. – P. 71–88.

25. *Morgenthau, Hans J*. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace // revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. – New York : Knopf, 1985 (ed.), (6th ed. Revised). – New York, 1985. – P. 688.

26. *Nye Joseph S*. Hard and soft power. Ch. 1. // Power in the global information age: from realism to globalization / Joseph S. Nye. – New York : Routledge, 2005. – P. 1–11.

27. *Pifer Steven*. Poroshenko Signs EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 27.06.2014 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/06/27-poroshenko-signs-eu-ukraine-association-agreement-pifer>.

28. *Raik Kristi*. EU assistance in transition // Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU's Policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood / Kristi Raik; CEPS Working Documents. – No. 237. – 2006, February. – P. 15–18.

29. Russia warns Ukraine and EU not to implement Association Agreement [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://www.borderlex.eu/russian-warns-ukraine-eu-implement-association-agreement/?print=print>.



30. *Schornig Niklas*. Neorealism // Theories of international relations / Siegfried Schieder, Manuela Spindler (eds.). – New York : Routledge, 2014. – P. 37–55.
31. Seven EU Countries Support Lifting Sanctions on Russia // TASS – russian news agency. 15.01.2015 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/01/15/2450>.
32. *Speck Ulrich*. Postponing the Trade Agreement With Ukraine: Bad Move, EU // Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 30.09.2014 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/30/postponing-trade-agreement-with-ukraine-bad-move-eu>.
33. Support Package for Ukraine [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : [http://europa.eu/newsroom/files/pdf/ukraine\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/newsroom/files/pdf/ukraine_en.pdf).
34. The EU's relations with Ukraine // European Union External Service [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : [http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index_en.htm) (consulted on 12.05.2019).
35. Ukraine–EU Relations // Mission of Ukraine to the European Union [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/relations>.
36. Ukraine suspends preparations for EU trade agreement, 21.11.2013 [Electronic resource]. – Access mode : <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25032275>.

*Стаття надійшла до редколегії 10.12.2018*

*Прийнята до друку 20.12.2018*

## **НЕОРЕАЛІЗМ ТА УГОДА ПРО АСОЦІАЦІЮ МІЖ УКРАЇНОЮ ТА ЄС: АНАЛІЗ МОЖЛИВОСТЕЙ ТА ОБМЕЖЕНЬ ТЕОРЕТИЧНОГО ПІДХОДУ**

**Оксана Хомей**

*Національний інститут стратегічних досліджень,  
вул. Пирогова, 7А, м. Київ, Україна, 01030, тел. (044) 234-50-07,  
e-mail: oksana.khomei@gmail.com*

Розкрито роль ЄС як нормативної сили. Ідентифіковано основні цілі Угоди про асоціацію між Україною і Європейським Союзом та її значення для національної безпеки України. Проаналізовано оцінку Росією впливу ЄС на ситуацію в Україні, розглянуті витрати й вигоди для кожної зі сторін виконання Угоди про асоціацію. Крім того, окреслено недоліки неореалізму в поясненні нинішньої геополітичної гри між ЄС і Росією, головною нагородою якої є Україна.

Угода про асоціацію між Україною та ЄС є не лише торговельною угодою чи звичайною міжнародною двосторонньою угодою. Сутність Угоди про асоціацію виходить за межі логіки «low politics» – «низької політики». Повна імплементація Угоди про асоціацію не лише змінить Україну як країну, а й встановить новий баланс сил на міжнародній арені. Неореалізм пояснює військові дії Росії в Україні прагненням до статусу «великої сили» і контролю над пострадянським простором. Росія жертвує своїми «низькими політичними» вигодами задля «високої політики». Однак неореалізм має суттєві недоліки в поясненні важливості «європейських цінностей» для українців, особливо готовності українців відстоювати так звані європейські цінності під час Помаранчевої революції та Революції гідності; неореалізм також не може пояснити складної наднаціональної структури самого Європейського Союзу.

**Ключові слова:** європейська інтеграція; національна безпека; Угода про асоціацію; Європейський Союз; Україна; неореалізм; нормативна сила; реформи.