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THE DOMESTIC POLICY OF INTERWAR POLAND IN THE OPINIONS OF UKRAINIAN CONSERVATIVES

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Conservatism occupied a great place in the ideology of the Ukrainian Catholic parties and organizations. This especially concerns those ideas that were expressed in the works of Vyacheslav Lypynsky. The emergence of such groups and their inclusion in the political process is a particular feature of this period of the history of Ukraine. The peculiarity of this phenomenon is that the national revival contributed to the spread of national ideas in almost all parts of Galician society. Simultaneously, unfavorable external circumstances forced not only politicians, but also religious figures, as well as the representatives of the rural and industrial elite to be involved in political activity, trying, or at least declaring their efforts to promote the cultural and economic development of the nation. This was the main factor determining the objectives and goals of each organization. Although Ukrainian conservatives generally accepted Polish state as the suzerain of Western Ukrainian lands, they strongly opposed its policy in the field of internal affairs and ethnic relationship.

Key words: conservatism, conservatives, Western Ukrainian Lands, Poland, domestic policy, Catholic.

The attitude of Ukrainian conservatives to Polish domestic policy was different from that of other political formations for the reason that Catholic parties, in which they were all united, pursued other goal: to spread Christian ethics and morals to all spheres of public and political life of Galician Ukrainians, as well as to promote Catholicism. That is why the strategic goal of the activities of Catholic organizations, as well as their close connection with the church, did not allow them to conduct such a rigid political struggle that was performed by other parties. This affected the opinions of conservatives due to the fact that despite the presence of certain criticisms of Polish politics in their speeches, they could not openly oppose the Polish authorities and could not be separated from the Polish state, as they would thereby show their intolerance. In addition, the failure to recognize the Second Republic, the Catholic state, could not have contributed to the spread of Catholicism and ecumenical ideas; therefore, the main allegiance of Catholic organizations towards Poland is their partial loyalty to her. At the same time, their members as well as some organizations clearly opposed the internal policy of Polish authorities in Western Ukrainian lands.

On August 4, 1925, Ukrainian Christian Organization was founded. Its leaders (O. Nazaruk, S. Tomashivsky, T. Galushchynsky) declared its apolitical status and loyalty to the Polish state, as it was stressed in the statement made by T. Halushchynsky at the founding conference of the UCO¹. The founders recognized that the newly

¹ Центральний державний історичний архів України у м. Львові (далі – ЦДІА України у м. Львові), ф. 359 (Назарук Осип Тадейович (1883–1940), адвокат, письменник, громадський і політичний діяч), оп. 1, спр. 397, арк. 6.

created organization "leaves its members full freedom to belong to Ukrainian political parties if they do not contradict the Christian outlook or do not stand in conflict with the interests and honor of the Ukrainian people". The leaders also stated that UCO "cannot be again ancillary to political life". According to those who established the organization, "over time, the UCO could become a separate political group". As can be seen from such allegations, the founders of UCO definitely intended to involve the group into the political life of Western Ukraine. To do this, they chose a number of ways: joining other parties and organizations, participating in elections without a separate list though, evaluating political events, fighting against ideological adversaries. All this was outlined in the tasks of the UCO, which included fostering the Ukrainian membership of the Catholic movement, the struggle against atheism and communism, and propaganda of loyalty to the state in order to achieve the autonomy of Western Ukrainian lands. Thus, the ideology of UCO absorbed both, the ideas of Christian conservatism and political cooperation with Polish state.

UCO did not agree with the tactics of many Ukrainian parties due to the fact that total majority of Ukrainian political organizations opposed the Polish state, which, according to UCO, did not contribute to their organizational work and deprived them of time and energy in labor for the benefit of the organization of national life⁷. According to its ideology, the UCO opposed the activities of both, nationalist and socialist parties⁸. It was UCO's attitude toward Polish domestic policy that caused protests from other Ukrainian parties, including Ukrainian National democratic Union, which stated, as Mr Tomashivsky said, that loyalty to the Polish state and propaganda of conservative ideas contradicted the interests of Ukrainians forced to live under the rule of Poland⁹. However, after a year of its activity UCO had to change its loyalty. As in the case of other Ukrainian political organizations, its position on relations with the Polish authorities was significantly influenced by their controversial domestic policy, which was carried out on Ukrainian lands.

From the very beginning of UCO's activity, in spite of its loyalty the organization started criticizing internal policy of Polish authorities as well as the actions of many Polish political parties, which supported it. In the characterization of the Polish authorities and its political environment, the UCO expressed some criticism: "From the well known actions of the Polish parties Ukrainian population of the Polish state is suffers very badly. On our own skin we feel what it means to be under the rule of parties guided by injustice, hatred, intolerance and hostility to all who are not from

² ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 359, оп. 1, спр. 397, арк. 2.

^{3 &}quot;Українська Христіянська Організація," Нова зоря, 29 серпня 1926.

⁴ ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 359, оп. 1, спр. 397, арк. 20.

⁵ Там само, арк. 21

^{6 &}quot;I.XI.1918," *Нова зоря*, 31 жовтня 1926.

⁷ ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 359, оп. 1, спр. 397, арк. 21–22.

⁸ Там само, арк. 22.

⁹ С. Томашівський – історик, політик, публіцист (Львів: Б.в. і р.в.), 31.

their party, and even more so, who are not from their national camp"¹⁰. At the same time, the UCO warned: "A nation that wants to build and retain its state must remember God as without faith and, without Christian virtues, it will not be realized. No state can stand, if it is built on hatred and hostility. It must sooner or later fail"¹¹. This warning indicates that UCO, like other political factors, believed that the chauvinistic policy of the Polish state concerning national minorities was a product of not only political factors or power structures, but also of the consciousness of the entire nation, although based on its loyalty to the Second republic of Poland, UCO expressed this idea a little veiled.

Realizing that, calling for the struggle for autonomy and advocating recognition of Polish power and loyalty to it, UCO could not approve the actions of the Polish state in Western Ukrainian lands. According to the interests of the party, as well as its ideology, the leaders of the organization shared their attitude towards Polish domestic policy like that: on one hand, they agitated to submit to the Polish authorities; on the other hand, they criticized its policy as chauvinistic¹². Simultaneously, they called for the struggle against new authorities as against "violence and injustice"¹³. Moreover, already in December 1927, an article by Ivan Hladylovych appeared in the "Nova Zoria" ("New Star"), in which he unequivocally stated that UCM contributed to the construction of the Ukrainian state by its activities, thereby de facto departing from the standpoint of autonomy and loyalty to the Polish authorities¹⁴. Strengthening contradictions in the Ukrainian-Polish relations and the aggravation of disputes between the government and the Sejm Opposition in the years 1929–1930 required the activation of the activities of Ukrainian political parties and organizations. This process affected UCO, too, despite the declaration of apoliticality.

The contradictions in the activities of the UCO, the discrepancy in the statements of its members and the ideology of the organization led to the failure of the UCO to act as an influential factor, therefore, in 1929, the UCO leaders resorted to a deeper analysis of the political situation in the Western Ukrainian lands. In particular, S. Tomashivsky in his writings tried to substantiate the autonomous concept of UCO: "Our people must be brought up to statehood through practice within the framework of foreign powers, and this practice can only be acquired under autonomy" Concerning the creation of the Catholic party as a political factor, S. Tomashivsky believed that this would become possible only when "Catholic ideology" would gain wide support among Ukrainian citizens However, the above-mentioned events have accelerated the founding of such a party.

¹⁰ ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 359, оп. 1, спр. 397, арк. 20.

¹¹ "Нездорові відносини," *Нова зоря*, 23 травня 1926.

¹² "Наше шкільництво," *Нова зоря*, 27 червня 1926.

¹³ "Спаситель світа," *Нова зоря*, 7 січня 1927.

¹⁴ Іван Гладилович, "В боротьбі з хаосом," *Нова зоря*, 31 грудня 1927.

¹⁵ С. Томашівський – історик, політик, публіцист, 9.

¹⁶ Степан Томашівський, *Про ідеї, героїв і політику. Відкритий лист до В. Липинського* (Львів: Діло, 1929), 85.

In October 1930, a group of the UCO representatives declared the creation of the Ukrainian Catholic People's Party. Since the UCPP was founded during the "pacification", then there arose the question about its attitude to such a policy of the Polish authorities. It was included in the program statement of the UCPP. Besides characteristics of Polish politics in Western Ukraine, the authors of the statement stressed on an assessment of the political and social upheavals that Ukrainians have experienced under Polish state. They wrote that "12-year experience has shown clearly that the lands that are subject to Warsaw live through the declining of all fields of public life. Lands, which were are terribly destroyed by war, are still not restored. The rivers are not regulated, roads are ruined, people cannot overcome severe economic and financial crisis. Public safety is threatened, destructive social competition increasingly comes in masses, national strife escalates to the extreme and threatening cataclysm, schooling loses its purpose and fails together with whole national economic and civic culture. Even minimal and, in fact, not sufficient self-governing that Poland internationally have committed to create in our country has not yet been made, and what is more, even the rights and institutions that our country has had since the days before the war, are either limited, or completely abolished"¹⁷.

While keeping to the autonomous positions, the UCPP accused Polish authorities in violation of the rights of Ukrainian people. Unlike other parties that considered their policy as a result of occupation, the UCPP called the centralism of the Polish state to be the main cause of these problems.

Thus, the centralism of the II Polish Republic and the groups that defended this centralism were declared the object of the struggle of the UCPP. On the other hand, the UCPP was intended to proclaim the autonomy of Western Ukrainian lands through a legal political struggle in the legal field of the Polish state. According to the UCPP, autonomous status could stop the confrontational policy of the Polish authorities and promote the development of national life¹⁸.

Such statements provoked a negative reaction from other Ukrainian parties, especially the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which tried to fight the autonomous manifestations in all directions. In this regard, O. Nazaruk declared nationalists to be enemies of Catholicism¹⁹. Not only Konovalets and Paliyiv were criticized by O. Nazaruk, but national democrats, who disagreed with the loyalty of the UCPP to the Polish state²⁰. The attitude of the UCPP to Polish policy was largely determined by the relations between the party and the church.

Khomyshyn, Bishop of Stanislav had a great influence on the ideology of the UCPP, calling for greater attention to be paid to the spiritual purity of the nation and

¹⁷ ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 392 (Українська парламентська репрезентація в польському сеймі, м. Львів), оп. 1, спр. 27, арк. 1.

¹⁸ ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 392, оп. 1, спр. 87, арк. 1.

¹⁹ Осип Назарук, Греко-Католицька Церква і українська ліберальна інтелігенція. Загальний огляд української кирині на церковній области в краю і на еміграції (Львів: Б.м.в., 1929), 137.

²⁰ ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 359, оп. 1, спр. 118, арк. 17.

the propaganda of Catholicism, rather than to fight against political opponents²¹. These ideas were expressed in the pastoral letter of Bishop Khomyshyn published in March 1931. The main idea of this letter was the following statement: "We had executed our own state and our power, but now we are in alien state and under alien power, so we must understand that this will allow us to accept God, and that this, though alien, authority, must be recognized"22. The letter aroused a protest by the OUN, UNDO, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and other Ukrainian groups. However, the UCPP expressed its favor in fully agreeing with such an ideas. Both the UCPP and Bishop Khomyshyn actively criticized the opposition of the Ukrainian parties to the Polish authorities: "Our negative position against the Polish state, although alien to us, does not meet the requirements of either simple natural reason, or of faith and ethics, and we are deprived of imminent suffering and harm"23. The UCPP also supported the advice of Bishop Khomyshyn concerning the strategy of Ukrainian parties in their policy regarding Polish power: "Therefore, a deliberate and legitimate policy requires also to indicate full loyalty to the state in which we are now. The practical reason tells us that, standing on the basis of complete loyalty, we have the same right to seek from the state all proper and final rights of our true cultural development, and to urge the state to fulfill its duty to look after us. The state is oppressed; we have forever and everywhere to indicate our loyalty.

I will move even further, and then to the surprise of the Poles themselves, and even more indignation of the Ukrainians say that our loyalty has to strive for the Polish state to be strong and secured, but at the same time – fair. When a state is strong and well-willed, and yet it is fair, then every nation feels well in it^{2,24}. As UCPP was under the ideological influence of Bishop Khomyshyn, the ideas expressed in his pastoral letter and endorsed by the leaders of the UCPP can be regarded as the basic points of the party's attitude to Poland.

As can be seen from the letter, Bishop Khomyshyn himself foresaw opposition to his position from the side of Ukrainian parties, understanding the irrelevance and prematureness of his statements. Moreover, he realized that even the Polish side did not expect the Ukrainians to offer ultra-loyalty, indicating that the attitude of both the bishop and the secret police was shaped not by the influence of the political situation, or the influence of Ukrainian-Polish relations and the policy of Polish authorities, but rather by the principles of Christian ethics and ecumenism.

The reaction of Ukrainian political groups to the pastoral letter was dictated by their negative attitude to Polish internal policy. Regarding the pastoral letter, the newspaper "Svoboda" ("Liberty") called on the bishop not to use the authority of the

²¹ ЦДІА України у м. Львові, ф. 359, оп. 1, спр. 448, арк. 14.

²² "Пастирський лист про політичне положення українського народу," *Нова зоря*, 23 березня 1931

²³ Там само.

²⁴ Там само.

church in order to promote the agreement²⁵. Speeches against the UCPP were caused by Polish politician Roman Dmowski, who compared the solution of the Ukrainian issue to the burning of their own house and called for the removal of this problem from the foreign policy of the Polish state²⁶.

According to Wiek Nowy (New Age), the newspaper, the Polish community supported the ideas of Bishop Khomyshyn²⁷. According to the documents of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the Polish authorities considered it necessary to support the UCPP in spreading the ideas of the Bishop of Stanislaviv²⁸. Later UCPP was renamed in Ukrainian People's Renovation.

On March 15, 1931, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, published a message to the believers where he called on the laity to establish another Catholic party – the Ukrainian Catholic Union²⁹. Understanding the political situation in Western Ukraine in October 1930, and being aware of the irrelevance of the ideological postulates of the UCPP, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky ensured respect for the future party both from the side of the public and from the side of the intelligentsia and political factors. UCU became the last founded Ukrainian conservative party.

Ukrainian Catholic Union was created at the meeting of the initiative committee on October 26, 1930 in Lviv. The meeting was attended by Bishop I. Buchko, Bishop N. Budko, Father Abbot Klimentiy Sheptytsky, Father Kovalsky, Eustachia Tyshynska, V. Dashkevych, B. Kuzmovych, M. Chubaty, and M. Voloshyn³0. In addition, in the first issue of the "Meta" ("Purpose") newspaper it was said that in political affairs of the UCU "will stand for the right of the Ukrainian nation to comprehensively organize their own forms of life"³¹. That meant that Polish internal policy would be seen through this statement.

UCU speeches in defense of the Orthodox churches in Volhynia and Kholmshchyna, protests against the closure of educational union called Prosvita (Education) in Volhynia, against the polonization of schools, and the executions of members of the OUN were seen as a protest against the Polish internal policies, in connection with which the government accused the UCU of developing a political struggle. This made Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky publish a response to such an accusation, in which he writes: "UCU does not have and cannot have its political party programs and goals and its purpose and program is to combine everything in one work for the good of the Ukrainian people in the Christian-Catholic understanding" This showed that there were exact reasons for the UCU to criticize the domestic policy of Polish Republic.

²⁵ "Пастирський лист," Свобода, 25 квітня 1932.

²⁶ "Галицька Соціялістична Радянська Республіка," Нова зоря, 7 червня 1931.

²⁷ "Pasterska lista Biskupa Greko-Katolickiego," Wiek Nowy, 24 stycznia 1933.

²⁸ Presydium Rady Ministrów, Archiwum Akt Nowych, sygn. 148/264, str. 154.

²⁹ "Митрополит Кир Андрей до українського народу," *Мета*, 15 березня 1931.

³⁰ "Наша мета," *Мета*, 15 березня 1931.

³¹ Там само

³² Андрей Шептицький, "Український Католицький Союз," *Мета*, 10 квітня 1931.

The UCU's attitude to Polish internal Policy was shaped by the diffusion of the national idea, the ideology of Catholicism and ecumenism, as well as Christian morality and ethics, and if the latter forced the Union to express some loyalty to the Polish state, then the first pushed for protests. As a result, the UCU's attitude to the Polish political actions in Western Ukraine was a synthesis of loyalty and negative attitudes and also contributed to the negative attitude of the Polish authorities towards the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in general and the UCU in particular.

Thus, the attitude of conservative organizations to Polish internal policy developed under the influence of different factors than the attitude of other Ukrainian parties. Their partly declarative apoliticality played a significant role in it. The common feature of all Ukrainian conservatives was the loyalty of their organizations towards Polish authorities, dictated by Christian ethics, the interests of Catholicism, and ecumenism. However, some conservative politicians as well as some organizations like UCU did express exact protest against many actions of Polish government and declared their dedication to the creation of Ukrainian state.

ВНУТРІШНЯ ПОЛІТИКА МІЖВОЄННОЇ ПОЛЬЩІ З ТОЧКИ ЗОРУ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ КОНСЕРВАТОРІВ

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Ставлення українських консерваторів, які об'єдналися в католицьких партіях та організаціях, до внутрішньої політики міжвоєнної Польщі різнилося від ставлення інших політичних формацій тим, вони у своїй діяльності переслідували іншу мету: поширювати християнську етику і мораль на всі сфери громадського і політичного життя галицьких українців, а також пропагувати католицизм і сприяти його поширенню. Велике місце в ідеології католицьких партій та організацій займали консервативні ідеї, особливо ті, які були виражені в працях В'ячеслава Липинського. Взагалі, виникнення подібних груп і включення їх у політичний процес — це особливість саме цього періоду історії України. Специфіка даного явища полягає у тому, що національне відродження сприяло поширенню національних ідей майже у всі ділянки тогочасного галицького суспільства, а несприятливі зовнішні обставини змушували не тільки політиків, але і релігійних діячів, представників сільської і промислової еліти включатися в політичну діяльність, намагаючись, чи принаймні декларуючи, свої намагання сприяти культурному і економічному розвиткові нації. Саме це і було основним фактором визначення завдань і мети для кожної організації.

Стратегічна ціль діяльності консервативних організацій, а також їх тісний зв'язок із церквою не давали можливості їм вести таку жорстку політичну боротьбу, яку вели інші партії. Це впливало і на ставлення католицьких організацій до діяльності польського уряду: незважаючи на присутність певної критики польської внутрішньої політики у їхніх виступах, вони не змогли відкрито виступити проти польської влади і не могли відмежуватися від польської держави, оскільки тим самим вони виявляли б свою нетолерантність. Крім того, невизнання Другої Речі Посполитої – католицької держави – могло зашкодити поширенню католицизму і екуменічним ідеям, тому

основною ознакою ставлення католицьких організацій до Польщі є їхня лояльність до неї. Попри те, багато представників консервативних кіл, а також деякі організації жорстко критикували як внутрішню політику Польщі.

У випадку із Українською християнською організацією і Українською народною обновою деяку роль відіграла їхня частково декларативна аполітичність. Спільною рисою як усіх католицьких організацій була їхня лояльність до влади, хоча Український католицький союз меншою мірою виражав цю лояльність через те, що він був створений у часі загострення конфліктності в українсько-польських стосунках, а також через глибше розуміння національного інтересу, у зв'язку із чим УКС намагався лавірувати між лояльністю і негативним ставленням до дій урядів Польщі. Значну роль у ставленні цих організацій до внутрішньої політики відіграли консервативні ідеї, які знайшли багато прихильників серед членів католицьких партій. Саме їхня лояльність до Польщі викликбла критику з боку інших українських чинників, ослаблюючи ідейні позиції як одних, так і других. Ця відчуженість менше відчувалася у стосунках українських партій і УКС, через протекцію митрополита і авторитетне представництво, а також через те, що УКС заявляв про свої самостійницькі позиції.

Ключові слова: консервативний, консерватори, західноукраїнські землі, Польща, внутрішня політика, католицький.

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